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 What is our responsibility towards others, both locally and globally, particularly as it 
relates to human rights? In a world connected by ever-advancing communications technology 
and social media, the question of responsibility takes on a greater significance when individuals 
have the capacity to be better informed than at any previous time in history. The digital age 
connects people from around the globe, fostering greater awareness about global issues and 
creating personal connections, which builds understanding and empathy. Traditionally, domestic 
responsibility has centered on civic engagement, such as being active politically and in the 
community. International responsibility has largely remained the purview of states through 
international law and policies such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine. However, the 
digital age has added new dimensions to the concept of individual responsibility, both by 
connecting people globally and creating a greater capacity for engagement. New technology 
allows for a greater dissemination of information and provides new avenues for engagement both 
nationally and internationally. Digital natives, those born into a world in which access to the 
internet is a normal part of life, present an ideal population to better understand how digital 
connections contribute to feelings of responsibility and how that responsibility is manifested. 
Through a survey of 826 digital natives in the United States, this dissertation seeks to understand 
how they use social media, consume news and relevant information, and conceptualize and act 
upon their responsibilities. The digital age provides a new capacity for the advancement of 
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“Where is your brother?” Who is responsible for this blood? In Spanish literature we have a 
comedy of Lope de Vega which tells how the people of the town of Fuente Ovejuna kill their 
governor because he is a tyrant. They do it in such a way that no one knows who the actual killer 
is. So when the royal judge asks: “Who killed the governor?”, they all reply: “Fuente Ovejuna, 
sir.” Everybody and nobody! Today too, the question has to be asked: Who is responsible for the 
blood of these brothers and sisters of ours? Nobody! That is our answer: It isn’t me; I don’t have 
anything to do with it; it must be someone else, but certainly not me. Yet God is asking each of 
us: “Where is the blood of your brother which cries out to me?” Today no one in our world feels 
responsible; we have lost a sense of responsibility for our brothers and sisters. We have fallen 
into the hypocrisy of the priest and the levite whom Jesus described in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan: we see our brother half dead on the side of the road, and perhaps we say to 
ourselves: “poor soul…!”, and then go on our way. It’s not our responsibility, and with that we 
feel reassured, assuaged. The culture of comfort, which makes is think only of ourselves, make us 
insensitive to the cries of other people, makes us live in soap bubbles which, however lovely, are 
insubstantial; they offer a fleeting and empty illusion which results in indifference to others; 
indeed, it even leads to the globalization of indifference. In this globalized world, we have fallen 
into globalized indifference. We have become used to the suffering of others: it doesn’t affect me; 
it doesn’t concern me; it’s none of my business!1 
 
In this globalized world, what are the responsibilities of individuals towards their 
neighbors both at home and abroad? From political engagement in a democratic society to 
human rights atrocities, each person has a responsibility for acting within their capacity to ensure 
others can live a life with dignity. Digital natives, those born into a world in which the internet 
has been the norm rather than the exception, are on the forefront of this debate as they are 
connected to the world unlike any previous generation. The digital world creates a capacity to be 
both informed and engaged on issues that impact their communities and others around the world. 
Social media connects users, forming digital communities that can spread information, create 
friendships, foster discussion, and so much more. This unique confluence of information and 
 
1 Homily of Holy Father Francis: July 8, 2013, Lampedusa, Italy. 
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interaction with others creates the perfect universe in which individuals can embrace a 
responsibility to act in a way that benefits others. This dissertation examines digital natives in the 
United States in an effort to understand how they conceive of and act upon their responsibilities 
both within their local communities and the world at large.  
This chapter began with words spoken by Pope Francis during a mass on the Italian 
island of Lampedusa in 2013, which reflects one of the crises of the modern world. As one of the 
first places reached by refugees and migrants coming from Northern Africa and the Middle East, 
Lampedusa lies at the center of the debate on who bears responsibility for those whose human 
rights are not being protected. Less than three months after this homily was delivered, a ship 
carrying migrants and refugees from Eritrea caught fire just off the coast of Lampedusa, killing 
366 people (Nelson, 2014). Sadly, this is not a unique tragedy. Since 2014, over 18,000 people 
have lost their lives while crossing the Mediterranean in search of a better life (Siegfried, 2019). 
After the failure of the international community to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 that 
claimed the lives of nearly one million people, the United Nations tasked the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) with formulating a policy to address 
what happens when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens. Their report, the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), created a doctrine that would provide the international 
community the justification to intervene is such cases. However, R2P remains only at the state 
level and gives no agency to individuals. Globalization and digital technology may have brought 
people closer together than at any previous point of history, yet there remains a fundamental 
question: What is an individual’s responsibility toward their community and at the local and 
global level? This question addresses both civic responsibility and human rights protections. It 
asks, how do individuals perceive and act on their responsibilities for the welfare of others, and 
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how do they conceive of these others? With a world made smaller by globalization, what does it 
mean to be a neighbor? Has the reference point for compassion and caring changed as a result of 
the global digital age? All of these questions center around one fundamental query: am I my 
brother’s keeper?  
Communication has always played a pivotal role in the protection of human rights. In 1943, 
Salek Kuenstler, a Polish Jew, wrote a letter to Sophia Zendler, a Catholic, begging her to look 
after his daughter Anita. She agreed, and Anita survived the Holocaust (Kuenstler, 1943). In 
1994, during the Rwandan genocide, Tutsis took refuge at the Hotel des Mille Collines in Kigali. 
When the hotel came under siege, those in hiding sent faxes and made phone calls pleading for 
help. Not a single life was lost at the hotel (Vasagar, 2005). As the conflict in Syria continues to 
rage on, Bana al-Abed, a 7-year-old girl living in Aleppo, has taken to Twitter to document her 
experiences and plead for help. Many of her tweets have gone viral and reached millions around 
the world. Thanks, in part, to her notoriety she and her family were able to escape to Turkey 
(Specia, 2017).  
 As communication technology has advanced, so too have the ways in which it can be used 
for the protection and promotion of human rights. The response to the May 25, 2020 murder of 
George Floyd, an unarmed black man, by Minneapolis police shows the power of civic 
responsibility, civic engagement, social media, and global solidarity. Two surveillance videos 
captured parts of the encounter, but the most damning was taken by a bystander, 17-year-old 
Darnella Frazier, who captured the eight minutes and 46 seconds which would be the last of 
Floyd’s life (McLaughlin, 2020; Nevett, 2020). While completely restrained and on the ground, 
three officers held him down, one with his knee on Mr. Floyd’s neck, for the duration of the 
video clip. The video went viral and people around the world heard Floyd’s pleas for help as he 
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called out for his mother and watched, for eight minutes and 46 seconds, as the people who are 
meant to protect him would be the cause of his death. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, 
which began in 2012 to call attention to unequal protection before the law suffered by Black 
people, quickly mobilized protests. This event caused a wave of protest demonstrations across 
the United States and even in other countries. Protests were held on every continent save 
Antarctica, and even drew condemnations from the European Union and African Union (Haddad, 
2020). Murals sprang up in places like Kenya and Syria, and on the Bundesliga pitch, Marcus 
Thuram took a knee and Jadon Sancho wore a “Justice for George Floyd” shirt (Harris, 2020; 
Jeffrey & Miller, 2020). As the protests continue, changes are starting to happen at the state and 
local level. 
In each of these events, individuals embraced their responsibility to take action during a 
situation in which the government failed to do so. The available means of communication were 
used to alert others to the situation and call upon them to intercede. As communication 
technology has evolved and society has entered the digital age, the ability to spread awareness 
about human rights atrocities has become instantaneous. The global community is now aware of 
atrocities being committed as they happen. In many cases, individuals now have as much access 
to firsthand accounts of human rights abuses as governments or any other entities. This has 
created an opportunity for individuals to take a larger role in the international human rights 
regime, which was once solely the prevue of states. 
As the world becomes more and more connected, where information is transmitted in real 
time and communication technology renders distance virtually meaningless, how is it possible 
that the response to human rights atrocities is often so lacking? Digital natives, those born into a 
time in which access to the internet has been the norm rather than the exception, are in a position 
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to reshape global politics. Social media connects people, both locally and globally, in ways that 
could never before have been imagined. Traditional notions of national sovereignty are 
challenged by the increasingly frequent movements of people, goods, services, money, 
information, and, perhaps most importantly, ideas across borders. Yet with all these evolutions, 
the world is also witnessing a growing trend of populist nationalism, an ideology that is largely 
antithetical to the values of human rights. This confluence of seemingly disparate philosophies 
calls for an examination of what it means to be a citizen in the digital age. These circumstances 
bring up questions of how individuals are interacting with their local communities and the global 
community. Increased access through social media allows for individuals to have contact with 
people from around the world, but how will that impact their feelings of responsibility? There are 
now more news sources and ways for individuals to both consume, produce, and react to media, 
which leads to questions about what types of media digital natives consume, how they consume 
it, and the levels of trust they place in various media outlets. There are also more ways for 
individuals to be engaged in their community and politics, but how do digital natives act upon 
those opportunities? In examining the views of digital natives in the United States, what 
responsibilities do individuals bear both within their local communities and the world at large? 
As digital natives come of age, their attitudes towards democratic institutions, community, 
information, and human rights become increasingly important to consider. To that end, this 
dissertation seeks to examine two specific areas of individual responsibility: first, within the 
local and national communities that have driven civic life for centuries; and second, the 
burgeoning cosmopolitan responsibility for global human rights.  
 
 





 When Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba released The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes 
and Democracy in Five Nations in 1963, it informed a new discussion of what it means to be an 
engaged citizen in a democracy. Their classification of different types of citizens (participant, 
parochial, and subject) remains a crucial way of understanding individuals in their relationship 
with the political community. With more than fifty years passing since the original publication of 
The Civic Culture, and massive societal developments brought on by the digital age, a 
reexamination of what it means to be a citizen is warranted. Additionally, digital natives deserve 
special attention because the trends they set will influence the behavior of future generations. 
This dissertation will examine the concept of the civic culture of the digital native 
Digital technology has fundamentally changed the way people relate to each other. 
Access to information, the ability to communicate in real time, and forums for discussion and 
dissemination of ideas are just some of the key tools offered by digital technology. The capacity 
for civic engagement in domestic political affairs has been expanded through the use of digital 
technology. Campaigning, mobilizing, communication between elected officials and those they 
represent, and other forms of political engagement have all expanded online. The internet has 
also been used in a variety of ways by populist nationalists the world over. In the United States, 
Donald Trump used the internet, and particularly social media outlets such as Twitter, to propel 
his candidacy for president in 2016. Opting for a social media campaign rather than traditional 
media, his campaign utilized online platforms to set him apart from his competitors. In the 
United Kingdom, the successful campaign to leave the European Union (Brexit) was largely 
driven by media manipulation by Cambridge Analytica, a company that illegally acquired 
Facebook data and used targeted ads and online posts to manipulate public debate (Wylie, 2019). 
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Both the U.S. and UK examples also faced outside interference from Russia. The power of the 
internet has also been seen as a threat to political regimes seeking to suppress social movements. 
In 2019, there were complete internet shutdowns or social media blocking in 21 countries 
(Woodhams & Simon, 2020). The use, and/or abuse, of the internet by those in power shows the 
tremendous impact of technology on governance and society. 
Global Responsibility 
 
 Along with domestic civic responsibility, digital natives are caught between the 
competing ideologies of populist nationalism and cosmopolitan responsibility. Populist 
nationalism has been on the rise, embraced by political movements such as Brexit, political 
parties like Alternative for Germany, and leaders such as Marie Le Pen (France), Jair Bolsonaro 
(Brazil), Rodrigo Duterte (Philippines), Boris Johnson (England), and Donald Trump (United 
States). They claim a mandate from a silent majority ignored by a political elite. They are 
dismissive of traditional neoliberal political institutions and promise security from an “outside 
threat.” Populist nationalists lambast globalization and an increasingly pluralist society, instead 
offering a return to an imagined wholesome past. Human rights are seen as unimportant or at 
least less important than domestic sovereignty and security. 
 Much of this comes as a response to the growing connectivity brought about the digital 
age and globalization. Countries can no longer isolate themselves from the world around them. 
Evans and Newnham (1998) explain the power of change: “Nationalism is often encouraged and 
enhanced by contact with foreigners. This contact may take place at the personal level or it may 
be mediated via media and other channels. It is clearly possible to manipulate these sentiments to 
create a climate of public opinion favourable [sic] to a political leadership faction or party. Once 
mobalized [sic] these attitudes are often difficult to control, and a particular leader or leadership 
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may become permanently invested with a kind of aura as a result. The term ‘charismatic’ is often 
used to identify this fusion of a people’s aspirations in one individual” (pp. 347–348). This fear 
of change from without also can be accompanied by a fear of change from within driven by a 
belief that powerful elites control a system that the people no longer have control over. This 
populist nationalism creates an appeal to the masses through a fear of change. 
 This increased connectivity can also drive an increased concern for human rights 
regardless of where the abuses are occurring (Gregory, 2019; Hankey & Clunaigh, 2013; Peralta, 
2018). World leaders and average citizens alike can no longer claim ignorance of atrocities when 
videos are streamed live into their homes. Traditionally ethical obligations extend to problems a 
person is aware of, which would have been things that happen in a local community. Not only 
does modern technology expand awareness, it also expands ethical obligations. Civic obligations, 
as discussed by Almond and Verba (1963) along with many others, are usually contingent upon 
capacity and there is no logical reason why the scope of those responsibilities should not expand 
with an increased capacity.  
 Thus, the question becomes how digital natives internalize and act upon the forces 
driving populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism. If obligation is contingent upon capacity, will 
digital natives act upon their increased capacity? Both populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism 
make claims upon an individuals’ responsibility, but the onus of responsibility remains on the 
individual. By examining the impact of media consumption, personal connections, political 
activity, and other such attitudes, this dissertation will explore how digital natives are having an 
impact on their world and some of the factors influencing them.   
 
 





At the international level, the past half-century has witnessed an increasing expansion of 
human rights law. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declared, “All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UDHR, Article 1). This profound 
statement is not the first time that human rights had been inscribed, nor would it be the last. The 
UDHR did, however, embody the hopes of a post-World War II global community that sought to 
create a comprehensive international statement of the rights of all people, regardless of where 
they were born. Along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), these three 
documents would become known as the International Bill of Human Rights. The UDHR was the 
first human rights document to come before the newly founded United Nations. The drafting 
committee was comprised of members from nine different countries, with influence coming from 
around the world. It was meant as a universal statement of hope, in a world increasingly divided 
by the looming Cold War. The UDHR implored countries to recognize these laws and to enforce 
them in their own domestic legislation. It also began a movement in the codification of 
international human rights law that continues to this day. Yet the struggle for human rights 
continues, particularly in the area of enforcement. As Hobbes wrote over 350 years ago, 
“Covenants not supported by the sword, are but words and have no strength to secure a man at 
all” (1651/2008, p. 113). The originally proposed plan for a United Nations military force never 
came to fruition. Regional political alliances such as the European Union, African Union, 
NATO, and others have developed military capacities, but much of international law still relies 
on agreement rather than enforcement.   
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 International law follows the liberal tradition of placing responsibility with the state. The 
development of the state and society has gone hand in hand with a search for systematic 
protection of human rights. In the state of nature, each person acts as his or her own sovereign 
and is thus responsible for his or her own protection. Seeking a life less “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short,” individuals surrender a limited amount of power and personal freedom in 
exchange for the benefits of a community. Responsibility for the most basic and fundamental 
freedoms passes from the individual to the state, in partial fulfillment of the social contract.  
However, when states fail to uphold their end of the social contract, either through inability or 
complicity, the burden of responsibility once again must shift. In the wake of genocides in 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, massive and systematic abuses of human rights in Burma, Sri Lanka, 
and other countries, the United Nations sought to develop a policy that would address these 
critical failures. When the R2P Doctrine was released by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, it attempted to address the failures of the 
international community to respond to widespread and systematic abuses of human rights. It 
declared that when a country is unwilling or unable to protect its own citizens, the burden of 
responsibility falls to the international community of states. Despite all good intentions that lead 
to the general acceptance of R2P as a guiding principle for the international community, the 
world has continued to witness atrocities in places like Darfur, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Burma, Syria and others. Now the digital age, fueled by globalization, presents new 
opportunities for a more comprehensive approach to human rights protections through a greater 
diffusion of responsibility between the state, the international community, and the individual as 
actor, victim, or bystander. 
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 This dissertation is an endeavor to examine the perceptions and actions of digital natives 
in the United States towards civic and global responsibility. The central research question is: 
how do the advancements of the digital age impact individuals’ sense of responsibility at the 
local and global level and what actions do they take to act on that responsibility? Digital natives 
are more empowered and informed than any previous generation to affect change, yet the 
question remains whether or not they will embrace that responsibility. The competing ideologies 
of cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism are both rising as an impact of globalization and 
both lay claim to individual responsibility. Cosmopolitanism focuses on a universal 
responsibility to others regardless of where they may live, and views all people as citizens of the 
world rather than of any particular nation. Populist nationalism takes an opposing view that 
focuses responsibility on one’s nation, the same nation that contributes to individuals’ identities 
and to which they owe allegiance. The hypotheses put forth in this dissertation (explained in 
detail in Chapter IV), look to address issues of personal relationships with people from other 
countries, media consumption, traditional and online political action, and other issues related to 
this central idea of responsibility. 
Significance 
 
This dissertation seeks to explore these interrelated concepts of civic engagement and 
global responsibility as understood by digital natives in the United States. Allison (2013) notes 
that “a worldwide embrace of new technology has produced a generation of young people—the 
‘digital natives’ aged 13 to 30 —who share a common culture of communication with their 
generational peers across borders and across continents” (p. 69).  These connections ought to 
foster a greater concern for others that extends beyond borders. The digital age has created 
capacities to share and receive information, organize, and advocate for any issue, including 
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human rights. In an article reassessing The Civic Culture, Sidney Verba (2015) wrote, “The 
changes in the world since 1959 include such obvious things as globalisation [sic], the role of 
technology, the seeming intensification of ethnic and religious conflict (certainly much more 
central than one assumed it would be 50 years ago), as well as the end of the cold war and the 
decline of communism. More recently there is the digital revolution and the role of the internet” 
(p. 242). In the area of human rights protection, even the relatively new concept of R2P has new 
areas of inquiry. There has been a philosophical and normative call for an Individual 
Responsibility to Protect (IR2P) put forth by Cronin-Furman and Renee, (2010), Luck and Luck, 
(2015), and Pison Hindawi, (2016). Luck and Luck (2015) focus on the individual responsibility 
to protect as a key development in R2P policy, but it gives too much focus to influential actors 
rather than individuals as a whole.  The Individual Responsibility to Protect needs to be 
understood as part of what makes someone a good citizen. When civic engagement and 
participation are examined, this IR2P must also be included. Citizens have a responsibility to 
work within their means to prevent, protect, and rebuild. This may be as simple as voting for 
policies that reflect these views or contacting their representatives to urge action. Luck and Luck 
(2015) address the problem that an IR2P could contribute to when they note, “the challenge of 
sustaining the attention of legislators on atrocity prevention remains daunting, given the link 
between distant atrocities and immediate national interests is not always apparent to those 
focused on day-to-day legislative and fiscal matters” (p. 247). The IR2P could create this much 
needed domestic constituency to keep politicians attentive to these issues. 
The impact of the digital age and the opportunities and obstacles it creates need to be 
understood. The new opportunities for the role of the individual in protecting human rights are 
made possible by the digital age. Individuals have more access to knowledge than at any other 
AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
13 
 
time in history. Individuals, through avenues such as social media, often have access to much of 
the same information that typically would have required professional news services. Live 
streaming video is no longer only possible through professional journalism, but now every 
person with a camera phone and internet access can stream live images in real-time around the 
world. Regardless of whether the individual is on the broadcasting or viewing end, he or she 
already has the capacity to take action. Individuals also now have the power to communicate in 
real-time with nearly every area of the world. The internet provides access to governments and 
societies beyond one’s own physical location. The individual now has the ability to be informed 
and engaged, not only on domestic issues, but on global issues as well. “[Democracy], if it is to 
live, must go forward to meet the changes that are here and that are coming. If it does not go 
forward, if it tries to stand still, it is already starting on the backward road that leads to 
extinction” (Dewey, 1946, p. 47). What is yet to be determined is to what level individuals will 
embrace these roles. 
As alluded to above, this dissertation will also add to the understanding of the modern 
conception of the civic culture. Traditional aspects of civic culture, such as political engagement, 
in-person clubs and organizations, religious activity, and such, remain, yet the digital age has 
greatly expanded how the individual can be engaged in their community. The very definition of 
community is even being changed by the digital age. Community is no longer just a geographical 
area, but a digital area that is able to exist through online mediums. Individuals can establish 
online communities centered around any shared interest or passion. Political engagement is 
expanding beyond traditional in-person actions to include online mobilization. Nearly every 
single aspect of traditional civic culture is being expanded by the digital age.  
 





 This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. The introduction has outlined a 
synopsis of the focus of this dissertation. It has addressed the need for further research into the 
topics of responsibility among digital natives, especially as it relates to civic engagement and a 
global responsibility for human rights. It has also briefly examined the current global divide 
between populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism that will have an impact on how digital 
natives internalize responsibility.  
 Chapter II presents an overview of existing literature in order to create a foundation for 
this present research. It is further divided into sections: The Civic Culture; Populist Nationalism; 
Cosmopolitanism; and Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect. This establishes the 
previous scholarship that informs the development of ideas within this present work. It also 
identifies the gaps in the literature from which the research questions for this dissertation were 
developed. 
 Chapter III provides coverage of the digital age and how it has shaped the modern world. 
It defines digital natives, and the opportunities and obstacles it presents to them. It also examines 
how digital technology impacts civic engagement, populist nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and 
human rights. 
 Chapter IV describes the development of the research methods used in this dissertation. It 
goes into detail on the development of the research questions, hypotheses, and plan to examine 
those questions. It explains the target sample and survey used to collect information. It also 
examines the demographic composition of the sample to better understand where the information 
was gathered. 
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 In Chapter V, Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) is explored in depth and 
used to establish how a civic culture is understood. It questions whether or not the typology of 
participant, subject, and parochial remain relevant in the digital age. It seeks to develop a model 
of the civic culture of the digital native. It also explores how digital natives understand their civic 
responsibility. It shows that the civic culture of the digital native is quite robust and goes beyond 
the elements found by Almond and Verba, and that with these new avenues of participation come 
new obstacles to that participation.   
 Chapter VI expands the views of digital natives on their responsibility to the global arena, 
particularly for human rights. It presents an argument for cosmopolitan responsibility, which, 
like the Individual Responsibility to Protect, calls upon those with the capacity to take action to 
do so in defense of global human rights. Through the development of a Cosmopolitan/Populist 
Nationalism (CPN) scale, this dissertation finds that social media connections and awareness of 
global issues are significant predictors in showing a preference for human rights advocacy. The 
analysis of survey responses also shows that these concerns are acted upon through a number of 
both traditional political actions and new forms of digital action.  
 Finally, Chapter VII offers concluding thoughts on the overall examination of 
responsibility in the digital age. Findings suggest that digital natives have embraced both civic 
and global responsibility. Digital natives are taking advantage of the online avenues by which to 
be engaged politically, as well as continuing with traditional political action. Digital natives who 
show cosmopolitan traits are more likely to be politically engaged, which shows evidence that a 
cosmopolitan responsibility for human rights does exist and is being acted upon. The chapter 
offers suggestions for further research and provides concluding thoughts on the project.  
  






The reinvention of the wheel, being one of the utmost superfluous tasks, needn’t be 
heretofore attempted, thus such a Sisyphean quest shall be omitted in exchange for a recitation of 
those giants upon whose shoulders this dissertation endeavors to stand. This project seeks to 
examine several interrelated concepts. First, is that of the civic culture. At the most basic level, 
this asks what the role of a person is within their community, including both rights and 
responsibilities. Second, is the current global trend of populist nationalism, both internationally 
and within the United States. Third, this dissertation examines the philosophical concept of 
cosmopolitanism. Just as the role of the individual needs to be examined in relation to one’s 
community, so too must the relationship between the individual and the world. Finally, the 
evolution of human rights, humanitarian intervention, and particularly the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) Doctrine will be examined with a particular focus on the duty bearer.  
The digital age has changed the way the individual relates to their community, both 
locally and globally. The central question of this dissertation is based upon understanding how 
individuals, particularly digital natives, understand their responsibility to their community and to 
the world. By examining their connections with those from other countries, media use, traditional 
and online political action, beliefs about cosmopolitan and populist nationalism ideals, and other 
such questions, this dissertation will address what responsibility individuals have to those around 
them. Traditionally, the state has been the locus of protection of rights for its people. In 
democratic societies, citizens are expected to contribute their voice and preferences to the 
political system. Cosmopolitanism extends this responsibility beyond the borders of the state. It 
provides a basis for human rights, which are predicated on both legal canon and de facto 
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practice. The interplay of these three concepts will be used to better understand the role of 
individual responsibility in the digital age. 
The Civic Culture 
 
In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published The Civic Culture: Political 
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. This cross-national study sought to examine the 
conditions under which democracy might best be able to flourish. Their study examined “basic 
issues in democratic government, especially on the role of ordinary citizens in such governance” 
(Verba, 2015, p. 234). In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1963) define a typology of 
“political orientations—attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes 
toward the role of the self in the system” (p. 13). They find that people can broadly be placed 
into three categories: Parochial; Subject; and Participant (p. 17). The political culture of the 
parochial is one of detachment and an ignorance and/or apathy in relation to the political system. 
A parochial does not recognize the role of government in their life and does not participate 
within the political system (Ibid, pp. 17-20). The political culture of the subject is one who is 
aware of the impact of government and an understanding of the role it plays but takes no direct 
action in trying to influence the way in which government operates. They may have pride or 
disdain for political conditions, but they do not pursue any avenues that would give voice to 
these positions (Ibid, p. 19). Finally, the political culture of the participant is one that both sees 
the function and result of government and takes a role in advocating one’s beliefs about such 
actions (Ibid, p. 19). These three broad classifications can be used to understand the ways in 
which the individual interacts with the political system. 
In their study of the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, 
Almond and Verba (1963) reached certain conclusions about each country, and this dissertation 
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is interested primarily in the findings on the U.S. One of the unique characteristics of the U.S. 
population was a strong feeling of ability to influence government at the local and national level 
(p. 186). Even if Americans aren’t exercising their right to vote (or participating in other 
traditional political activities) at very high levels, the important aspect is that if they choose to, 
they believe they can have an impact. Almond and Verba (1963) also found that Americans are 
the largest percentage of people who believe local and national government impact their lives (p. 
91), the largest percentage of those who pay “much” attention to political campaigns and the 
second most who follow political and governmental affairs regularly (p. 89). Americans were 
more willing to discuss politics with others (p. 116) and they believed people should be engaged 
in their community more than any other country (p. 169). These are the traits that led Almond 
and Verba to call the United States “a participant civic culture2.” These traits are essential for a 
vibrant and healthy civic culture, which in turn promotes a healthy and vibrant democracy. Yet 
while these traits are critical, they are not static. Civic culture is developed over time, but is 
subject to fluctuation, hence the need to reexamine changing circumstances in American civic 
culture.  
Their world, besieged by the Cold War and countries emerging from colonial rule, 
witnessed a clash of ideologies and a stark question of whether communism or democracy would 
be the defining political system of the future. The primary means of information at the time of 
their writing still came through television and newspapers, which was filtered through 
newscasters and editors before being transmitted to the public. Air travel was on the rise, but 
international travel was not as accessible as it is today. Minorities faced widespread exclusion 
from mainstream society in the United States. The world has undergone a transformation and 
 
2 See Almond and Verba (1963) Chapter 14. 
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globalization has created a society of globally connected individuals with a greater capacity to 
affect change. While the Cold War has ended, democracy has emerged as the prominent political 
system, and the internet has connected most of the world, Almond and Verba’s typology of 
citizens within a democracy remains applicable today. It offers a way of understanding how 
individuals relate to the political system around them, how they understand their own 
responsibility, and how they exercise that responsibility.  
Almond and Verba’s work was groundbreaking in both method and scholarship, creating 
a long-lasting impression on political science and beyond. They are often credited with the first 
cohesive definition of civic culture as: “[a] political orientation— attitudes toward the political 
system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system” (Almond & 
Verba, 1963, p. 13). Civic culture thus encompasses the role of the citizen within the political 
system and the collective attributes of a political society. Noting the importance of the work, 
Campbell and Conradt (2015) note, “On rare occasions…a text appears that is sufficiently 
influential in its ideas and methods to contribute to shaping the development of the discipline” 
(p. 217). Dahlgren (2000) expanded on the work of Almond and Verba and identified four 
dimensions of civic culture: (a) relevant knowledge and competencies; (b) loyalty to democratic 
values and procedures; (c) practices, routines, and traditions; and (d) identities as citizens (pp. 
337-340). He simplified and expanded this list in his 2002 work in which he lists six dimensions 
of civic culture: (a) civic values; (b) civic affinity; (c) civic knowledge; (d) civic practices; (e) 
civic identities; and (f) civic discussion (pp. 20-23). While all are interrelated and 
interdependent, these six items all help to explain the aspects that make up a civic culture. Civic 
culture requires a basic acceptance of the system and a belief in its legitimacy (civic values). It 
requires a minimum of tolerance and trust of the people around you (civic affinity) and the 
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knowledge of how to communicate with others within the community (civic knowledge). It 
needs an ability to communicate within the system (civic practices) and a sense of belonging and 
personal identification (civic identities). Finally, people need to be able to communicate with 
others (civic discussion). These elements all reinforce one another, and should be considered 
when examining what civic culture entails. 
Many scholars have reexamined various aspects of The Civic Culture since its first 
publication in 1963. Conradt (2015) found that in the case of Germany the political culture 
changed greatly from the original Almond and Verba study due to things such as the political 
cleavages of the Second World War, the Cold War, reunification, and other drastic changes to 
the system. Docherty, Goodlad, and Paddison (2001) examined how to foster participation, a key 
aspect of civic culture, through various community level structures. Civic culture has been used 
to understand local policy development (Reese and Zalewski, 2018), the role of religion (Lam, 
2006), how it can help in understanding multicultural organizations (Chen and Eastman, 1997), 
and numerous other avenues of inquiry. The Civic Culture has played a major role in many 
fields, not just political science. The study, now over a half-century-old, remains one of the 
predominant works on civic and political engagement. 
Like any study, there were valid criticisms of The Civic Culture. Conradt (2015) and 
Pateman (1980) criticized the focus on the Anglo-American style of democracy, especially as it 
relates to examining the democratic countries within their study that do not have the same style. 
A more pertinent critique to the study, as it relates to this current project, was made by Campbell 
and Conradt (2015) who note, “The analysis of participation [was] largely confined to 
conventional forms [and] neglected the more direct, confrontational ways in which individuals 
participate” (p. 219). Just looking at methods of nonviolent action, Gene Sharp (1973) identified 
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198 methods of such action. Political action takes on numerous forms and should not be limited 
to the traditional methods of voting, petitions, protests, and others examined by Almond and 
Verba. One criticism, or perhaps observation would be more apt, that this dissertation seeks to 
address is the lack of an outward focus within The Civic Culture. Almond and Verba focused on 
understanding how individuals relate both to each other and to their domestic political system. 
Their goal was a better understanding of what made democratic society thrive and what values 
contribute to democratic systems. Looking at attitudes towards other countries is not necessarily 
a distinct component of democratic society, especially in the past. This oversight will be 
addressed in Chapter VI, wherein the question of how individuals feel and act on their 
responsibility towards those outside their communities and political systems. It will examine the 
extent to which individuals feel a responsibility towards others and what actions they take based 
on that.   
One of the predominant concerns since the publication of The Civic Culture has been a 
fear of decreasing rates of participation in civic and social associations. Putnam (2000) traced the 
evolution of this decline and the resulting decrease of public and societal trust over the past 
century. While he lists several possible reasons for this, among them is the fact that people have 
supplanted civic life with the distraction offered by television and the internet. Some early 
studies on internet usage supported these conclusions, such as Shah et al. (2001) who found that 
“people’s use of the Internet for social recreation (i.e., participation in chat rooms and game 
playing) was consistently and negatively related to their engagement in civic activities, trust in 
other people, and life contentment” (p. 149). Borgida et al. (2002) found mixed results from a 
study of two American cities in which they examined residents’ views on how technology 
impacts society. But Skocpol (1999) reminds us that just because traditional membership in civic 
AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
22 
 
associations has changed, it does not mean that civic culture itself is in jeopardy. When scholars 
see declining numbers in civic organizations, especially since the 1960s, they are often tempted 
to view overall civic engagement as being on the decline. Skocpol (1999) notes that since that 
time, the U.S. has witnessed the civic enfranchisement of a number of groups (women, African 
Americans, the LGBTQ community, etc.) that had previously been excluded from much of civic 
life, along with a ‘professionalization’ of associations that draw on permanent staff and financial 
donations rather than community engagement. Even Shah et al. (2001) found that certain types of 
internet usage, such as information seeking and information exchange, have a strong positive 
relationship with social capital and civic engagement.  
The changing circumstances brought about by the continuing spread of the internet has 
given cause for scholars to question how civic and political life have changed with these new 
technologies. In 1996, Gabriel Almond gave an address in which he reflected on some of the 
more notable changes that have occurred since the publication of The Civic Culture. Among 
those changes, he noted two critical aspects of modern life that have a major impact on civic 
culture: the role of technology and globalization. Verba echoed those sentiments in 2015 and 
noted that one of the most significant (and inter-related) changes to political culture has been that 
“political culture now exists in a global world— of population movements of a communication 
revolution. The internet is creating new ways of doing things, new ways of thinking” (p. 237). 
Sanford (2007) offers an early testimonial to the changing nature of civic culture in her book, 
Civic Life in the Information Age. Through interviews of Generation Xers3 she found that civic 
engagement is only in decline if it is measured through the same institutions of previous 
generations. With new generations there will be new ways in which they interact with the 
 
3 Sanford defines Generation X as those born between 1960 and 1981. 
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community, and measures that defined civic engagement for Baby Boomers and the Greatest 
Generation are incomplete to understand Generation X and Millennials. Ridlen Ray (1999) 
points out, “Technologies offer choice in shaping associational life…Association as a matter of 
individual choice, preference, and selection is more truly voluntary than ever before” (p. 324). 
Engaging with others, on any level, is now no longer limited to one’s local community with the 
internet expanding the reach of the individual. Shah et al. (2005) conducted a study to test the 
relationship between the internet and civic participation and found that “Online information 
seeking and interactive civic messaging—uses of the Web as a resource and a forum—both 
strongly influence civic engagement, often more so than do traditional print and broadcast media 
and face-to-face communication” (p. 551). Their results indicate that the internet can be used as a 
way to further civic culture. However, it should be noted that this study took place in 2005 with 
information collected during the 2000 presidential election. While many already feared the 
capacity for distraction, this occurred during the relative infancy of social media. Much of social 
media had either just begun or was not even developed yet. LinkedIn debuted in 2002, Myspace 
in 2003, Facebook in 2004, Reddit in 2005, Instagram in 2010, and so on. The studies that have 
examined civic culture in the modern period of the digital age will be discussed in Chapter III. 
The typology of participant, subject, and parochial created by Almond and Verba remains 
relevant for scholars in assessing the ways in which the individual interacts with the community. 
By understanding how individuals are motivated and what actions they are willing to take, 
political movements can focus their efforts on harnessing the strength of its members. This 
typology also allows researchers and policy experts to examine both the motivations and actions 
of the populous. Finally, this typology needs to be tested in relation to the changes that have 
occurred since the 1960s. Communication technologies, in particular, have greatly expanded 
AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
24 
 
access to information that might eliminate the parochial.  While Almond and Verba kept an 
inward focus on the individual’s relation to local and national communities, in an increasingly 
globalized world that typology can be expanded to include the relationship between the 
individual and various aspects of a global community. This dissertation builds upon this typology 
in order to address the changes brought upon by digital technology and adds an examination of 
how the individual relates to the global community, particularly in the context of promoting 
human rights. This provides an opportunity to advance both the understanding of civic culture 
and identify opportunities to advance engagement both domestically and internationally. In order 
to understand this relationship of the individual to the greater global community, it is critical to 
first examine the growing trend of populist nationalism and then cosmopolitanism, a field of 
philosophy, which has asked that question for millennia.  
Populist Nationalism 
 
 Populist nationalism is the growing phenomenon of identity built upon one’s own 
community and an affinity for leaders perceived to speak to their shared problems. Ignazi (2010) 
notes, “These demands and needs converge in the defense of the natural community, at national 
or sub-national levels, from alien and polluting presence—hence racism and xenophobia—and 
respond to the identity crisis produced by atomization at the societal level, by globalization at the 
economic level, and by supra-nationalism at the political level” (p. 2). While nationalism and 
populism have been used by both sides of the political spectrum, populist nationalism has taken 
on a distinctly rightwing orientation (Askola, 2017; Carpenter, 2017; Fukuyama, 2018; Hafner-
Burton et al. 2019; LePore, 2019). Dahlgren (2018) explains, “Right-wing populism has to a 
significant degree managed to mobilise [sic] an array of deep grievances—economic, social, 
cultural—that are often legitimate. Populism in a sense reflects the failures of democratic ideals, 
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yet it also establishes discourses that set an abstract ‘us’—‘the people’—against ‘them,’ 
variously the government, liberal politicians, mainstream media, intellectuals, experts, 
immigrants and so on, who are seen as the root of the problems” (p. 24). Populist nationalism 
promotes unity within a shared commonality, in this case the state, which acts as a unifying force 
against these threats.  
As the term implies, elements of nationalism and populism combine to form a movement 
aimed at a focus on domestic policies built on popular rhetoric. Like most theories, nationalism 
does not have one simple definition. David Miller (2008) lists three beliefs as the main 
components of nationalism: 1) “…nations are real: there is something that differentiates people 
who belong to one nation from those that belong to its neighbors; 2) …membership in a nation 
has practical implications: it confers rights and imposes responsibilities; and 3) …nationhood is 
politically significant” (pp. 529-531). Nationalism is an ideology often associated with the state, 
but the state is merely the existence of political institutions that provide a formal structure and 
international legitimacy to the nation. Nations are often geographically bounded, but the 
demarcations of a state do not necessarily represent those of a nation. Populism similarly has a 
number of understandings. Kaltwasser et al. (2017) provide a very thorough history and 
description of populism and its recent scholarship, noting that most research has focused on 
populism as a cultural, economic, ideological, or strategic force. Canovan (2008) focuses on how 
populism attempts to tap into the legitimacy offered by the people. Populism appeals to the 
masses, who feel left out by elites who do not share their values. It emboldens the people with a 
greater sense of being stakeholders in the movement compared to a feeling of being a bystander 
in traditional politics. Populist movements from both the left and right have drawn legitimacy 
through a claim of widespread support amongst the people. Populist nationalism draws on 
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widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo perceived as caused by elites (Negreponi-
Delivanis, 2018). It then offers a solution to the ills of modern life (often blamed on 
internationalism, foreigners, and other outsider elements) through isolationism, appeal to 
traditional values, and promises of a renewed focus on domestic issues.  
Efforts to understand the characteristics of this growing trend of populist nationalism in 
modern global politics have produced a litany of descriptions including anti-globalist, nativist, 
isolationist, and even racist and fascist. Largely the product of rightwing ideologies, this trend 
has found a voice on nearly every continent. Leaders such as Donald Trump in the United States, 
Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Marine Le Pen in France, Geert 
Wilders in the Netherlands, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, 
Vladimir Putin in Russia, and others, have shown the growth and power of this movement. 
Franke and Guttieri (2019) note that leaders such as these, and events such as Brexit “exemplify 
the mounting public discontent by those who feel left behind by the global economy, 
technological change, and growing inequalities” (p. iv). This phenomenon is also a growing part 
of academic focus with studies on Finland (Askola, 2019), Argentina (Besoky, 2014), China (Xu, 
2001; Yu, 2014), and of course, the United States and Europe (Johnson & Frombgen, 2009; 
Shattuck, 2017), among many others.  
One of the main drivers of populist nationalism is the reaction to an increasingly 
globalized and connected world. Digital technology connects people in ever expanding ways, the 
movement of goods and people across borders occurs with increasing frequency, and the actions 
of neighbors have greater impacts on others. Fukuyama (2018) builds on the work of 19th century 
theorist Ferdinand Tönnies’ idea of the conflict between identity formed through Gemeinschaft 
(village community) and Gesellshaft (urban society). He writes, “The psychological dislocation 
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engendered by the transition from Gemeinshaft to Gesellschaft laid the basis for an ideology of 
nationalism based on an intense nostalgia for an imagined past of strong community in which the 
divisions and confusions of a pluralist modern society did not exist” (Fukuyama, 2018, p. 65). If 
nationalism pushes for Gemeinschaft through an active opposition to all things Gesellshaft, then 
it creates an ideology of isolationism, antithetical to cosmopolitanism.  
Populist nationalism has manifested in the United States with the rise of President Donald 
Trump and his platform of America First. His actions have all the hallmarks of traditional 
populist nationalism: a claim of an unresponsive government run by elites, casting a critical 
media as an enemy of the people, challenging long established international alliances, unfounded 
claims of persecution by political rivals, appeals to egoism, claims of an existential threat posed 
by “outsiders” (undocumented immigrants and refugees), and a pledge to be the only person 
capable of Making America Great Again. Guttieri (2019) examines the impact of Trump’s 
policies (what she describes as exclusionary populism) and warns, “Populists seeking to 
consolidate power are quick to identify enemies and opportunities to change the rules of the 
game in their favor, including diversionary war” (p. 18).  Trump’s foreign policy has challenged 
the role of the United Nations and NATO, which has led to conflict within his own 
administration. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis resigned, stating, “One core belief I have always 
held is that our strength as a nation is inextricably linked to the strength of our unique and 
comprehensive system of alliances and partnerships. While the U.S. remains the indispensable 
nation in the free world, we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without 
maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies” (Mattis, 2018, p. 10).  Rabel 
(2019) places this manifestation of populist nationalism within the historical context of American 
populist and nationalist movements, which he views not as an “idiosyncratic aberration” but 
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something with “deep roots in American politics” (p. 10). Aspects of populist nationalism, as it 
relates to Donald Trump and American policy has received increased focus (Kivisto, 2017; 
Pierson, 2017; Skonieczy, 2018; Stone & Christodoulaki, 2018, Muller, 2019) which is likely to 
only grow further. 
Nationalism can be a reaction to the digital age because it brings images, sounds, and 
ideas from around the world to every village, hamlet, and community with access to the internet. 
The connectedness driven by the digital age has fostered greater bonds between people 
regardless of distance, thus promoting cosmopolitan values, but the tensions of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism become more evident. De Matas (2017) explains the conflict between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism as seeming to represent two diametrically opposed forces, 
explaining, “Where the latter works to create a structure based on a shared territory, uniformity, 
and sameness, the former attempts to tear down such structures” (p. 23). Nationalism places a 
premium on territoriality and the state and assigns a value to it. Warf (2012) explains, “If the 
primary emotions associated with nationalism are pride and fear, the primary emotions 
associated with cosmopolitanism are empathy and respect” (p. 281). In many ways, nationalism 
is incompatible with cosmopolitanism because of competing responsibilities. Should the 
individual be beholden to those who live in the same territory or does a shared humanity call for 
a global reach? Scholars such as Pavel (2009) and Brennan (2001) have suggested that the two 
ideologies are simply irreconcilable. 
Cosmopolitanism 
 
 The principal basis of cosmopolitanism is the belief that people are part of a global 
community, bonded not by geographical boundaries, but rather by a shared humanity. “In its 
most basic form, cosmopolitanism maintains that there are moral obligations owed to all human 
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beings based solely on our humanity alone, without reference to race, gender, nationality, 
ethnicity, culture, religion, political affiliation, state citizenship, or other communal 
particularities” (Brown & Held, 2010, p. 1). Cosmopolitanism claims a responsibility and shared 
identity for all people, not just those who happen to be born into a certain location or group. The 
lottery of birth, the random process that places a child into a particular set of circumstances, 
through no merit or decision of the child, is no basis for defining a moral obligation. However, 
this lottery has developed into isolationism, tribalism, nationalism, religious zealotry, and other 
ideologies that promote one group over another. Cosmopolitanism seeks a redress for this 
through the promotion of a common identity and shared responsibility. 
 The term cosmopolitan has been credited to Diogenes (known as Diogenes the Cynic and 
Diogenes of Sinope), a Greek philosopher who was asked where he was from and replied, “I am 
a citizen of the cosmos” (kosmopolites) in the 4th century BC (see Hasen, 2009). This concept, 
however, can be traced to many other times and places. The belief that we are all citizens of the 
world with a shared responsibility for all can be found in ancient Egypt under the rule of pharaoh 
Anhnaton (1526 BC), and other writings throughout the ancient world by the “Phaeacians, 
Hebrews, Chinese, Ethiopians, Assyrians, and Persians” (Brown & Held, 2010, p. 4). The South 
African term Ubuntu (loosely translated as: I am because we are) is based upon the idea of a 
universal connectedness that makes people responsible for one another. It defines and identifies 
the individual as a relation to the greater community, rather than a geographical position. 
Graness (2018) offers Ubuntu as both a critique and addition to cosmopolitanism by removing 
the idea of boundaries that create the label of “others” and bringing the focus to a rational 
relationship with all humanity. “Thus, individual human beings are what ultimately matter; they 
matter equally, and every human being is the ultimate unit of concern for everyone—because, 
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ultimately, we affirm our humanity by recognizing the humanity of others” (Graness, 2018, p. 
404). In discussing the political philosophy of Nelson Mandela in post-apartheid South Africa, 
Davids (2018) writes, “Mandela’s conception of cosmopolitanism is inextricably linked with 
Ubuntu—you are human because of others, which connects the individual and society in 
reciprocally responsible ways” (p. 28). While it is easy to focus on the idealist conceptions of 
Ubuntu, Danso (2017) notes that “the centrality of interdependence to the concept of ubuntu [sic] 
means that other members of society are linked to belligerents and affected directly or indirectly 
by conflict” making it critical in the understanding of conflict management (p. 88). The tenets of 
cosmopolitanism can be found in nearly every culture, showing the universal nature of the belief 
that people are connected through their humanity rather than by the other bonds which create 
both an in and out group. 
 Perhaps the most prolific cosmopolitan writer is Immanuel Kant, who authored, among 
numerous other works, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose in 1784 and 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch in 1795. In Universal History, Kant explains the notion 
of unsocial sociability, which is a conflicting set of desires that leads to societies governed by 
law. This unsocial sociability is a contradictory desire for individuals to live within a society 
whereby they might realize their talents and security while also wanting to live in isolation so as 
to be governed by no one but themselves. In order to balance these tensions, laws are instituted 
so that the competition between people is enough to foster innovation and growth but not so 
much as to allow for violence. (See Propositions 4 and 5). States, too, are subject to this 
antagonism between one another, and they will seek to develop systems that allow for the 
greatest benefit for their citizens. (See Propositions 7 and 8). Human nature drives this balance 
between freedom and competition at the individual and state levels, and “this encourages the 
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hope that, after many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest purpose of 
nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realized as the matrix within which all 
the original capacities of the human race may develop” (Kant, 1784/1991, p. 51). Thus, 
cosmopolitanism is not only a preferred system, but also one that is driven by a rational human 
nature.  
 Kant builds on this theme in Perpetual Peace in which he sets forward a number of 
conditions that would create a more peaceful world. Among those conditions is the need for what 
Kant calls a cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality (See Third Definitive Article). His 
justification lies within the claim that all people have a “right to the earth’s surface which the 
human race shares in common” (Kant, 1795/1991, p. 106). The ability to travel the world 
unmolested brings numerous opportunities for building understanding and exchanging ideas. 
Isolationism breeds insecurity and a fear of the other by limiting interaction among diverse 
populations. Kant’s universal hospitality promotes dialogue and interaction, leading to more 
cosmopolitan communities.  
 The tenets of cosmopolitanism also provide the rational foundation for human rights and 
the responsibility to promote and protect those rights (Lamb, 2019; Moyn, 2014). Prominent 
modern cosmopolitan theorists such as Seyla Benhabib (2002, 2006, 2009), Kwame Anthony 
Appiah (2006), David Miller (2007), Jurgen Habermas (1995, 2007, 2008, 2010) Daniele 
Archibugi (1998, 2009), David Held (1991, 1997, 2003, 2004), Ulrich Beck (2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011), and others have built upon the tenets of cosmopolitanism, especially as it relates to 
international law and global justice. Benhabib (2004) explains her connections to Kantian 
Cosmopolitan, saying, “I follow the Kantian tradition in thinking of cosmopolitanism as the 
emergence of norms that ought to govern relations among individuals in a global society…These 
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norms are neither merely just moral nor just legal…They signal the eventual legalization and 
juridification of the rights claims of human beings everywhere, regardless of their membership in 
bounded communities” (p. 119). This focus on legal norms promotes adherence to a human 
rights framework that protects individuals without the need for some sort of global government. 
Warf (2012) explains cosmopolitanism as “an ethical, moral, and political philosophy that seeks 
to uncouple ethics from distance, arguing that each person is bound up with, and obligated to, 
humanity as a whole” (p. 272). Cosmopolitanism is not confined to the tenets of philosophical 
consideration and normative formulations. The very existence of the human rights canon 
presupposes the existence of a global commonality shared by all people, regardless of national 
citizenship. Cosmopolitanism is not only a justification of human rights, but it also provides the 
reasoning for why each individual has a responsibility toward them. Through greater interaction 
and access to those from around the world, individuals ought to develop greater compassion and 
care for people globally. “These Enlightenment principles have to do with the belief that 
individual freedom (human rights) is a reflection of the ethical principle promoting mutuality 
(the ethical responsibility to treat people the way we ourselves would want to be treated), the 
vision of a League of Nations, the vision of Perpetual Peace, and the claim that the common 
good is shaped in public discourse (an active civil society)” ( Miller, 2012, p. 10).  
 One of the main criticisms voiced against both cosmopolitanism and the leveling effect of 
globalization, is the perceived threat to state sovereignty. Kant (1795/1991) explicitly promotes 
the idea of a global federalism of independent states and even warns against the “impact as the 
government increases its range and soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, 
will finally lapse into anarchy” (p. 113). Kant’s cosmopolitan purpose is not the elimination of 
state sovereignty but rather a global unity promoted through a shared vision of rights. Some 
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scholars have addressed this perceived schism between cosmopolitanism and the nation state. 
Peterson (2011) sums up this separation, stating, “At the heart of the debate has been the extent 
to which the nation-state remains the main location for the practice of citizenship” (p. 423). 
Peterson and others4 have responded to this perceived incompatibility by developing a 
“republican cosmopolitanism.” Peterson (2011) notes four tenets of republicanism that can also 
apply to cosmopolitanism: “civic obligations, a commitment to the common good, civic virtue, 
and deliberate forms of democracy” (p. 423). “Republican cosmopolitanism […] can be 
understood as an attempt to ensure that cosmopolitan ideas […] incorporate an awareness of the 
importance of civic obligation and citizen sovereignty within political institutions and practices 
beyond the nation-state” (Ibid). Miller (2007) takes a similar approach of promoting global 
justice through the existing framework of states, but also adds that each person bears a 
responsibility for the actions (both current and historical) of that state.  
However, while not dealt a deathblow by cosmopolitanism, the once sacrosanct principle 
of sovereignty no longer provides an absolute license for world leaders to do as they please 
within their own borders. Traditionally, the actions of a sovereign upon his or her citizens was 
seen an internal matter, not subject to interference by other states. The power of a sovereign was 
absolute, unless the actions crossed an internationally recognized border. The world, as seen by 
Thucydides, treated rights as a luxury afforded to only the powerful. “Right, as the world goes, is 
only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
what they must.”5 The Social Contract established sovereignty as an agreement between the 
government and the people, that latter of whom could abolish said contract if the government 
failed to fulfill its end. The Social Contract placed a limit on sovereignty from within the state by 
 
4 Of particular note are Held, 2003; Bohman, 2001; Hudson, 2006, et al. 
5 Thucydides “Melian Dialogue” 
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ensuring an unprotected society had a legitimate right to revolt. Sovereignty was further eroded 
when the international community adopted the R2P Doctrine and declared that legitimate 
intervention could take place when a state was unwilling or unable to protect its own citizens. 
Even prior to the adoption of R2P, the right for collective action to be taken against a sovereign 
nation has been recognized in supranational treaties such as Chapter Seven of the Charter of the 
United Nations (1945) and Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000). 
Sovereignty has been limited, both from within and without. Now, the digital age has eradicated 
state borders in terms of the flow of communication and information.   
Yet the role of the state should not (and cannot) be ignored. The state is still the primary 
source of legal institutions, both domestically and internationally, and remains a vast source of 
economic and military power. The state ought to be an instrument for the realization of 
cosmopolitan responsibilities, rather than a target of consternation. The spread of cosmopolitan 
views is not antithetical to the existence of the state. Ypi (2008) proposes an “ethical 
universalism and political particularism” in which human rights, and their accompanying 
responsibilities, can be treated as universal, without requiring a global state to enforce them (p. 
51). Ypi’s (2008) “statist cosmopolitanism” upholds the political unit of the state as a necessary 
stable unit of social organization while also promoting cosmopolitan values within that system.  
She goes on to note: 
Political obligations are likely to be effective only if they are preceded, and 
followed, by an attempt to establish cultural as well as a political hegemony.  
However, this attempt to homogenize the public sphere is necessarily linked to a 
historical sense of the collective, to the self-understanding of citizens as members 
of a community of fate, to justified ways of reasoning and debating, to a national 
literature, to dominant religious books, legal traditions and historical institutions 
(Ypi, 2008, pg. 68).   
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Stevenson (2005) offers the view that “A cosmopolitan political community should be based 
upon overlapping or multiple citizenships connecting the populace into local, national, regional 
and global forms of governance” (p.47). The state is but one level of social relationship and can 
lay no reasonable claim to responsibility over other relationships. Cosmopolitanism is not meant 
to necessarily replace the state, but rather to expand the traditional relations that develop within 
the state. Globalization and digital technology have ways of creating connections that were 
previously only formed through the common identity of the state. Yet this is not the sole path to 
realizing such a shared identity and values.  Face to face relations, religion, nationality, shared 
history, and other commonalities have provided the basis for such relations throughout history.  
 For this dissertation, it is essential to look at the state as a means by which individual 
responsibility is manifested, both domestically and internationally. While domestic responsibility 
has largely been covered in the above section on the civic culture, cosmopolitanism still has 
something to add. Engagement in civic discourse is the hallmark of any democracy, and 
cosmopolitanism acknowledges the importance of public deliberation in which ideas may be 
debated and exchanged. Benhabib (2009) describes democratic iterations as “a complex process 
of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims are 
contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and 
political institutions as well as in the associations of civil society” (p. 37). Public discourse, the 
sharing and debating of ideas, is what Kant sought for his cosmopolitan right. In any democratic 
society, such debate is critical, and it can also be used to further connections both locally and 
globally. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan values within human rights have been internalized 
within the laws of many states. The codification of human rights in domestic politics has been 
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examined by scholars such as Eriksson, 2013; Ngwena, 2016; Sloss & Sandholtz, 2019; 
Simmons, 2009; Squatrito, 2016; and others.  
 The state also serves as a means by which individuals can fulfill their responsibility for 
the promotion of human rights globally. From the Treaty of Westphalia to modern times, the 
state has been the primary political actor in relation to the protection of its society, and human 
rights have been an expected protection guaranteed by the state. In 1948, the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration for Human Rights (UDHR) which proclaimed that the 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The supranational 
organization of states used the UDHR to enshrine the dedication of all states to the protection of 
human rights.  The importance of the individual can also be found in the United Nations Charter, 
which opens, “We the people of the United Nations…” rather than a preamble dedicated to the 
states of the world. Habermas (2010) observes, “Human rights constitute a realistic utopia 
insofar as they no longer paint deceptive images of a social utopia which guarantees collective 
happiness but anchor the ideal of a just society in the institutions of constitutional states 
themselves” (p. 476). The legal recognition of human rights and the enforcement of those rights 
are made possible through state capacity.  
Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect 
 
 The penultimate manifestation of state capacity to promote and protect human rights thus 
far has come to fruition within the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine. It is the latest in a 
long history of attempts to achieve a universal norm of humanitarian intervention6. Although 
R2P is less than two decades old, the journey from philosophical and moral principles to 
 
6 For a detailed history of humanitarian intervention, see Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian 
Intervention by Gary J. Bass. 
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international practice is both long and continuous. Traditional political thought believed the 
biggest threat to human rights would come from a force from outside the states, such as interstate 
war. The Pact of Paris (also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War) of 
1919 sought to address threats to humanity. While often naively viewed as a failure, the Paris 
Pact achieved a rare near universal consensus, and showed the power of international law. While 
it failed in eliminating war, it would set a legal precedent that force was no longer sufficient for 
establishing “right.” As Hathaway and Shapiro (2017) note, “Might still produced military 
victories. But it could no longer provide lasting legal victories” (p. 316).  
However, the events of the latter half of the 20th Century would make the world realize 
that human rights were also threatened by the state itself. Between April and July of 1994, the 
world sat idly by while between 800,000 and one million Rwandans were brutally murdered by 
their neighbors with government support. Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, and genocide in 
Timor-Leste and Cambodia, led the international community to reevaluate the absolute right of 
sovereignty in the state system. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) released the report Responsibility to Protect. It emphasized the ideal that 
sovereignty exists as a responsibility, and the state only maintains legitimate sovereignty when it 
upholds the human rights of its citizens. If and when the state is unwilling or unable to provide 
such protection, the state can no longer claim sovereignty, and the burden of responsibility for its 
citizens falls to the international community. While the R2P Doctrine has been enshrined in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the hope that atrocities like Rwanda, Yugoslavia, 
Timor-Leste, and Cambodia would never again happen while the international community stood 
idly by, has still remained an elusive dream. Although R2P is still in its infancy, the world 
continues to witness the targeted annihilation of the people of Darfur, the Rohingya in 
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Burma/Myanmar, and Syrian civilians. These failures of the international community underscore 
the difficulties facing a true realization of human rights. 
 Numerous scholars (Badescu, 2014; Bellamy, 2009; Cooper & Voinov, 2009; Doyle, 
2016; Evans, 2008; Hilpold, 2012) have covered the evolution of R2P, so only a cursory 
summary will be provided here. The R2P Doctrine, as originally written, lays out three core 
pillars: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.  
These three interrelated concepts form a doctrine which “directs our attention to the costs and 
results of action versus no action, and provides conceptual, normative and operational linkages 
between assistance, intervention and reconstruction” (ICISS, 2001, p. 17). The R2P Doctrine is 
meant to justify international action when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its own 
citizens.  
Norms, especially at the global level, take time to spread. Just as the Paris Pact helped to 
establish a new international legal framework, R2P is contributing to a new global awareness of 
how human rights are violated and how they may be protected. Archarya (2013) notes, “the 
creation of international norms is never a one-way or a one-step process” (p.479). Additionally, 
Badescu and Weiss (2010) caution that norm diffusion can be helped or hindered based upon the 
use, or misuse, of values such as R2P. Gareth Evans, the co-chair of the ICISS, explains, 
“Between 2005 and 2011 [the United Nations Security Council] had in fact passed only four 
resolutions mentioning R2P…it had—by early 2017— endorsed over fifty other resolutions 
directly referencing the responsibility to protect” (2017, p. 247). 
Brown (2013) cautions against the view that many have taken towards R2P, that is exists 
(or should exist) in a non-political realm as “an approach that all men and women of good faith 
should identify with” (p. 425). Idealism is often couched in a higher moral authority which is 
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hoped would be universally embraced by all rational beings. Whether or not the idealists are 
correct, the policies still need to function within a system of realpolitik. Brown goes on to say, 
“the future of Responsibility to Protect depends on its ability to transcend its anti-political 
ambitions and become part of the framework of world and national politics, such that states may 
define their ‘national interests’ as encompassing a concern for the victims of crimes against 
humanity” (p. 442).   
The enormity of what is proposed within R2P has naturally led to some concerns. Spain 
(2014) argues that humanitarian intervention must follow the purposes of both international law 
and sovereignty, which are the pursuit of a meaningful and lasting peace. Haslett (2014), 
Sussman and Nicolaidis (2016), and others have warned that a misuse of the doctrine could lead 
to it being viewed as another tool of the strong to dominate the weak. Other aspects of R2P have 
also been questioned such as the role of regional organizations (Kingah & Seiwert, 2016), the 
limitations on what rights it actually protects (Magnuson, 2010), and its conformity with existing 
international law (O’Donnell, 2014).  
For this dissertation, R2P is used as an example of an evolving international norm aimed 
at the protection of human rights. While its development, application, and shortcomings are all 
worthy of scholarly attention, they are beyond the scope of this work. The main fault within R2P 
in this context is that it seeks to solve a problem at the same level in which the problem has been 
created. Namely, it seeks to provide a redress for state shortcomings by appealing to the 
international community of states. This is by no means a fatal flaw, but simply an area that has 
room for improvement.  
 
 





One of the central questions within civic engagement, populist nationalism, 
cosmopolitanism, and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, is that of responsibility. What is the 
individual’s responsibility within the polis and within the larger global community? Almond and 
Verba (among others) and the ideology of populist nationalism asks the former question, and the 
latter has been the central question of cosmopolitan philosophy for centuries. The R2P Doctrine 
asks about global responsibility but keeps the question at the level of states rather than that of 
individuals. The interplay of civic culture, populist nationalism, cosmopolitanism, human rights, 
and the R2P Doctrine is an area ripe for exploration, especially with the changes brought about 
by the digital age. In an ever-globalizing world, the issue of individual responsibility must be 
examined as it relates to domestic issues as well as international. We can no longer pretend that 
geographical distance can prevent the issues of one society influencing nearly all others. While 
many of these areas have been explored individually or in conjunction with another area, this 
dissertation seeks to incorporate aspects of each of them.  
 Brooke Ackerly (2018) proposes the idea of just responsibility, which she describes as “a 
human rights approach to taking responsibility for injustice itself in ways that transform power 
inequities by connecting those taking responsibility to each other” (p. 26). This entails not only 
addressing the injustice itself, but also its root causes and the conditions in which it is created. 
This is appealing for many reasons and applies to the heart of this dissertation, which seeks to 
understand how individuals perceive their responsibilities. Responsibility, whether local or 
global, requires the individual to accept their role in the system that either allows injustice or 
fails to act. All people have some responsibility for human rights, such as helping a neighbor 
when possible, ethical shopping, raising awareness, voting, all the way to those who have greater 
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power taking greater actions. The power of the individual citizen and the power of the political 
leaders are very different, but they all have responsibility to act within their capacities.  
Furthermore, Ackerly (2018) calls for connecting people, which is one of the main strengths of 
digital technology. Individuals can both learn about global human rights abuses and network 
with others for the purpose of addressing these abuses. This addresses human rights abuses at the 
root of the problem, rather than just addressing the manifestations of abuse. Another way digital 
technology is able to enhance the efficacy of collective action is to provide a central forum for 
organization and debate. Van Stekenburg and Klandermans (2017) found that the informational 
and logistical support provided by formal organizations during collective action can now also be 
provided by social media if those organizations are not present or inadequate.  LeFebvre and 
Armstrong (2018) point out, “Because social media platforms allow for speedy information 
dissemination and low-cost forms of communication, they have been utilized by many groups 
hoping to mobilize citizens for physical engagement in protest events. Additionally, social media 
platforms serve as an outlet to those unable or uninterested in participating in physical protests 
allowing them to remain engaged with the subjects and their broader social implications” (p. 12). 
 The literature thus far provides a solid foundation for the expanded examination of these 
interrelated concepts. The Civic Culture was groundbreaking scholarship, but in the fifty-plus 
years since its publication the conditions of the world have changed. It also was limited in its 
inward-looking scope that examined the individual’s role in domestic politics but did not inquire 
about any global outlook. As the world has gotten smaller, responsibility ought not be confined 
to one’s local community. This shrinking world has also led to the competing ideologies of 
populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Those who feel threatened by globalization have 
sought out a return to what they perceive as a simpler time with certain moral and ethical 
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implications. Political movements have drawn on this discontent. Conversely, those who 
embrace a growing connectedness have to consider what responsibility these new conditions 
entail.  
The world has also changed with respect to conflict. Whereas the twenty-first century 
witnessed some of the worst conflicts occurring between states, the new century has seen a move 
towards more intrastate conflict (Waller, 2001).  Human rights and international law now have to 
address conflict that takes place within a state by actors not always clearly defined as 
belligerents. Traditional thought focused on a concern for the horrors inflicted on civilians as a 
byproduct of war between states, but now much of the threat comes from the state itself. When 
looking specifically at the gravest of human rights atrocities, the Responsibility to Protect was 
meant to address this previously ignored threat. However, among the flaws with R2P is the 
expectation that problems within a state should be solved through the collective action of states. 
When connecting these concerns with a greater cosmopolitan responsibility, new opportunities 
emerge to aid in the protection and promotion of human rights.   
At the forefront of these changes driven by globalization and digital technology are 
digital natives, those who have come of age when the internet has been the standard rather than 
the exception. Digital natives are poised to reshape the changing world. The central research 
question is, how do the advancements of the digital age impact individuals’ sense of 
responsibility at the local and global level and how do they act upon that responsibility? 
Responsibility is a normative question, so rather than address the various ethical theories on it, 
this project will seek to understand how digital natives view their responsibilities and what 
actions they take in furtherance of them. The attitudes of digital natives must be examined within 
the context of the human rights discourse. Human rights are only as real as their enforcement and 
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for them to continue expanding, they must be supported by a growing number of people. As 
cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism both offer a claim of responsibility, how are digital 
natives responding to these changing conditions? Previously, inaction could be blamed on a 
claim of not knowing about atrocities being committed in other places, but as the world becomes 
more connected these excuses no longer offer any defense. Will digital natives feel a sense of 
responsibility for those beyond their own borders, or will they decide that domestic claims are 
more worthy of attention? This research sheds light on this debate and also offers a better 
understanding of digital natives.  
With the focus of this work being framed by digital natives, it is important to understand 
the scope of the digital technology that is shaping their world. Beyond the generational shift, 
digital natives are impacted by growing communication technologies that build bridges over 
territorial borders. Digital natives are unique in having grown up within this new world, so in the 
next chapter an extensive look will be taken into the history and evolution of the digital age.  
  




Digital Realities, Digital Possibilities 
 
I know everyone here…even if I’ve never met them, never talked to them, may never hear from 
them again…I know you all… 
[…] 
We exist without skin color, without nationality, without religious bias… 
- The Conscience of a Hacker, 19867 
-  
The Conscience of a Hacker, more widely known as The Hacker Manifesto, written by 
hacker “The Mentor” in 1986, was an angst-filled tirade against traditional society and a vision 
of the meaning disillusioned youth were finding in the online world. The internet provides 
anonymity, yet also fosters strong connections amongst various groups. It brings the entire world 
into the screen of anyone with an internet connection. It transcends national borders and creates 
groups that share a strong bond without ever meeting in person. The internet has created a means 
by which people can connect globally in real time. But the internet is a means, not an end in and 
of itself, and like any means, its utility is found in how it is used. It has the capacity to advance 
both civil society and democratic responsibilities. It can also advance human rights through 
greater awareness and avenues of international engagement. As access to the internet continues 
to expand, it will bring these opportunities to new communities the world over. This chapter 
details the development of the digital age and the technology that drives it. Understanding the 
means available to digital natives allows for a better understanding of how they view and act 
upon their responsibilities. The digital age provides a number of both opportunities and risks for 
better civic engagement and global responsibilities, including immense implications for human 
rights. This chapter is about the technology and trends that enable digital natives to have a 
 
7 Also known as The Hacker Manifesto, written by hacker “The Mentor” (born Loyd Blankenship) 
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greater means by which to exercise their civic and global responsibility and the challenges that 
they also must endure.  
The Digital Age  
 
 Arguably, the roots of the digital age (also known as the information age) can be traced 
as far back as the 1930s with the work of Alan Turing at Bletchley Park in the United Kingdom 
and Vannever Bush at the National Defense Research Committee in the United States (see 
Campbell-Kelly et al. 2014). Driven by the needs of the defense industry, computers were 
developed as an innovation of warfare. The modern digital age began to develop in the 1970s 
and 1980s with digital communications replacing many of its analog counterparts. Credit cards 
with magnetic strips, computer readable universal codes on products, and perhaps the most 
critical innovation, personal computers, began to be ubiquitous. With the Altair 8800 (in 1975), 
Apple II and TRS-80 (in 1977), and IBM Personal Computer (in 1981), personal computers and 
their progeny became household fixtures with growing adaptation over the next two decades 
(Campbell-Kelly et al. 2014). As the number of personal computers rose globally, so too did the 
functions they could perform. In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee, working at the European Council for 
Nuclear Research (CERN) in Switzerland, developed the World Wide Web, which enabled 
online users to access global information sharing technology (Norris, 2001). With the rise of 
connected networks (the internet) that allowed users to access the global store of digital 
resources (World Wide Web), global connectivity became an ever evolving and expanding fact 
of life. “In the fall of 1990 there were just 313,000 computers attached to the Internet; five years 
later that number was approaching 10 million, and by the end of 2000 the number had exceeded 
100 million” (Ibid, p. 137). The digital age represents a movement from a society shaped by 
traditional industry to one shaped by global communications and access to information. 
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Digital Natives and Digital Immigrants 
 
 The first generation born into the modern digital age, digital natives, also called the Net 
Generation (N-Gen), Millennials, and Generation Y, are those born roughly between 1980 and 
2000 and have grown up with the existence of the internet (Economist, 2000). For digital natives, 
technology is the norm rather than the exception. They have grown up with digital technology 
and have become the first users of many digital platforms. Tapscott (1998) discusses the unique 
circumstances in which digital natives (or N-Gen as he prefers to call them) live and their 
capacities: “from their fingertips they can transverse the world. They have new powerful tools 
for inquiry, analysis, self-expression, influence, and play. They have unprecedented mobility. 
They are shrinking the planet in ways their parents could never imagine” (p. 3). Friedman (2005) 
also shares this vision of a smaller or “flatter” world in which global connections and 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been the driving force in creating 
“Globalization 3.0” in which progress is largely driven by individuals and networks. Those who 
have not been raised surrounded by digital technology are referred to as digital immigrants. “As 
Digital Immigrants learn—like all immigrants, some better than others—to adapt to their 
environment, they always retain, to some degree, their ‘accent,’ that is, their foot in the past. The 
‘digital immigrant accent’ can be seen in such things as turning to the Internet for information 
second rather than first” (Prensky, 2011, p. 5). Digital immigrants must learn new ways in which 
things are done whereas digital natives embrace such technology as the status quo. Digital 
natives speak, as their first language, what digital immigrants must learn as their second.  
 There are ongoing attempts to understand what exactly defines this generation of digital 
natives, and if they share commonalities besides the period in which they were born. Many 
observers wrongly associate digital natives with an innate competency of digital technology. 
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While many digital natives may have a proficiency in digital technology, information literacy, 
and general computer skills, it would be erroneous to assume that all digital natives will possess 
such skills (Bennett, Maton, & Kervin, 2008; Sorgo, et al., 2017). The Economist (2010) notes, 
“discussions about ‘digital citizens’ run into the same problems as those about digital natives: 
there may simply be too much economic, geographic, and demographic disparity within this 
group to make meaningful generalisations [sic].” Tapscott (1998) presents an optimist view of 
digital natives, claiming, “They are more knowledgeable than any previous generation and they 
are deeply concerned about social issues. They believe strongly in individual rights such as 
privacy and rights to information. But they have no ethos of individualism, thriving, rather, from 
close interpersonal networks and displaying a strong sense of social responsibility” (p. 9). 
History shall be the final arbiter of the defining characteristics of this generation, but the modern 
digital age is already having noticeable effects on society, which can be studied. 
Internet as an Active Medium 
 
 One of the key innovations of the internet has been the capacity to not only passively 
receive information, but the ability to create, disseminate, and interact with the information 
received. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue (2011) stated, “with the advent of Web 2.0 services, or 
intermediary platforms that facilitate participatory information sharing and collaboration in the 
creation of content, individuals are no longer passive recipients, but also active publishers of 
information” (p. 6). Tapscott (1998) further explains that “Time spent on the Net is not passive 
time, it’s active time. It’s reading time. It’s investigation time. It’s skill development and 
problem-solving time. It’s time analyzing, evaluating. It’s composing your thoughts time. It’s 
writing time” (Tapscott, 1998, p. 8). Traditional media, such as newspapers, radio, and 
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television, all provided a one-directional source of information with the viewer consuming the 
information received. There was no way to participate in that creation, interact with it, or do 
anything other than consume. The internet has changed the flow of information from passive 
consumption to interactive exploration which changes the way people interact with information. 
This offers new avenues by which information is created, shared, and consumed, as well as 
offering an outlet for engagement.  
Risks for the Digital Age 
 
 While the digital age has produced a great many benefits, which will be discussed in 
detail shortly, there are always risks that accompany such opportunity. The digital age has 
produced a generation with the greatest access to information in history, but not everyone has 
access to this plethora of knowledge. Even when individuals have that access, they must sort the 
labyrinth of misinformation, disinformation, false reports, and fake news. The quote ironically 
misattributed to Mark Twain that “a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is 
still putting on its shoes” has gained an even greater saliency in the digital age (Chokshi, 2017). 
Finally, the two risks most relevant for what is being examined in this dissertation: negative 
impacts on political engagement and a tool for the abuse of human rights, both of which will be 
discussed shortly. When examining the attitudes of digital natives towards civic and global 
responsibility, it is important to acknowledge the risks involved. As such, this dissertation will 
examine digital natives’ views on both media consumption and trust, along with political 
attitudes in order to determine the impact of these problems. 
Digital Divide 
 
 The term digital divide has been used to describe the gap between educators (most of 
whom are digital immigrants) and students (digital natives), focusing on how traditional 
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pedagogy is no longer meeting the needs of current students (see Bauerlein, 2011). However, this 
term has also been used to describe the wide disparity in access to the technology that has 
defined the digital age. The digital divide is a broad term used to define several of the gaps in 
internet access. “The global divide refers to the divergence of Internet access between 
industrialized and developing societies. The social divide concerns the gap between information 
rich and poor in each nation. And finally, within the online community, the democratic divide 
signifies the difference between those who do, and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to 
engage, mobilize, and participate in public life” (Norris, 2001, p. 4). Rifkin (2000) also writes 
about the digital divide as a result of what he calls “Hypercapitalism,” which is the 
commodification of everyday life. With more and more critical aspects of life (everything from 
banking, to healthcare, to civic debate) moving to the digital realm, the digital divide is a very 
real concern. In a digital world, the lack of access caused by the digital divide also means a lack 
of access to markets, institutions, information, and more. The benefits, and risks, of the digital 
age are only available to those able to access the possibilities offered by the internet.  
In 2017, there were over 2.46 billion social media users worldwide, with 208.9 million in 
the United States – or 78% of the U.S. population (Clement, 2018). These numbers are likely to 
increase as digital technology becomes an ingrained part of everyday life.  In the United States, 
“Ninety-two percent of adolescents aged 13–17 go online daily, with 73% having access to a 
smartphone and 45% reporting daily use of social media at an average of 2 hours per day” 
(James et al., 2017, p. S72). However, while the overall statistics are encouraging for this 
domestic population, there still exists a social divide in which the wealthy are more likely to 
have access than the poor. “School-age children in lower-income households are especially 
likely to lack broadband access. Roughly one-third of households with children ages six to 17 
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and whose annual income falls below $30,000 a year do not have a high-speed internet 
connection at home, compared with just 6% of such households earning $75,000 or more a year” 
(Anderson & Perrin, 2018). The global divide is even more stark. From 1993 to 2015, global 
internet access has moved from 1% to nearly 44% with almost every single country showing 
drastic upward trends in access (World Bank, 2017). While internet access continues to favor 
countries with greater wealth, the upward trends continue for all regions. Unlike the previous two 
aspects of the digital divide, the democratic divide is a bit harder to measure. There is a wide 
variety of ways in which an individual can use digital technology to be engaged in civic and 
political life, from researching a topic online or signing an online petition, to coordinating 
national protests. There are passive consumers of content and creators of content. Examining the 
state of the democratic divide is beyond the scope of this chapter, but aspects of its impacts will 
be discussed throughout this dissertation.  
Separating Truth from Fiction 
 
Another pitfall of social media is the echo chamber effect of self-selecting the opinions 
and views wanted by users. This can lead to the user being exposed to a much greater amount of 
information that is not critical of one’s own viewpoint. It can also lead to online social pressure 
to not express unpopular or divergent opinions. Kim (2016) found that “Those with weak or 
moderate levels of partisan strength were less likely to express their minority views, which led to 
decrease their political participation in the real world…[however], for those with strong 
partisanship, perceived opinion climates on Facebook do not have any impact on physical 
participation” (p. 700). There is also cause for concern because of the susceptibility of those who 
consume information on social networks without any critical assessment. Warner-Soderholm et 
al., (2017) found that “Younger individuals trust social media more than older individuals in 
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terms of integrity and competence [and those] who use social media the most trust social media 
more than those who use social media only once a day” (p. 310). With such an excess of 
information and opinion, those who seek to inform themselves via the internet must have the 
capacity to separate truth from fiction. Objective news and biased commentary must not be 
treated at the same level of reverence. Digital competency (understanding of the digital world 
and the means by which to navigate it) must be a critical aspect of education in the digital age.  
The issue of what constitutes actual information needed by citizens in a democratic 
nation is not a new question. Writing in 1890, Warren and Brandeis bemoaned:  
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is 
potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative 
importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of people. When 
personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for 
matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and 
thoughtless mistake its relative importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to 
that weak side of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the 
misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps 
the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once 
robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no 
generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence (p. 196).  
 
Not all information is pertinent to one’s own life, much less that of a citizen in their deliberation 
of the important issues of the day. Somewhat ironically, the digital age (the information age) 
allows access to the near totality of all human knowledge, but the user is inundated with the 
trivial and benign. Along with such useless information, the digital age presents a formidable 
obstacle in the pursuit of truth, namely misinformation or disinformation.  
For better or worse, the wealth of information provided by the digital age must be 
deciphered between what is true and what is false.  The effort required may seem taxing to some, 
but it needn’t be. Kim (2016) offers a more optimistic view on the possible implications of social 
media’s echo chamber: 
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The results of this study suggest that if Facebook users are selectively exposed to 
news content or postings with attitudinal congruence, no one may feel to be a 
minority on Facebook. Selective exposure to congruent political content on 
Facebook may lead Facebook users who support different political camps (liberals 
or conservatives) to perceive opinion distribution on Facebook to be congenial or 
supportive, which may increase voices from both sides of the political spectrum 
on Facebook and promote political engagement in the real world (p. 700). 
 
Jimmy Wales (2018), the co-founder of Wikipedia, also holds a more optimistic view of the 
threat posed by misinformation on the internet. He notes that people have the ability to take 
simple steps to check the accuracy of the information online.  
Slacktivism 
 
When examining how digital natives interpret and act upon their responsibilities, it is 
important to remember that there are fears that the digital age will actually have a negative 
impact on engagement. As a developing field, there have been many terms used to describe 
activism that takes place online but has little to no effect on traditional civic engagement. This 
phenomenon has been called slacktivism (Christensen, 2011), clicktivism (Lilleker & Koc-
Michalska, 2017), among other terms.  Christensen (2011) defines slacktivism as “political 
activities that have no impact on real-life political outcomes, but only serve to increase the feel-
good factor of the participants” (pg. 1). Things such as posting a political opinion on social 
media without any real engagement or taking concrete steps to affect change are the activities 
that may bring a feel-good factor but have no real political outcomes. Howard et al. (2016) put 
forth the slacktivism hypothesis as “the supposition that if Internet or social media use increases, 
civic engagement declines” (p. 57). In a survey of a sample of the British electorate, Lilleker and 
Koc-Michalska (2017) found that online political participation is more the result of extrinsic 
motivations in which the user seeks recognition from others rather than a desire to affect change, 
which is more commonly observed with offline political behavior. (p. 35). Cabrera, Matias, and 
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Montoya (2017) summarize the debate by pointing to two very differing perspectives: 
“…conservative commentator Andres Sullivan (2009) proclaiming during the uprising in Iran 
‘The revolution will be Twittered,’ as he saw social media playing a central role in fostering 
social change. Conversely, Malcom Gladwell (2010) delivered a scathing critique of Internet 
activism in ‘Small Change: Why the revolution will not be tweeted.’” (p. 400). Sullivan (2009) 
viewed the campaign of Barack Obama for president in the United States and the popular 
uprisings in Iran as evidence of the power of social media, Gladwell (2010) believed that 
compared to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, social movements on social media lack 
leadership, structure, and meaningful and lasting connections. The central argument in this 
debate is whether online activism can provide a valuable substitute for in-person civic 
engagement. This issue will be examined within this dissertation specifically by looking at 
whether online traditional activism is coupled with traditional political action. 
Several studies have refuted the claim that online activism is limited in scope and that it 
has replaced traditional means of political engagement. Shah et al. (2005) conducted an early 
study of the impact of the internet on political engagement. Using survey data from 1999 – 2000, 
they found that “Online information seeking and interactive civic messaging—uses of the Web 
as a resource and a forum—both strongly influence civic engagement, often more so than do 
traditional print and broadcast media and face-to-face communication” (Shah et al., 2005, p. 
551). Online political engagement supplements traditional political engagement rather than 
supplanting it. Citing Dynamics of Cause Engagement, a 2011 study from Georgetown 
University’s Center for Social Impact Communication, Dutt and Rasul (2014) explain, 
“’slacktivists’ were twice as likely as others to engage in activities like volunteering, donating 
and recruiting others for a cause. Their social media support supplemented offline activism.” (p. 
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433). Skoric et al. (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 22 studies relating to social media and 
civic engagement and found strong evidence of a positive relationship between the two.  They 
note, “this is consistent with the findings from an earlier meta-analysis by Boulianne (2009) who 
argued that easy and expanded access to diverse political information might reinvigorate citizen 
participation by improving political knowledge and stimulating political discussion” (Skoric et 
al., 2016, p.1833).  Studies involving British voters (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Segesten 
& Bossetta, 2017), protesters in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2014), and Wisconsin protests 
(Macafee & De Simone8, 2012) have all found that online activism does contribute to traditional 
political participation. 
Human Rights Abuses  
 
For all the possibilities raised by digital technology, it can also empower those who 
would use its capacities for evil. Repressive states can use technology to censor and monitor 
public discourse. “It is true that the internet can provide an outlet for political expression for 
people living under repressive regimes. But those regimes are also likely to monitor the internet 
closely. And in some cases there is, in effect, a new social contract: do what you like online, as 
long as you steer clear of politics” (Economist, 2010). Stories such as China being accused of 
using facial recognition software to silence dissidents (Standaert, 2018), and hate speech that 
drove the genocide against the Rohingya in Myanmar being spread via social networking sites 
like Facebook (Al Jazeera, 2018) are becoming commonplace. Terrorist groups can use the 
internet to spread their ideology of hate and recruit new members. The anonymity provided by 
the internet can allow hate speech to flourish. However, the ability of governments to stifle and 
suppress media does not always work out in their favor. “The protests [in Egypt during the Arab 
 
8 It should be noted that Macfee and De Simone found a positive relationship between expressive online behavior 
and political activism, but the same was not true for those who engaged solely in online informational behavior. 
AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
55 
 
Spring] gained momentum as a result of Mubarak’s electronic communication blackout, as the 
loss of connectivity further alienated the generation of ‘Internet youth’ and served as a tipping 
point for many previously unaffiliated citizens who began to sympathize with the movement” 
(Cattle, 2016, p. 419). Like any tool, the power exists in how it is wielded.    
Opportunities for the Digital Age 
 
While the risks and pitfalls of the digital age may seem daunting, there also exists a 
tremendous amount of potential. With the near infinite number of possibilities, this dissertation 
will limit the focus to two specific avenues: the impact on civic and political engagement, and 
the impact on the protection and promotion of human rights. The digital age provides access to 
information; it provides ways to network with diverse communities and express opinions. It 
challenges the narratives of state-controlled media and allows individuals to both create and 
disseminate content. The internet can be both a democratizing force and a powerful ally in the 
fight for human rights. This dissertation examines the extent to which digital natives believe in 
the democratizing force of the internet, social media, and their smart phones.  
The impact of the digital age on civic engagement and political participation is only 
beginning to be understood. The literature thus far suggests a positive impact, but there are still 
many unknowns. “Across most advanced industrial democracies, citizens use the online 
environment to provide and gather information; to network with colleagues, friends, and 
supporters; and to interact” (Koc-Michalska et al., 2016, p. 1807). These digital tools will only 
spread as the technology is made available to more and more people globally. 
 The digital age has created a myriad of opportunities to further political participation. 
“Access to social media per se usually does not turn people into engaged citizens; yet, to the 
extent that the political can discursively arise, the Internet and social media take on an important 
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public-sphere function of discussion” (Dahlgren, 2018, p. 2059). Social media, and digital 
technology of all sorts, is not a sufficient condition to create participation, but it does create 
conditions to further both participation and to introduce those who may not consider themselves 
politically active to issues that may bring about their participation. Digital technology, 
particularly social networking sites, facilitates political participation through lowering the 
barriers to entry, disseminating information, providing access to a wider audience and greater 
range of opinions, expanding the ways in which individuals can contribute to political affairs, 
and uniting those who share common beliefs and causes. The importance of access to 
information cannot be understated. Gil de Zuniga et al. (2012) found that “seeking information 
via social network sites is a positive and significant predictor of people’s social capital and civic 
and political participatory behaviors, online and offline” (p. 319). Traditional political 
participation has been divided between latent and manifest activities (Ekman & Amna, 2012; 
Segesten & Bossetta, 2017) but even those distinctions are being challenged by the digital age. 
Latent action such as discussing political issues on a social networking site, even if it takes place 
between two people, can become a manifest action in that others can see and reflect or take 
action based on what would have once been considered a private conversation. Digital 
technology also acts as a democratizing agent insofar as it offers greater inclusion and 
opportunities to be engaged both locally and globally. Kavada (2016) states that “Digital media 
are thought to facilitate more decentralized, dispersed, temporary and individualized forms of 
political action that subvert the notion of the collective as singular, unified, homogeneous, 
coherent, and mass” (p. 8). Lee and Chan (2014) examined the role of digital tools in the annual 
protests remembering Tiananmen Square, and found that not only does online activism 
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contribute to successful in-person protesting, but it also contributes to individuals taking up 
leadership roles. 
Media play a significant role in shaping the discourse and message of any public topic. 
The framing effect of media has had a tremendous impact on politics and the way a topic is 
viewed by observers (Borah, 2018). In 1944, Vice President Henry Wallace warned of the 
dangers of the manipulation of public information: 
The really dangerous American fascist... is the man who wants to do in the United 
States in an American way what Hitler did in Germany in a Prussian way. The 
American fascist would prefer not to use violence. His method is to poison the 
channels of public information. With a fascist the problem is never how best to 
present the truth to the public but how best to use the news to deceive the public 
into giving the fascist and his group more money or more power... They claim to 
be super-patriots, but they would destroy every liberty guaranteed by the 
Constitution. They demand free enterprise, but are the spokesmen for monopoly 
and vested interest. Their final objective, toward which all their deceit is directed, 
is to capture political power so that, using the power of the state and the power of 
the market simultaneously, they may keep the common man in eternal subjection 
(p.7). 
 
When the primary means of information was newspapers, radio, and television, the media could, 
to a certain degree, be monitored or regulated by governments. Howard (2010) notes the 
diffusion of media that has changed the ability of governments to control how discussions are 
framed. He notes, “That mobile phones and the internet help political parties compete, journalists 
investigate, and civic groups organize is a result of technology diffusion” (p. 180).  
The digital age has the capacity to be the great democratizer in many ways. A mobile 
phone with internet access is a tool with fantastic capacities. The public square, so long held as 
the idyllic manifestation of a democratic society, is no longer a physically bounded space, with 
all the limits that location creates; it is now a hand-held device that people carry with them. 
Nearly the entire wealth of human knowledge exists within the storage of the internet. The 
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mobile phone has become both a library and a megaphone, allowing the user to learn, discuss, 
disseminate, and advocate.  
Human Rights in the Digital Age 
 
Much of the conversation surrounding human rights and the digital age centers on the 
question of whether access to the internet is a human right. In 2011, Frank La Rue, submitted a 
report to the Human Rights Council in which he reaffirmed the rights of freedom of opinion and 
expression, and identified the internet as an “enabler” of rights which warrants human rights 
protections9. Many news outlets interpreted this report as a call to make internet access a right in 
and of itself (see LA Times, 2011; Kravets, 2011). In 2012, Vinton Cert, often considered the 
father of the internet, penned an op-ed in the New York Times in which he argued “technology is 
an enabler of rights, not a right itself.” Cert acknowledged that the UN Report did not label it as 
such, but he sought to expressly state that any such human rights were those facilitated by the 
internet, not the technology itself. He closed with the statement, “Improving the Internet is just 
one means, albeit an important one, by which to improve the human condition. It must be done 
with an appreciation for the civil and human rights that deserve protection—without pretending 
that access itself is such a right” (Cert, 2012, A25).  
However, there is also a strong foundation for why access should be considered a human 
right. Mathiesen (2014) presents a convincing argument on the need to view access to the 
internet as a derived human right, rather than a primary right. She says, “there are good practical 
reasons to consider derived rights human rights. While Cerf is correct that we should not get too 
focused on means at the expense of ends, we also should not get so focused on ends that we 
forget that we must have the necessary means” (Mathiesen, 2014, p. 7). The internet is a vehicle 
 
9 The importance of the internet as a means of protecting and promoting human rights was again affirmed in a non-
binding resolution of the Human Rights Council in 2016. See A/HRC/22/L.20. 
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by which many rights are realized, such as, access to information, freedom of speech and 
expression, freedom of assembly, and many others. Furthermore, Mathiesen emphasizes a need 
for a “Declaration of Human Rights” in order to clarify “what human rights require in the digital 
realm and how ICTs may enhance or threaten our ability to respect, protect, and fulfill a wide 
variety of human rights” (Ibid, p. 7). Frank La Rue (2011), United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, has described 
the internet as an enabler of human rights, warranting special protections. This question of 
internet access (including freedoms of information, expression, censorship, etc.) has been 
examined by a growing number of scholars (Crawford, 2003; Penney, 2011; Winter, 2013; Tully, 
2014; Joyce, 2015). Advocates of treating access as a human right have pointed out that such a 
right is necessary, especially in light of countries such as Syria and Turkey who have shut down 
access to promote state interests (Howell & West, 2016). Viewing access to the internet as a 
human right exists not only in the theoretical realm, but also in state policy. Realizing the 
importance of internet access in the digital age, countries such as Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, 
France, and Spain have already taken legal steps to either make access a right, or at least increase 
the availability of such access (Cattle, 2016). Suvi Linden, Finland’s communication minister in 
2010, stated, “We considered the role of the internet in Finns everyday life. Internet services are 
no longer just for entertainment” (BBC, 2010). The internet is critical for information, speech, 
commerce and trade, and many other parts of everyday life and as such, more countries are 
searching for ways to ensure open and affordable access. 
For this dissertation, the more relevant issue surrounds the impact of the digital age on 
the protection and promotion of human rights. Collaborators who may never meet in person can 
plan social movements.  Organizers can communicate through email, FaceTime, virtual 
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meetings, or the hundreds of instant messaging platforms available to them. Social movements 
often have a Facebook page to help with outreach and planning. They have events pages to 
spread awareness about direct action. They promote the movement through planned hashtags on 
Twitter. With any luck, their hashtag will become trending, bringing more awareness to the 
cause. Photos of public demonstrations are posted on Instagram. Live streaming of events may 
be broadcast simultaneously on Facebook, Instagram, and Periscope. All these social media posts 
will likely be shared by supporters, casual observers, and even enemies criticizing the cause. 
Supporters from around the world will send messages of encouragement, along with likes, 
shares, and retweets. The traditional image of a protest, groups walking with signs and placards, 
now has an additional element: the smart phone. Hands will rise above crowd, sharing images of 
scene with friends and strangers online. Any altercation with authorities or opposition groups 
will quickly bring about a sea of phones recording from every angle.  
The internet has become a means through which the expression of fundamental human 
rights may be both exercised and protected.  Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.” Although written in 1948, the 
UDHR still maintains its relevance for the protection and promotion of human rights. The 
internet has become a means of “receiving and imparting information…regardless of frontiers.” 
Cattle (2016) notes that the internet serves to “[protect] communication and affiliation—
including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association…[and has a 
role in] addressing issues such as discrimination, equal access, and women’s rights” (p. 420).   
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 Messages can be conveyed to every person with access to the internet in real time. The 
power of the internet to mobilize large segments of the population has not gone unnoticed by 
governments seeking to subjugate dissidents. Countries such as Nepal in 2005, Myanmar in 
2007, and Egypt in 2011, have all taken down internet access on a national scale during times of 
perceived threat from popular uprisings (Cattle, 2016). La Rue (2011) explains, “The vast 
potential and benefits of the Internet are rooted in its unique characteristics such as speed, 
worldwide reach and relative anonymity. At the same time, these distinctive features of the 
Internet that enable individuals to disseminate information in ‘real time’ and to mobilize people 
has also created fear amongst Governments and the powerful” (p. 7).  
The internet serves a critical role “in countries where there is no independent media, as 
they enable individuals to share critical views and to find objective information. Furthermore, 
producers of traditional media can also use the Internet to greatly expand their audiences at 
nominal cost. More generally, by enabling individuals to exchange information and ideas 
instantaneously and inexpensively across national borders, the Internet allows access to 
information and knowledge that was previously unattainable” (La Rue, 2011, p. 7). Additionally, 
traditional media no longer maintains a monopoly on information to which the public has access. 
“Digital technology now enables people to directly advocate for fundamental human rights, 
providing new models for engagement and community building. The Internet, mobile phones, 
satellite television, and other digital technologies provide platforms on which individuals and 
organizations employ combinations of images, audio, video and text to raise awareness about 
social, political and economic struggles, mobilizing global audiences” (Dutt & Rasul, 2014, p. 
427). 
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Dutt and Rasul (2014) identify five ways in which digital technology is transforming 
human rights protection: (1) transforming relations between human rights organizations and 
constituents; (2) redefining who can be an activist; (3) giving voice to marginalized people; (4) 
creating new methods for delivering help; and (5) transforming how human rights abuses are 
documented and monitored (pp. 428-430). For this dissertation, redefining who can be an activist 
will be a critical part of the development of cosmopolitan responsibility. The digital age allows 
people to become activists by spreading awareness, contacting elected officials, engaging in 
campaigns, and many other actions from their home, regardless of where they are. People who 
are physically close to human rights problems can now become monitors and reporters through 
the use of a cell phone. In many ways, digital technology breaks down the physical and 
geographic barriers that previously divided society. Digital technology allows for little or no-cost 
communication between organizations and members. It also creates new avenues in which the 
public can interact with human rights organizations. Digital technology allows individuals to 
play a greater role in the protection and promotion of human rights through access to 
information, ability to document and report, and by creating networks for cooperation between 
states, civil society, and the public. As it relates to human rights, digital technology is already 
having a tremendous impact. The ICISS notes, “The revolution in information technology has 
made global communications instantaneous and provided unprecedented access to information 
worldwide. The result has been an enormously heightened awareness of conflicts wherever they 
may be occurring, combined with immediate and often very compelling visual images of the 
resultant suffering” (2001, pp. 6–7). The digital age has brought forth a wave of 
communicational and organizational power that can be harnessed to both protect and promote 
human rights. 





 One aspect of the digital age that impacts responsibility at the local and global levels is 
the way in which it allows for contact between people. Allport (1954) found that various types of 
contact between out-groups fostered better understanding and can “lead to the perception of 
common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups” (p. 281). As 
people interact with one another, they develop an understanding of the other, which can lead to 
feelings of empathy and respect. Amichai-Hamburger et al. (2015) notes that “The numerous 
open groups and the ease of creating groups online makes it easier than ever before to open a 
discussion group where members have shared interests with the outgroup [sic]” (p. 521). Prior to 
the digital age, such contact would require physical interaction with others. Even corresponding 
with someone by mail or phone required having a preexisting familiarity with the other, or a way 
to be put into contact with the other. The internet allows for people to search for others with 
shared interests through websites, chat rooms, discussion groups, and other such mediums.  
Discussion 
 
The impacts of the modern digital age, the revolutionary expanse of information 
communication technologies, and the attitudes of the digital native generation are still 
developing. Optimists have heralded the digital age as the savior of democracy and a unifying 
force in a divided world. Pessimists have bemoaned the idea of “armchair activists” and new 
tools for dictators to oppress their people. “We have become accustomed to greeting the new, 
including new technology, via the discursive polarities of utopia and dystopia” (Papacharissi, 
2010, p. 7). The digital age is neither utopia nor one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse. It 
has the potential to enhance civic participation, but only if populations have access and are 
willing to be engaged citizens. It also has the capacity to further global human rights. The digital 
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age is a democratizing utility, but only to the extent individuals are willing to use it as such. 
Digital technology is breaking down barriers between countries and cultures and allowing for 
greater interaction between all connected peoples. 
This chapter has detailed the advancements of the digital age and the opportunities and 
risks present for digital natives in acting upon their responsibilities. In order to answer the central 
research question posed herein—how do the advancements of the digital age impact individuals’ 
sense of responsibility at the local and global level and what actions do they take to act on that 
responsibility—it is necessary to understand what the digital age means in terms of a changing 
society. This chapter shows that along with numerous risks such as access, information overload, 
misinformation, slacktivism, et cetera, there are also ample opportunities for digital natives to be 
better informed and more engaged than any other generation in history. Having now detailed the 
existing literature on these issues and explored the digital age, the next chapter will explain how 
this research project was formulated and carried out, including the hypotheses that will be 
answered in later chapters.  
  




Methods and Descriptives 
 
 Building on the existing literature discussed in the second chapter and the conditions of 
the digital age discussed in the third chapter, Chapter IV will be a discussion of what questions 
will be answered in this dissertation and the means by which those answers may be discovered. 
The central question of this dissertation is one of responsibility. Empowered by the digital age, 
people now have an ability to affect change through democratic institutions at home and abroad. 
How do digital natives, those born into a world in which internet access is part of everyday life, 
internalize that responsibility and what actions do they take to produce change? Broadly 
speaking, this dissertation seeks to examine the opinions and attitudes of digital natives 
concerning civic obligation and global responsibility for human rights. To that end, a survey was 
created to test several hypotheses put forth in this dissertation: 
H1: The typology of parochial, subject, and participant developed by Almond and Verba 
(1963) will remain useful in understanding how individuals embrace their civic 
responsibility, but with a lower number of parochials. 
Almond and Verba (1963) believed that three types of citizens would be found in every 
democracy. Democracy requires civic engagement, yet it does not mandate it. Citizens ought to 
be involved in a meaningful way but there are no coercive measures forcing them to do so. As 
such, Almond and Verba grouped citizens into three levels of engagement: subject, parochial, 
and participant. I hypothesize a lower number of parochials because of greater access to 
information in the digital age. Democracy still requires engagement, and it is not forced, but 
having greater awareness of the impact of government should create an environment that drives 
civic engagement.  
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One of the unique hallmarks of the digital age is the unprecedented amount of available 
information and the vast expansion of access. From word-of-mouth to newspapers, then radios 
and television, to the cornucopia of instant media provided by the internet, information is coming 
in greater quantities and at faster speeds. Digital natives have more information available to them 
than any previous generation. While the quantity of information is greater in the digital age, it 
does not necessarily indicate a greater quality of information. This greater quantity of 
information also includes greater obstacles to discerning valuable information from everything 
else. These obstacles include information overload (being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 
information available), misinformation (incorrect information), disinformation (purposely false 
information designed to mislead or support a specific agenda), echo chambers (only accessing 
information that fits a person’s preconceived beliefs and/or only associating with those who 
share a person’s beliefs), and distraction (the banality of clickbait and gossip that entertains 
rather than informs). Finally, the speed of information hinders contemplation and discernment. 
Rather than giving careful consideration to information, people are encouraged to respond 
instantly. This leads to emotional rather than reasoned responses. This atmosphere of seemingly 
limitless information paired with chaos of information distortion presents both opportunities and 
obstacles for civic engagement.  
H2: Civic engagement will expand beyond traditional means and include new avenues of 
engagement, such as digital means, available to digital natives. (Shah et al., 2005; 
Boulianne, 2009; Skoric et al., 2016) 
Common forms of civic engagement include voting, signing petitions, contacting elected 
representatives, running for political office, participating in protest, and strikes. The digital age 
has created new ways of engaging via digital means such as online networking, digital advocacy, 
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online engagement with elected officials, and more. Traditional engagement (enhanced by digital 
technology) combined with digital engagement creates a more robust arsenal for overall civic 
engagement. This will lead to a new form of civic culture, with similarities to the one described 
by Almond and Verba (1963), but with added layers of complexity produced by the opportunities 
and risks in the digital age. 
H3: The digital age has created capacities by which individuals will be empowered to be 
more engaged at the global level, particularly as it relates to human rights. (Cronin-
Furman, 2010; Luck & Luck, 2015; Piston Hindawi, 2016). 
The digital age has created a means by which people are able to witness actions happening 
globally. Human rights atrocities can be streamed in real time from virtually any locale with an 
internet connection. The information is available to those who seek it. Social media has also 
played a role in connecting people globally who can share their experiences and perspectives 
with all their connections, exposing even parochials to global issues. Increased awareness of the 
perils faced by many may lead to digital natives placing a greater importance on advocating for 
human rights than previous generations. Along with this increased awareness, digital tools exist 
for individuals to take action on issues of concern both locally and globally. There still exists the 
counteracting forces of populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism, but individuals who embrace 
a global responsibility will be better equipped to do something about it.  
H4: Digital natives who display cosmopolitan traits will be more likely to have travelled 
internationally, have more social media contacts from other countries, will be more 
interested in international affairs, and will use a greater variety of news sources. 
(Stevenson, 2005; Benhabib, 2009) 
AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
68 
 
Knowing people from other countries fosters understanding and compassion by humanizing the 
other. Rather than people from other countries being nameless, faceless entities, knowing 
someone creates the recognition of humanity and a familiarity. These connections, be it in person 
or through social media, ought to create an interest in global affairs that is informed by a variety 
of news sources, and conversely: 
H5: Digital natives who display populist nationalism traits will be less likely to travel 
internationally, have fewer social media contacts from other countries, will be more 
interested in domestic affairs, and will use less of a variety of news sources. (Warf, 2012; 
De Matas, 2017) 
These hypotheses arise from the two interrelated concepts of civic culture and global 
responsibility, and how they are both impacted by the digital age. As discussed in Chapter II, 
these areas have never been explored in relation to each other, and even in their individual 
examinations, there are many areas that still require further inquiry. Even Verba (2015) noted the 
changes of the digital age calls for a reexamination of the civic culture. Furthermore, with the 
impacts of globalization, in which the events happening in one locale impact other areas, the 
question of civic responsibility must extend beyond the local community. This has long been the 
argument of cosmopolitans such as Kant (1795), Ypi’s (2008) statist cosmopolitanism, and 
Ackerly’s (2018) just responsibility. Particularly with the global events that necessitated the 
creation of the Responsibility to Protect continuing to occur, the question of how to make it more 
effective must be asked.  
Creating the Survey 
 
In order to examine these issues, a survey was chosen due to the ability to generalize 
from a sample to a population, the ease of distribution, and the ability to reach the widest sample 
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possible (Creswell, 2009). While the concepts are interrelated, there are two main areas of 
inquiry, an examination of civic culture in the digital age and cosmopolitan responsibility. Since 
both civic culture and cosmopolitan responsibility involve questions of changing circumstances 
brought on by the digital age, many of the questions in the survey include elements of digital 
technology. The research design for an examination of civic culture in the digital age is largely 
based on the work of Almond and Verba in their 1963 book The Civic Culture: Political 
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. They asked questions about news consumption, 
political action, political attitudes, and engagement in social activities. Their questions on news 
consumption were expanded to also include questions about digital media. While Almond and 
Verba examined the civic culture of five countries, only their results from the United States are 
being examined here. While they primary used interviews for their method, the questions they 
created for the interview guide are easily transferred to a survey. The survey questions created to 
measure international responsibility will be discussed shorty in the section on the creation of a 
cosmopolitan/populist nationalism scale. Finally, a battery of demographic questions was asked 
including age, gender, academic major, and social activity.  
Creating A Scale 
 
 To assess the attitudes and opinions of digital natives towards their responsibility at a 
global level, it is necessary to create a scale that measures individuals as cosmopolitan or more 
aligned with populist nationalism. This scale makes it possible to identify survey respondents as 
cosmopolitan or populist nationalist, and examine the implications of those worldviews. Leung et 
al. (2015) created a Cosmopolitan Orientation Scale (COS) which they believe reflects the three 
distinct factors of cosmopolitanism: “cultural openness, global prosociality, and respect for 
cultural diversity” (p. 83). Their 15-question scale was narrowed down to six questions in order 
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to keep the survey as brief as possible and in response to initial peer reviews that indicated some 
perceived overlap in the scale. The seven questions that were omitted were deemed to be too 
prone to a social desirability bias or too closely related to the six questions that were selected.  
Questions were taken from all three factors identified by Leung et al. (2015). The six questions 
included on this survey are: 
(C1) I am willing to work abroad in another culture 
(C2) I am willing to live abroad in another culture 
(C3) I enjoy learning more about different cultures in the world 
(C4) I get upset when people do not want to offer help when those in need are foreigners 
(C5) I want to help those in need even if they are from other countries 
(C6) We should celebrate cultural differences 
 
Leung et al. (2015) focused on the relationship between cosmopolitans and environmental 
concerns. While having a cosmopolitanism scale is valuable, it does not fully encompass the 
range of attitudes that this dissertation seeks to examine. Cosmopolitanism and populist 
nationalism are often understood as two ends of a spectrum (Pavel, 2000; Brennan, 2001), but a 
low score on one end does not necessarily indicate strong feelings on the opposite end. To assess 
the level of isolationism and nationalism, the cosmopolitanism scale needs to be expanded. 
Franke and Tuschling (2019) examined national identity amongst college students in the United 
States and their survey included several poignant questions that relate to populist nationalism 
tendencies. Three of their questions that most directly related to the theme of this project were 
included in this survey: 
(PN1) Being an American is important to me 
(PN2) International organizations are taking away too much power from the U.S. government 
(PN3) Immigrants increase crime rates 
 
In order to create a robust isolationism/nationalism scale, additional questions were needed. 
These attitudes promote a responsibility for the nation above any international concerns and 
views foreign affairs through the lens of what serves the domestic interest. There was also a need 
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to address some of the common arguments that have been used against invoking the 
Responsibility to Protect. In 1994, during the Rwandan genocide, Senator Paul Simon urged the 
Clinton administration to act but was told the lack of public support for a humanitarian mission 
in Africa prevented any such action (Simon, 1999). Power (2002) quotes as interview Senator 
Simon gave on the NPR program All Things Considered in which he said, “If every member of 
the House and Senate had received 100 letters from people back home saying we have to do 
something about Rwanda, when the crisis was first developing, then I think the response would 
have been different” (p. 377). For the Responsibility to Protect to succeed, or at least be 
attempted, there must be domestic support for it; therefore, attitudes towards international 
intervention must be examined. To these ends, the following questions were added based on the 
values and beliefs of populist nationalism as defined by Ignazi (2010), Miller (2008), Johnson 
and Frombgen (2009), Fukuyama (2018), and Shattuck (2017):  
(PN4) I believe we should solve problems at home before helping other countries 
(PN5) I believe my country usually does what is in the best interest of the world 
(PN6) When there is widespread human suffering in another country, I believe the U.S. should 
use military intervention if the country is important to the U.S. 
(PN7) When there is widespread human suffering in another country, I believe the U.S. should 
focus on its responsibility towards other Americans. 
 
In order to ensure that respondents did not just select the same answers for all questions 
in a grouping, these questions were interspersed with other questions throughout the survey. 
Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the above items on a five-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Because the questions measuring populist 
nationalism are antithetical to cosmopolitanism, the responses were reversed (5 = strongly 
disagree, 1 = strongly agree). Respondents who showed strong cosmopolitan values and low 
populist nationalist values would have a score approaching 5, whereas those scoring high on the 
populist nationalist scale and low on the cosmopolitan scale would have a score closer to 1. Of 
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the 834 digital natives sampled, when creating this scale, eight were discarded for not answering 
three or more of the scale questions. Additionally, 29 respondents did not answer one of the 
questions, and five did not answer two of the questions. For all 826 respondents who answered at 
least 11 scale items, their aggregated score was divided by the number of questions answered to 
calculate a mean scale score. Those who had a score of 4 and above were then coded as 
cosmopolitans while those with a score of 2 and below were coded as populist nationalists. 
While the literature review (Chapter II) already established that cosmopolitanism and populist 
nationalism have contradictory and incompatible values, to confirm these findings, the 
cosmopolitan and populist nationalism scales were compared and a strong and significant 
negative correlation was found, (r (826) = -.40, p < .001).   
Validity and Reliability of the Scales 
 
 Before changing the direction of the populist nationalism questions, it was necessary to 
verify that cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism are in fact antithetical to each other. To 
that end, a primary component analysis (PCA) was conducted to see if the cosmopolitan and 
populist nationalism elements would come up as two distinct components. The cosmopolitanism 
scale created by Leung et al. (2015) had already been validated through “Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) with full information maximum likelihood estimation” (p. 83). However, as only 
six questions of their original 15-question scale were used, and a new populist nationalism scale 
was created, another round of validation was warranted. To that end, a primary component 
analysis was conducted on the 13 items with an oblique rotation (Direct Oblimin). An oblique 
rotation was chosen over an orthogonal rotation due to the correlation of the factors (see Table 4a 
in Appendix A). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure, which establishes the suitability of data for a 
Factor Analysis, verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .82, and all KMO 
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values for individual items were > .72, which is well above the acceptable limit of .5 (Field, 
2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity X
2 (78) = 3751.17, p < .001 indicated that correlations between 
items were sufficiently large for PCA. As two factors were predicted (cosmopolitanism and 
populist nationalism), the fixed number of factors was set to two, and both had eigenvalues over 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 48.9% of the variance. The results of the 
PCA with oblique rotation can be seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2: 
Table 4.1: Pattern Matrix     Table 4.2: Structure Matrix 
 
 Component   Component 
  1 2   1 2 
C2 .82   C2 .80  
C1 .80   C3 .77  
C3 .80   C1 .76  
C5 .67   C5 .71  
C6 .64   C4 .70  
C4 .63   C6 .66  
PN7  .69  PN1  .68 
PN1  .68  PN3 -.49 .67 
PN6  .66  PN7  .66 
PN4  .61  PN4  .64 
PN3 -.32 .58  PN6  .61 
PN5  .58  PN5  .59 
PN2  .49  PN2 -.39 .57 
 
 The reliability of the scales was tested and found to be reliable with a Cronbach’s α score 
of .83 for the cosmopolitanism scale and .76 for the isolationism/nationalism scale. The 
exclusion of any item from either scale would not increase the level of internal consistency, the 
results of which can be seen in Tables 4b and 4c in Appendix A. The minimum corrected item-
total correlation was .42. Having established the validity of two opposing concepts, the responses 
for the questions relating to populist nationalism were then reversed and added to the 
cosmopolitan questions to form a Cosmopolitan/Populist Nationalism (CPN) scale. The 
individual respondents could then be classified as a cosmopolitan (with a CPN score of 4 and 
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above, for a total of 167 people), populist nationalist (with a CPN score of 2 or below, for a total 
of 165 people), or neutral (with a CPN score of 3, for a total of 494 people). The full CPN scale 
retained the high Cronbach’s α score of .83, and the exclusion of any item would not have 
increased the score (See Table 4d in Appendix A). Multicollinearity is often a problem in 
parametric testing, so during the analysis, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was observed to 
always be under 10, and the intercorrelations between predictor variables never exceeded .80 
(Pituch & Stevens, 2016). 
Distributing the Survey 
 
Prior to launching the survey, test surveys were distributed to an expert panel of 20 
fellow Ph.D. students to check for clarity, accessibility, and overall design. Changes were made 
based on their feedback. The full survey questionnaire can be seen in Appendix B. The survey 
was then sent out to college students in the United States between April 26 and August 18, 2018, 
using the program Qualtrics. The Kennesaw State University Institutional Review Board10  
approved the survey (Study #18-479) and it was distributed via an anonymous link to ensure 
confidentiality. No identifying information was collected. Distribution began through the 
author’s classes as Kennesaw State University and connections at other universities in the United 
States. The anonymous link to the survey was also posted on social media sites Facebook and 
LinkedIn. Both university connections and respondents were asked to forward the anonymous 
survey link to others to help gain a wider distribution. This snowball method allowed for a large 
sample to be collected. 
 The target population of those surveyed was digital natives, those born roughly between 
1980 and 2000 in the United States, therefore a snowball convenience sample was sought with 
 
10 See Appendix B 
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the intention of producing a large enough sample to make it representative of the population at 
large. (Bernard, 2006). The traditional age of college students is 18-24, so universities provide an 
adequate population to study. Additionally, non-traditional students include all age groups, 
which would include the older segments of digital natives. Unfortunately, targeting colleges and 
universities does omit those digital natives who are not pursuing an academic degree11. An 
attempt to correct for this was made by also distributing the survey via social media, but because 
of the anonymity it is not clear how many responses came from college students and how many 
came from others. To address possible confounding variables, an extensive comparison of the 
survey respondents was made to the general public, the results of which are discussed later in 
this chapter. A total of 1283 responses were collected, and of those, five were excluded for 
nonacceptance of the consent form, 101 were excluded for answering less than five questions, 
and 225 were excluded for being less than half complete. The remaining 952 responses were 
further narrowed down by those that indicated they belonged to the age group that is considered 
a digital native, 18-38, for a total of 834 responses. All statistical analysis was performed using 
IBM SPSS StatisticsTM Version 25 (IBM, SPSS, Chicago, IL). 
Exploring the Sample 
 
 One of the most important aspects of survey research is understanding the sample, 
especially in relation to the population as a whole. Since this research builds upon the results 
from Almond and Verba (1963) their findings will be discussed when relevant. In order to 
examine the question of generalizability, the results of this survey will also be compared the 
current demographics of the United States, as reported by the United States Census Bureau. One 
distinction unique to this survey is that the survey conducted for this dissertation focused 
 
11 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that approximately 69.1% of high schoolers move on to higher 
education, as of October 2018. See: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm  
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specifically on digital natives, so unlike Almond and Verba, the age range is limited to 18-37. 
Almond and Verba12 (1963) had a more even age distribution: 51 or over 40.8%; 31-50 37.4%; 
18-30 21.8%. Respondents were largely white in both surveys, 89.4% for Almond and Verba  
and 71.6% in this current study (compared to 75.1% of the U.S. population). For the full 
breakdown of ethnicity, see Table 4e in Appendix A. Gender is another variable examined (see 
Table 4f in Appendix A). Almond and Verba had a slight female majority (53.1%), while this 
survey had a greater majority of female respondents at 59.5% (compared to 50.8% of the U.S. 
population). The final commonality between Almond and Verba and this study involves region 
of residence (see Table 4g in Appendix A). Almond and Verba had a more diverse regional 
response whereas this survey had a very heavy southeast skew at nearly 85%. Overall, it should 
be noted that this survey has a sample bias favoring whites, females, and those from the 
southeast region of the country. 
 In order to justify any measure of generalizability, it is also critical to compare the sample 
collected with the population as a whole. The comparison of questions asked by Almond and 
Verba and this study have been discussed above, but with this study going beyond Almond and 
Verba, other demographics can be compared to the current U.S. population. Since the target 
population was ages 18-38, the age will not correspond to the larger population, but other factors 
can be examined. One important factor is political attitudes in the United States. A 2018 Gallup 
poll found that those aged 18 to 29 identified as 26% conservative, 40% moderate, and 31% 
liberal. For ages 30 to 49, 29% identified as conservative, 37% moderate, and 30% liberal (Saad, 
2019). In this survey, 34% (281) of respondents identified as conservative, 26.3% (217) as 
 
12 For a more nuanced breakdown see Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 521. 
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moderate, and 38.7% (320) as liberal. When asked about how democratically respondents think 
the United States is being governed today, the results showed a somewhat pessimistic view: 




The majority of respondents indicated that they did not believe the United States to be 
democratically governed, with 57.2% answering with a 5 or below. This is similar to the findings 
of a PEW Research study, which found only 18% of Americans say that democracy is working 
very well in the United States (Doherty, 2018). The pessimism regarding government is 
unsurprising at a time where the U.S. is increasingly divided by partisanship (Schaeffer, 2020).  
There were also a number of demographic questions asked in this project that do not 
relate to Almond and Verba or the current U.S. population as a whole. Nevertheless, these 
questions were included to give a better understanding of the sample population. When asked 
about the type of community where they spent most of their life, 51.3% (428) said it was semi-
urban, 27.9% (233) said urban, and 20.4% said rural. When asked about the community where 











How democratically do you think the United States is being governed today?
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said rural. Since college-age students were the primary target demographic, the current academic 
status was asked. Freshmen/First Year students were the largest group at 32.4% (270) with 
Sophomore slightly behind at 27.0% (225), and Juniors at 17.6% (147). Seniors, Graduate 
Students, and Unclassified all came in under 10% (9.7% (81); 6.6% (55); and 6.5% (54) 
respectively. Respondents were also asked about their extracurricular activities and participation 
in various organizations outside of school. Over 62% (519) indicated they were in at least one 
student club, and nearly 64% (530) participate in outside organizations. It should be noted that 
these results may be impacted by a social desirability bias in which respondents wanted to 
present a more engaged image of themselves. Only 21.4% (179) said they were not a part of 
activities at school or in their community. Academic clubs and honor societies were the most 
popular, with 201 members each, and outside of university, church and religious groups had the 
highest reported membership at 248. Full results can be seen in Tables 4h and 4i in Appendix A. 






























 There are inherent strengths and weaknesses within any research design, and as such, for 
the questions posed by this dissertation, it was determined that a survey of digital natives would 
supply the information needed to answer these questions. Self-administered online surveys allow 
for the greatest number of responses in the least time for the lowest cost. Surveys also have 
advantages such as avoiding interviewer bias and having more expansive questions, such as long 
lists that would be awkward in a face-to-face interview (Bernard, 2006, p.258). While a survey 
may be the best method for this particular project, it is important to address the shortcomings and 
how they may be addressed (if possible). The first limitation is the distribution itself. Although 
this survey targeted digital natives, by using an online survey instrument to conduct the survey, it 
limits responses to those who have internet access. Digital natives are the target for this specific 
research but excluding those without internet access makes comparisons between the two 
populations difficult, so generalizability is an issue. Digital natives should not be assumed to be 
technologically savvy nor should it be implied they have access to the internet. The views of 
digital natives who are not online could not be examined with this survey. However, since there 
is such a high rate of digital penetration in the United States (see Chapter III), this limitation is 
relatively minor. Furthermore, with the purpose of the dissertation being to understand the 
impacts of digital technology, the responses of those without internet access would not be able to 
inform the discussion. 
 Another issue that had to be addressed was the sample. It consists primarily of college 
students since the survey was primarily distributed through universities. While the survey was 
shared through other platforms such as social media sites, the questions presupposed college 
enrollment and, regrettably, there was no measure to distinguish between students and non-
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students. It is possible that respondents who took the survey through social media or had it 
forwarded to them were not students. However, a sample comprised of college students is not 
inherently problematic, especially because it is comprised of the target age group of digital 
natives. This survey did not ensure a completely random sample of digital natives, but every 
effort was made to ensure a wide representation that would be as random as possible. As 
Peterson (2001) suggests “researchers should be encouraged to report more fully on the 
characteristics of their samples so that independent, informed judgments can be made as to the 
possible influence of these characteristics [samples comprised of college students] on research 
results” (pp. 458-460). It is for this reason that an in-depth discussion of the sample was 
presented later in this chapter. 
Discussion 
 
 The demographic characteristics of the sample are important to allow the reader to be 
able to draw conclusions about the dataset. These characteristics will also allow for a deeper 
analysis of some of the issues relating to this dissertation. In order to examine civic and global 
responsibility amongst digital natives in the US, a survey provides the ideal method for gathering 
information. The data collected will allow for an examination of the hypotheses put forth in this 
chapter. Guided by the existing literature and cognizant of the gaps in that literature, this 
dissertation will expand on the existing knowledge of individual responsibility as it has been 
impacted by digital technology.  
 The examination of civic responsibility at the local and national level begins next in 
Chapter V. This chapter includes the testing of hypotheses one and two which focus on digital 
natives and their attitudes towards domestic responsibility. Almond and Verba (1963) defined 
the civic culture for their generation, but the digital age requires a new examination of how 
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people view their roles and the actions they take in the age of information. Chapter VI expands 
the scope of responsibility to the global community. It tests hypotheses three, four, and five, 
looking specifically at the influence of cosmopolitan and populist nationalist attitudes towards 
responsibility beyond borders.  
  




A Digital Civic Culture? 
 
At the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, James McHenry, one 
of the delegates, recorded as interaction between a fellow delegate Benjamin Franklin and a 
passer-by, Mrs. Powel. She asked Dr. Franklin, “Well Doctor, what we got [sic], a republic or a 
monarchy,” to which Dr. Franklin replied, “A republic…if you can keep it” (McHenry, 1787). 
Since the inception of the United States, the responsibility for its maintenance has fallen not on a 
ruling class, but on a well-informed and engaged citizenry. The notion of citizenship in a 
democratic republic carries with it a charge of responsibility. All the legal rights given to a citizen 
are made possible by the responsibilities of the citizenry to the community. While rights have a 
long tradition of elaboration in democratic societies, responsibilities have received far less focus. 
Stewart (1995) has distinguished between citizenship as a legal status and citizenship as “shared 
membership of a political community, in which conception citizens are political actors 
constituting political spaces” (p. 63). It is this latter conception of citizenship that is the focus of 
this present work. This chapter examines the attitudes of digital natives towards domestic or 
national responsibility, manifested through their views on civic culture. 
The historical roots of democracy, and of democratic responsibility, are often traced back 
to the Athenian city-state. The democratic system of Athens in the middle fifth century BCE was 
one of the most rigorous and demanding examples of civic engagement. Government participation 
was the norm, and most posts were filled by lot or election, thus placing an immense 
responsibility on the citizenry. Raaflaub (2007) (referencing Hansen, 1999) contends that “several 
thousand citizens were politically active every year, and many of them for years on end—out of a 
population of adult male citizens that in the fourth century comprised hardly more than 30,000” 
(p. 5). He further contends that “It is thus clear that [Athenian democracy in the fifth century 
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BCE] was not only ‘direct’ in the sense that decisions were made by the assembled people, but 
the ‘directest’ imaginable in the sense that the people through assembly, council, and law courts 
controlled the entire political process and that a fantastically large proportion of citizens was 
involved constantly in public business" (Ibid). While the growth of populations and expanding 
territories has made such direct democracy a near impossibility, some form of participation 
remains an imperative in any democratic system.   
The overall theme of this dissertation is a study of digital natives’ conceptions of 
responsibility, and how digital technology both informs that responsibility and allows individuals 
to take action. This chapter focuses on the manifestation of that responsibility at the national or 
state level. It addresses the first two hypotheses from Chapter IV (The typology of parochial, 
subject, and participant developed by Almond and Verba (1963) will remain relevant, but with a 
lower number of parochials, and that civic engagement will be more robust with new avenues of 
engagement available to digital natives). The typology developed by Almond and Verba is 
important in understanding how individuals relate to the government and society in which they 
live. The relevance of this typology will likely continue to inform how we understand this 
relationship, but there will be few, if any, parochials (those who are not engaged nor informed) 
because of the abundance of information in the digital age. While the categorization of someone 
as a participant, subject, or parochial is subjective, the level of engagement individuals show can 
make this into a testable hypothesis. There will also be more a more robust arsenal for 
engagement because along with the traditional methods of civic engagement, the digital age has 
created new conditions that enable a greater array of civic engagement through available 
information and communication technology. This chapter presents an investigation into the civic 
culture of digital natives in the United States.     
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The Civic Culture 
 
In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published The Civic Culture: Political 
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Their central question in this comparative study was 
to understand the nature of civic culture within a democracy. They defined the civic culture as “a 
pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, 
a culture that permitted change but moderated it” (p. 8). When they published their study, they 
examined a world much different from the one in existence today, over 55 years later. While 
many of the questions and observations remain relevant (see Chapter II), there is cause to 
reexamine some of their findings. Also, and perhaps more significantly, their study provides a 
useful foundation upon which to build a new understanding of civic and political culture in the 
digital age. In seeking to understand how individuals relate to their government and act within 
their society, they developed the typology of participant (someone informed and engaged), 
subject (someone moderately informed and sometimes engaged), and parochial (someone neither 
informed nor engaged) (see Chapter II). This typology can contribute to the understanding of 
how individuals today relate to an increasingly globalized and connected world. The means of 
being informed and the ways in which people are able to share and communicate their beliefs 
have changed significantly in the digital age. Almond and Verba’s original purpose, to “study the 
political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it,” has 
contributed to a number of fields, most notably studies of democracy and culture, and the field of 
political science in general (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 3). Their classification of citizens as 
either participant, subject, or parochial can provide a useful foundation for understanding 
political and civic participation in the digital age. 
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Almond and Verba (1963) did not set out to identify what the citizen in a democracy 
ought to be, rather, they set out to understand the realities of what citizens actually believe and 
do within a democracy. Similarly, this dissertation does not seek to offer a treatise on the ideals 
of democratic citizenship, but rather offer an examination of the implications of the digital age 
on the attitudes of digital natives as they examine their own actions and responsibilities, both 
nationally and globally. Almond and Verba (1963) identify three broad areas to aid in 
understanding civic and political culture: (1) belief in an ability to influence the political system 
(2) access to information, and (3) action taken to influence the political system. As discussed in 
Chapter III, the digital age has influence in each of these areas, especially as communications 
and access to information continues to expand exponentially. Digital natives were born into a 
new world in which information and communication exist nearly universally. How they make 
use of these new opportunities should be examined. 
What makes a person likely to be engaged within their community is also an important 
area of inquiry. To examine this, Almond and Verba (1963) asked respondents about their 
membership in various organizations because of a possible connection to civic and political 
behavior. They used this information to analyze both the impact on the respondents’ civic nature 
and also as a way of delving into social psychology. For this dissertation, only the prior motive 
will be examined. Their findings indicated that “membership in an organization, political or not, 
appears…to be related to an increase in the political competence and activity of the individual” 
(Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 310). Any study focusing on college students will have a presumed 
higher rate of participation in clubs and activities given the opportunities available on many 
campuses. In this study 78.7% (656 of 834 respondents) reported being a part of at least one 
organization compared to Almond and Verba’s findings where 57% of respondents indicated 
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such (p. 302). This can further be broken down into campus activities and non-campus activities. 
There are similar results for both on campus (62.8%) and off campus (63.8%) membership. This 
level of participation through organizational membership is a sign that digital natives may 
actually play an active role in their political community. One topic for future research ought to 
be whether participation in these types of activities continues past college, thus addressing 
Putnam’s (2000) fear of a declining civic culture. Simply having the early proclivities for such 
civic and political action is insufficient without also understanding how that culture manifests 
within one’s interactions with the world around them. The ability to influence the political 
system, having access to information, and engaging in political acts are all ways in which civic 
culture comes to fruition.  
Ability to Influence 
 
The first aspect of political and civic culture concerns how individuals view their ability 
to influence the political system. This awareness of impact opportunity upon the system is a 
prerequisite for any ability to participate within it. Furthermore, the belief in an ability to 
influence the system is important for every level of civic culture. The participants must have a 
belief that their actions will have an effect, and the subject and parochial must believe that they 
could participate and affect change if they ever had a compelling reason to do so. The legitimacy 
of the democratic system rests on the ability of the individual to be able to have an effect upon 
the system.   
In assessing the relationship between the individual and the state, the first item measured 
by Almond and Verba was the individual’s view whether or not they feel the government 
impacts their lives. They found that 35% said it had a great effect, 53% said some effect, and 
10% said no effect (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 81). In this study, 74.7% of survey respondents 
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believe that the government has a great deal of impact on their lives, and only 9.1% showed 
some disagreement with that statement (the full results can be seen in Table 5a in Appendix A). 
Given that most, if not all, colleges and universities require some basic government course, it 
would be expected to see a very high level of at least a basic understanding of how the 
government system works among respondents. Whether or not those classes are effective in 
conveying how the individual is impacted by the government is a question for another study but 
given that only 9.1% of respondents disagreed with the government having “a great deal of 
impact,” it indicates these classes are working. This measure contributes to the understanding of 
the respondents’ views of the “Output Object” as a scale in determining one’s role in the political 
culture. As Almond and Verba (1963) explain it, “We were concerned with whether people 
perceived government as having an effect on them, their families, and their communities” (p.88). 
If people do not believe the government has an impact on their lives, then there would be no 
reason to try and influence that government. This attitude shows a belief in the ability of the 
government to impact lives, as a measure of power through capacity. People participate in 
democracy because they believe their voice will have an impact. Democratic government is 
rendered meaningless if it is unresponsive, or even perceived to be unresponsive, to the wishes of 
the citizenry. This is not a value statement of positive or negative impact, simply an 
acknowledgment of the role of the government. 
Another important measurement of trust within the political system is the belief that the 
individual will receive the same treatment as others. When asked if they agreed with the 
statement “I believe I receive the same treatment under the law as anyone else,” 41.1% (340) 
agree, 20.7% (171) said they neither agree nor disagree, and 38.2% (316) said they somewhat 
disagree. The ambivalent and somewhat negative response to this question is likely the result of 
AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
88 
 
the racial discrepancies within the criminal justice system. The Black Lives Matter movement 
that started with the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2012 highlights what many see as a 
disproportionate treatment by law enforcement. When looking at the survey results through a 
racial lens, those who identified as Black or African American were more likely than those who 
identified as White or Caucasian to believe they receive the same treatment under the law, x2 (8, 
N = 823), 70.17, p < .001. Only 17.5% (21) of African Americans believed they received the 
same treatment under the law compared to 47.2% (279) of Caucasians. While a more robust 
inquiry into the reasons for this distrust would be a good area for future research, this present 
work can only speculate on such reasons. The importance of this, for this dissertation, is its 
impact on civic culture. Participation within the system requires a perception of fairness. 
To further examine digital natives’ attitudes towards a belief in the ability to impact the 
political system, several questions were asked to gauge their trust in the responsiveness of 
elected officials. The first of these questions asked to what extent the respondent felt that their 
elected representative cared about their views. Digital natives showed a mixed view towards 
elected officials with 46.5% agreeing with that statement and 32% in disagreement (full results 
can be seen in Table 5b in Appendix A). Respondents were also asked whether or not they 
thought elected officials would respond to them if they contacted them. Only 26.7% of 
respondents agreed with this statement and 44.4% disagreed (full results can be seen in Table 5c 
in Appendix A). A greater number of digital natives believe that their elected representatives 
care about their views, yet only a minority believe they would hear back from those same 
officials. Democracy is predicated on a feedback system between the general public and the 
people who represent them. Given the 46.5% of digital natives who believe representatives care 
about their views, it is surprising that only 26.7% believe they would hear back from those 
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representatives. It is possible that these respondents believe in more of a trusteeship model of 
representation in which the representative does what they believe to be in the best interest of the 
people, caring about their constituents’ opinions, but not necessarily being able to respond to 
them individually. A delegate model of representation places a greater emphasis on 
representation of the majority and would, presumably, mean a greater focus on individual 
feedback.     
Access to Information 
 
 The second area of inquiry identified by Almond and Verba, and perhaps the aspect most 
impacted by the digital age, is that of access to information. Digital technology empowers 
anyone with internet access to nearly the entire wealth of human knowledge. Information can be 
shared and viewed in real time and citizens have greater access to their elected representatives. 
The digital age is marked by a communications revolution in which the means of being 
connected and informed are seemingly limitless. Awareness of the political system and political 
actors is an integral part of being an active participant in the system. “We may assume that if 
people follow political and governmental affairs, they are in some sense involved in the process 
by which decisions are made” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 88). Being engaged in the political 
system not only requires an understanding of the impacts of that system but also an informed 
knowledge and understanding of the components of such a system. Looking solely at traditional 
media (newspapers, radio, television, and magazines) it would seem that digital natives have a 
much lower score of political awareness. Very few respondents indicated that they follow public 
affairs daily through traditional media. Television (both local and cable news) used to be the 
most popular source for following public affairs, but barely 15% of respondents said they 
watched them daily. However, when including new media (various online news sources), the 
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proportion of those who follow public affairs at least weekly through one or more sources raises 
to over 96%13. The full results of the reported media consumption can be seen here: 
TABLE 5.1: Media Consumption14 
 




















































































































  The wide variety of media sources now available offers a range of ways in which people 
can be informed in the digital age. Digital natives have access to a much greater variety of media 
than previous generations. Television alone has undergone radical changes from three channels 
(ABC, NBC, CBS) in 1963 to hundreds in 2019. Digital natives now have access to everything 
 
 
13 96.1% of respondents (N = 826) report following at least one source of traditional or new media at least weekly. 
14 Actual text of question: “People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For 
each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less 
than monthly, or never.” 
15 CNN, Fox, and MSNBC were given as examples of online traditional news websites 
16 Occupy Democrats, Inforwars, and Breitbart were given as examples of online agenda-based news sites 
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their forebearers did, plus social media, email, internet-based news sources, and so on. Digital 
natives have the most expansive access to public affairs ever known and the capacity to be 
informed has never been so great. Over 80% of respondents said they learn about public affairs 
through talking with friends or on social media weekly or daily, well eclipsing the reports of 
other sources of information. This shows that their opinions are heavily informed by peer groups 
and social media contacts.  
One unique aspect of the digital age is the transformation of media from a passive to an 
active form of political participation. Almond and Verba (1963) considered exposure to political 
communication through media to be a passive activity in which one could not engage with the 
information they were consuming (pp. 115–116). The digital age enables media consumption to 
be both passive and active. People are now able to read a news story, share it through social 
media, and comment on the content.  Only 16.8%17 of digital natives said they would never share 
a political news story online, while 30.9% said they had never done so in the past year18. Even 
traditional news organizations are embracing a more active form of broadcast with various ways 
in which the audience can interact with the newscast. There are now instant polls that are 
reported live, comments taken by phone or social media, and even stories submitted by the 
public. 
 With information so readily available to the public, it should ideally mean a better-
informed populace. However, the quality of that media must be called into question. While there 
 
17 Actual text of question: “Here are some forms of political action that people can perform online. For each of these, 
please indicate if you have done any of these, would do them, or never would do them: Sharing a political news 
story.” The results were: Have done (37.5%; 313); Would Do (13.8%; 115); Might Do (26.8%; 224); Would Never 
Do (16.8%; 140); No Answer (5%; 42); N = 835.  
18 Actual text of question: “Thinking about those political actions that you can perform online, please consider how 
many times you have performed these actions in the last year: Sharing political news story” The results were: Very 
often (10.7%; 89); Often (12.1%; 101); Sometimes (22.6%; 189); Rarely (18%; 150); Never (30.9%; 258); No 
Answer (5.6%; 47) N = 835). 
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is a fair distribution in trust among the various media platforms, daily newspapers and local 
television news had the highest level of trust (59.8% and 54.5% respectively) and online agenda-
based media (such as Occupy Democrats, Infowars, and Breitbart) and social media showed the 
most distrust (46.9% and 48.7% respectively). One striking result is the level of ambivalence 
regarding the trust of various media sources. With the exception of daily newspapers, local 
television news, and (barely) online traditional news, the most common response to other media 
types was “neither trust nor distrust.” The full results can be seen in Table 5.2: 






































































































































One possible explanation for the high level of ambivalence towards trusting media is the 
current political climate in which political leaders and pundits decry certain media as “fake,” and 
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truly fake news is able to spread quickly on social media. This is supported by the fact that 
48.7% of respondents had an unfavorable opinion of the trustworthiness of social media, and 
only 14.5% indicated a favorable opinion. It is paradoxical that while 68.3% of respondents said 
they get their news from social media daily, only 3.1% find it to be very trustworthy. One 
possible explanation is that people are already on social media for other reasons (entertainment, 
distraction, networking, etc.) and just happen to also get news from it. Social media may also not 
be their sole source of news. Social media is a platform where news can be actively sought out or 
it can be passively observed when social media contacts post links to news stories or comments 
on certain issues. Future research should continue to expand on understanding the ways in which 
social media is used as a source of news. However, this low confidence in the press is not a new 
phenomenon. The World Values Survey has been tracking confidence in the press since 1981, 
and with the exception of the first year measured, only 20-25 percent of respondents reported 
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 Another possible reason for the ambivalence in trust may be the ability to manipulate 
information in the digital age. The speed at which false news stories and misinformation can 
spread across social media has become so disconcerting that top officials from Facebook, 
Twitter, and Google were called to testify before Congress (Barrabi, 2018). Not only is false 
information spread easily, but it can be manipulated into appearing more legitimate through a 
mirage of widespread support. “For many years now, automated bot armies have artificially 
amplified perspectives and manipulated trending algorithms. These small, coordinated groups 
have deliberately gamed algorithms so that a handful of voices can mimic a broad consensus” 
(Diresta, 2018). Technology, meant to ensure a democratic promotion of ideas based on popular 
 
19 World Values Survey: Wave 1 (1981) Variable 138; Wave 3 (1995) Variable 138; Wave 4 (1999) Variable 149; 
Wave 5 (2006) Variable 133; Wave 6 (2011) Variable 110. Actual text of the question: “I am going to name a 
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal 
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all: The Press” (Confident is defined 
as those who responded a great deal of confidence or quite a lot of confidence and not confident is defined as those 
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liking, sharing, and commenting, can now be manipulated to give a false sense of popularity. 
Nearly half (48.3%) of digital natives in this survey reported sharing memes, news stories, and 
posts without verifying whether the information was true. That number increases to 63.4% when 
the original post is coming from a source that they personally trust. The plethora of 
disinformation acts as a counterbalance to what should be the most well-informed generation in 
history. In his farewell address, President Barack Obama (2017) highlighted some of the most 
pressing obstacles currently facing democratic society. He said:  
For too many of us, it’s become safer to retreat into our own bubbles, whether in 
our neighborhoods or on college campuses, or places of worship, or especially 
our social media feeds, surrounded by people who look like us and share the 
same political outlook and never challenge our assumptions. The rise of naked 
partisanship, and the increasing economic and regional stratification, the 
splintering of our media into a channel for every taste—all this make this great 
sorting seem national, even inevitable. And increasingly, we become so secure in 
our bubbles that we start accepting only information, whether it is true or not, 
that fits our opinions, instead of basing our opinions on the evidence that is out 
there. 
 
While access to information has greatly increased, so has access and exposure to misinformation 
and disinformation. For a society to be informed, it must be able to distinguish between 
legitimate facts and falsehoods.  
 The importance of accurate information in a democracy cannot be overstated. In 1975, 
James R. Schlesinger remarked that “everybody is entitled to his own views…everybody is not 
entitled to his own facts” (Wyant Jr., 1975, p. 7). Democratic government should be based upon 
competing ideals, not competing conceptions of reality. Even though respondents showed a 
general distrust of media, they did indicate that they learn about issues from more than one 
source. When asked about their agreement with the statement: “When I see a story I am 
interested in, I will read about it from a variety of news sources,” 61.5% (486) agreed and only 
14.5% (115) disagreed. Even with biased news and distorted summaries, when someone reads 
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about a story from a variety of sources, the facts ought to become apparent. Distrust in media, or 
skepticism, can be healthy if it drives a curiosity that seeks out the truth. Democracy requires 
debate, but it cannot function if the basic facts of the matter are in dispute.   
Taking Action 
 
 The third area in examining civil and political culture is the extent to which a person is 
active within the political system. One of the most basic aspects in understanding an individuals’ 
level of involvement is their interest in politics. This dissertation seeks to examine the attitudes 
on both national and global issues, so the question was broken up to measure interest in both. 
When asked about their level of interest in national and global affairs, the most common 
response for both was “interested” at 37.6% and 39.3% respectively. Over half of all respondents 
indicated some level of interest in political issues (53.2% in domestic politics, and 56% in 
international issues). Given that domestic politics plays a larger role in their lives, it is surprising 
that there would be a greater interest in international politics. It is possible that globalization has 
made people more aware of the impact of the world around them. This, coupled with the 
increased ability to hear about international events, has likely driven this increase in interest. 
Digital natives reported a disinterest in domestic politics at only 27.5%, and 21.9% for global 
affairs. The full results can be seen in Table 5.4: 
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Table 5.4: Interest in Domestic and Global Affairs 
 




Very interested 15.6% (129) 16.7% (139) 
Interested 37.6% (312) 39.3% (326) 
Neither interested nor disinterested 19.3% (160) 22.0% (183) 
Not very interested 17.1% (142) 13.5% (112) 
Not interested at all 10.4% (86) 8.4% (70) 
 N = 829 N = 830 
 
Along with being aware of what is going on in one’s world, one of the most critical 
attributes of input cognition regarding political awareness is following the affairs of elected 
officials. Knowing the positions and issues being addressed by one’s elected officials is 
necessary for being involved in the political affairs of the community. The digital age adds a new 
dimension to this by increasing the number of ways in which the individual can follow political 
and governmental affairs. Forty-one percent of digital natives in this sample reported that they 
follow an elected official on social media. This allows elected officials to communicate directly 
with the people they represent on a wide scale. Additionally, 18% of digital natives said they 
would follow the social media account of an elected official and 24% said they might do so. 
Only 17% said that they would never follow an elected official on social media. This direct line 
of political communication better enables individuals to follow the actions of their government.     
Another measure of political action is engaging in civil discourse with other members of 
the community regarding political issues. Almond and Verba (1963) noted the importance of 
political discourse by saying: “If ordinary men and women are to participate in a democratic 
political process, they must have the feeling that it is safe to do so, that they do not assume great 
 
20 Actual text of question: “Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in domestic political affairs, 
with 1 being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested” 
21 Actual text of question: “Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in international/global 
affairs, with 1 being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested” 
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risks when they express political opinions, and that they can be relatively free about whom they 
talk to” (p. 115). Civil discourse is essential in the democratic process, and citizens ought to be 
able to express their views and engage with others on topics of political importance. Political 
communication is an area that has been greatly enhanced by the digital age. People now can 
communicate in person, over the phone (with voice and/or video), or online. As digital 
technology connects more people, political communication can take place irrespective of 
physical proximity. Somewhat surprisingly, even with this greater capacity for communication, 
when digital natives were asked about the frequency with which they discuss politics and 
national and global issues, they seem to prefer in-person communication. Twenty-four percent of 
respondents indicated they would never engage in an online political discussion while 76% said 
they either might or have done so. When asked about whether or not they recently engaged in 
such discussion, 34% replied that they had not engaged in an online political discussion within 
the past year. However, although the frequency of discussing politics with others has not 
changed with the evolution in communication technology, another question asked of digital 
natives revealed there may be more to this issue. When asked how often they discuss current 
national or global issues with friends and colleagues, only 1.3% replied that they had never done 
so. This may indicate a bias towards the idea of talking about “politics.” Certainly not all 
national and global issues will have a political component, but most will. When nearly 90% of 
respondents indicate that they discuss national and global issues with friends and colleagues 
either weekly or daily, it certainly seems to be a strong indicator for this component of civic 
culture among digital natives (see Table 5.5). It is possible that the term “politics” has a negative 
connotation to it, which would explain the difference between talking “politics” and talking 
about “national and global” issues.  
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Table 5.5: Discussing Politics 
 
Frequency of people who 
learn about national and 
global issues through talking 
with friends or colleagues 
Frequency of people who 
would engage in online 
political discussions 
Frequency of people who 
have engaged in online 
political discussions in the 
last year 
Daily 56.9% (467) Have Done 38.0% (302) Very Often 15.6% (124) 
Weekly 31.8% (261) Would Do 12.1% (96) Often 10.6% (84) 
Monthly 7.7% (63) Might Do 26.2% (208) Sometimes 20.9% (166) 
Less Than 
Monthly 
2.3% (19) Would Never 
Do 
23.7% (188) Rarely 19.0% (151) 
Never 1.3% (11)   Never 33.9% (269) 
N = 821 N = 794 N = 794 
 
Perhaps the most widely used measures of political participation in a democracy include 
actions such as voting, contacting elected officials, engaging in protests, signing a petition, and 
other areas of participation. Almond and Verba (1963) explained the crucial nature of 
participation for the functioning of democracy by saying: “Certain things are demanded of the 
ordinary citizen if elites are to be responsive to him: the ordinary citizen must express his point 
of view so that elites can know what he wants; he must be involved in politics so that he will 
know and care whether or not elites are being responsive, and he must be influential so as to 
enforce responsive behavior by the elites” (p. 478). Elected representatives cannot be said to 
truly represent the people if the people are not willing to make their opinions known.  
One of the clearest examples of political action within a democracy is that of voting in 
local and national elections. Democratic governance is based upon the consent of the governed 
conveyed through a popular vote to determine who will represent the populace in government. 
Voting has long been a contentious issue in the United States considering its relatively low voter 
turnout compared to other nations. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 
reports on voter turnout around the world, and the U.S. has seen relatively low rates of Voting 
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Age Population22 (VAP) with turnout not breaking 60% since the 1992 presidential election. The 
more recent elections exemplify these low turnouts: 2016 (55.98%); 2014 (32.98%); 2012 
(51.80%); 2010 (38.51%), (IDEA, 2018). Digital natives report 37.5% claiming to always vote in 
national elections and 15.4% in local elections. While these numbers do not bode well for 
democracy, another 31.3% (and 29.9% for local elections) report that they were not old enough 
to vote, but plan to vote in future elections. If those numbers hold true, that would bring the voter 
turnout to 68.8% for national elections and 45.3% for local elections23 (See Table 5.6). These 
numbers would be slightly higher than past averages, but there is still the social desirability bias 
to be concerned about, especially for those who say they plan to vote when they are old enough.  
Table 5.6: Voting24 
 
 National Elections Local Elections 
Always 37.5% (313) 15.4% (129) 
Usually  13.3% (111) 17.4% (145) 
Sometimes 9.6% (80) 20.7% (173) 
Never 6.0% (50) 13.2% (110) 
Not old enough, but plan to 31.3% (261) 29.9% (250) 
Not old enough, do not plan to 1.9% (16) 2.6% (22) 
No Answer 0.5% (4) 0.7% (6) 
 N = 835 N = 835 
 
Yet a vibrant democratic society requires much more than simply voting. There are 
numerous other methods of traditional political action, such as signing petitions, calling elected 
officials, joining in a boycott, attending peaceful demonstrations, and joining in strikes. As with 
any action, individuals often weigh risk versus reward. Actions with potential higher risks or 
 
22 Some measures of voter turnout are based on the percentage of registered voters, but VAP is based upon those 
who are of legal age to vote. 
23 The exact turnout for local elections is often less than for national elections, sometimes upwards of 50% less, so it 
may be overly optimistic to assume that those who say they were not old enough to vote but plan to vote would still 
vote at the same rate for both national and local elections. The 45.3% reported would likely be less in practice.  
24 Actual text of question: “When (national/state and local) elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or 
never?” 
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lower chances of achieving their objectives (rewards) are less likely to be taken. When asking 
digital natives about their participation in such actions, signing a petition had the highest 
response of have done or would do at 77.5%. Signing a petition has relatively little cost in terms 
of time, effort, or risk. Contrast that with an action such as joining a strike with a high cost of 
time, effort, and potential risk, and only 26.6% of digital natives indicated that they have or 
would participate in a strike, whereas 35% said they would never engage in one. Full results can 
be seen in Table 5.7:  
Table 5.7: Traditional Political Action25 
 


















14.3% (118) 4.3% (35) 






34.2% (282) 22.3% 
(183) 






32.0% (264) 38.4% 
(315) 






19.5% (161) 35.0% 
(287) 
N 826 823 820 825 820 
 
 Along with traditional or conventional political action, the digital age has enabled people 
with even more avenues for political engagement. There are several areas that involve both 
access to information and taking action, such as following elected officials, traditional media 
groups, and issue advocacy groups on social media. Nearly 40% of digital natives reported 
following an elected official on social media, 29.1% followed traditional media (such as CNN, 
MSNBC, Fox, etc.) and 18.9% follow issue advocacy groups (National Rifle Association, Sierra 
 
25 Actual text of question: “Here are some of the forms of political action that people can take. For each of these, 
please indicate If you have done any of these, would do them, might do them, or never would do them: Signing a 
petition, calling an elected official, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, joining strikes” 
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Club, etc.). An even greater percentage of respondents indicated they might follow each of the 
three groups on social media (39.9% for political officials, 43.7% for media, and 47.5 for issue 
advocacy groups). Additionally, the digital age provides avenues for the dissemination and 
discussion of ideas and information. The vast majority of digital natives (79.1%) reported that 
they had or might share a political news story on social media. Similarly, 77.5% had or would 
share a political meme. Actions like these serve the function of spreading information, which 
could possibly lead to a more informed discussion on important issues. The digital age also 
brings new ways to directly communicate with elected officials. Nearly 63% of digital natives 
said they had or might comment on an elected officials’ social media post and 67.5% reported 
that they had or might email an elected official. The ability to engage in preference expression is 
critical in a democracy and a requirement for classification as a participant. The full results of 
responses to online political action can be seen in Table 5.8:   
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 This chapter sought to reexamine the tenets of the civic culture, as described by Almond 
and Verba in 1963, in light of new opportunities brought upon by the digital age. Prior to the 
digital age political engagement was limited to acts such as voting, signing petitions, call or 
writing elected officials, striking, boycotts, protests and riots. Political information was 
transmitted through newspapers, radio, television, magazines, and talking with others. Following 
domestic and/or international affairs could only be done through one or more of these media. 
Civic life itself was relegated to local communities. Engaging with others based on a shared 
interest was only possible if it took place within a distance someone was willing to travel. If 
someone wanted to join a book club, a political advocacy group, or a bowling league, it would 
have to be within a local community. People were more connected through interpersonal contact, 
because that was the only option available to them. 
 The digital age revolutionized many things, including how individuals relate to the 
community around them. Political engagement now includes various forms of online activism. 
Petitions can be signed online, representatives can be contacted through email, and political 
action can be organized online. Perhaps the greatest advancement comes through access to 
information. Traditional media has expanded to digital content available to anyone with internet 
access. Media has gone global and it has also bypassed the traditional gatekeepers such as editors 
and program directors. Anyone with a camera phone and access to the internet can share live 
images anywhere in the world. Elected officials now have various social media accounts where 
they can address the public directly. When Theodore Roosevelt referred to the office of the 
presidency as the bully pulpit, something that gave him both legitimacy and a wide audience by 
which to spread his message, it is unlikely that he (or anyone) could have imagined the reach that 
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social media gives to everyone.  However, there is the dangerous precedent of popularity being 
mistaken for legitimacy. Speaking of the political struggles of populist nationalist leaders such as 
Donald Trump (U.S.), Boris Johnson (UK), and Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel), Graham (2019) 
notes that, “A common denominator is that once in office, these politicians have found that 
charisma does not translate smoothly to power.” Populist nationalism often relies on a critique of 
the status quo and a claim of representing those who have been ignored by elites in power.  
Finally, civic life itself has been transformed, and is no longer bound by geography. 
People can engage in civic activities from their computers, and it also provides a greater diversity 
of activity. In 1963, if someone wanted to join a book club to discuss Fahrenheit 451 by Ray 
Bradbury, there was a risk of being ostracized. Unless the community happened to be 
enlightened enough to read a book that had been banned in many places, such a book club would 
have been unthinkable. Today people can connect through shared interests freely online without 
fear of judgment.     
Underlying the discussion of civic culture, in 1963 or 2018, is the question of how 
individuals interpret and exercise their responsibility within the political community. Almond 
and Verba (1963) used the typology of parochial, subject, and participant to understand the levels 
of involvement by people in the polis. One of the biggest possible changes from 1963 is whether 
or not parochials still exist, or more aptly, can they still exist? In an age in which information is 
available via so many media, the ability to be removed from or ignorant of the system, to be a 
parochial, becomes somewhat of a conscious choice rather than de facto position. Parochials do 
not know how government impacts them, they do not follow governmental affairs, and they do 
not see themselves as playing any role within the political system. With 96% of digital natives 
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indicating that they follow governmental affairs, at least occasionally, one must ask if there is 
still cause for including parochials in the classification.   
But the question of whether or not there still is a civic culture in 2018, and what that 
looks like, remains. This was the central question of this chapter. The first hypothesis tested 
assumed that the typology of participant, subject, and parochial would remain relevant, although 
parochial would be much less relevant. For the most part, this hypothesis has been confirmed. 
Digital natives can still be understood as those who are actively engaged in the political 
community (participants) and those who may be slightly active but remain largely on the 
outskirts of such political activity (subjects). The vast majority, 74.7%, of digital natives believe 
that the government has a great deal of impact on their lives. When it comes to discussing 
politics, there is a similar trend with 66.1% of digital natives saying they have engaged in online 
political discussions.  Finally, when it comes to following the accounts of political and global 
affairs, only 16.8% of digital natives said they would never follow an elected official on social 
media. It is clear that digital natives are aware of the impact of government on their lives and at 
least some are active in shaping the civic life around them. 
One critical aspect of civic culture is the ability to be informed. A subset of the first 
hypothesis is that digital natives would be more informed but would also face greater obstacles 
to discerning between legitimate news, misinformation, and disinformation. There is no question 
that there are more sources available to digital natives than there were to people in 1963, but 
quantity should not be confused with quality. Digital natives don’t get their information from 
newspapers, magazines, television, or radio at the same rates found by Almond and Verba, but 
many of them get their information from new media such as online traditional news, email 
newsletters, and social media. Almond and Verba did not indicate how many people in their 
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study followed public affairs in total; they only reported how many did so through various media 
sources. This study did tabulate how many people followed public affairs through at least one 
medium, and at 96%, it would appear that the civic culture of digital natives is quite healthy.  
Digital natives also show a healthy skepticism for many of those same sources of 
information. The three most often viewed sources of information are social media, talking with 
friends, and online traditional news sites, but, ironically, they are not the most trusted sources. 
Nearly 49% of digital natives reported viewing social media as an untrustworthy source of 
information (compared to 14.5% that found it trustworthy). Similar results are seen with friends 
(27.7% trustworthy; 21.9% untrustworthy) and online traditional news sites (38.2% trustworthy; 
28.5% untrustworthy). These sources are beaten out by daily newspapers and local television 
which both are found trustworthy by over 50% of the sample. Presumably, individuals would get 
their information from the source they believe to be most credible, but these results suggest 
otherwise. However, only 13.7% of digital natives said that they rarely or never read a story from 
more than one source. Even if digital natives don’t place much trust in where they get their news, 
it would seem they counter that by following the story on a variety of mediums.  
Even with all the obstacles presented by the digital age, there are still several reasons for 
continued optimism for the civic and political engagement of digital natives. With the plethora of 
media available to digital natives, there is always the risk of information overload and an 
inability to discern truth from fiction. According to the Pew Research Center, “those with high 
political awareness, those who are very digitally savvy, and those who place high levels of trust 
in the news media are better able than others to accurately identify news-related statements as 
factual or opinion” (Mitchell, et al., 2018). Digital natives have shown a predilection for 
obtaining their news from a variety of sources, better enabling an informed public. 
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The second hypothesis tested here was that civic engagement will be more robust with 
new avenues of engagement available to digital natives. Almond and Verba did not ask 
respondents to disclose various forms of political action, but they did ask how respondents might 
try to influence government. They asked about writing letters, signing petitions, contacting 
elected officials, voting, protests, and violent actions. Along with these actions, digital natives 
also have the ability to write emails, organize online, comment on news stories or posts by 
representatives, share information, and so on.  
The three areas that aid in an understanding of civic and political culture, (1) belief in an 
ability to influence the political system, (2) access to information, and (3) action taken to 
influence the political system, all seem to be present for digital natives. While their civic culture 
is not the same as the one studied by Almond and Verba in 1963, it is still a vibrant civic culture. 
Technology has brought neither damnation nor salvation to the civic culture, but it has created 
new ways for people to be engaged. Like all things, whether it has a positive or negative impact 
is dependent on how it is used. Digital natives believe they have the ability to influence the 
system. They have access to information. They are taking action to influence that system. While 
the methods by which civic engagement had traditionally been understood have changed, that 
does not mean the civic culture is any less robust.  
  






No man is an island, 
Entire of itself. 
Each is a piece of the continent, 
A part of the main. 
[…] 
Each man’s death diminishes me, 
For I am involved in mankind. 
Therefore, send not to know 
For whom the bell tolls, 
It tolls for thee. 
John Donne, 162426 
 
 Writing in 1624, John Donne elegantly put into poetry the idea of a universal 
connectedness that embodies the philosophy of cosmopolitanism. No human exists without 
impacting, and being impacted, by others. No human survives in absolute solitude. 
Cosmopolitanism promotes the recognition of the dignity within all, regardless of where a person 
is born. There is a commonly recognized belief in some level of individual responsibility towards 
those in one’s community. The critical question arises of how far that community extends and 
how far that obligation extends. Geographical and political conditions have defined communities 
for millennia, but that was based on the technological capacities of the time, which limited 
communication and interaction. 
 Just as the digital age changed the way in which individuals interact with their political 
community, so too did it change the way in which they relate to the world. Expanded 
communications and global social networking have led to greater interaction between people 
from around the globe. Unlike previous generations in which physical distance created barriers to 
interaction, the digital age both enables and enhances communication. Digital natives have 
 
26 Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation XVII. 
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grown up in a world where interaction routinely takes place across borders. With this interaction 
comes both empathy and understanding along with a capacity to have an impact on events 
around the world. 
 This chapter will examine the attitudes of digital natives as they relate to both 
cosmopolitan and populist nationalism attitudes. While globalization has created greater global 
connections, the Western world has witnessed a growing trend of populism grounded in 
nationalist and isolationist sentiments. Digital natives are being torn between these two 
fundamentally opposed ideologies. The previous chapter examined the manifestation of 
responsibility by digital natives within their community, but the next step requires understanding 
how (or if) they view a responsibility beyond their own countries. Both cosmopolitanism and 
populist nationalism provide arguments for where the individual’s responsibility ought to lie. 
Cosmopolitan responsibility today is the premise that individuals, connected by the digital age, 
will feel responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights for all people, 
regardless of geographic proximity. This theory also believes that individuals will act within 
their capacity to affect change at the global level. This chapter seeks to both identify the 
differences between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists and examine whether there is 
evidence of the existence of a cosmopolitan responsibility. 
Cosmopolitans and Populist Nationalists 
 
 As discussed in Chapter II, cosmopolitans and populist nationalists differ in a number of 
areas, most obviously in their outlook towards the outside world. Populist nationalists have an 
inward focus on their own community. They prefer a homogenous culture, state focus on 
domestic concerns, protection from outsiders, and promoting a strong nationalism (Ignazi, 2010). 
Populist nationalists often favor a strong military and open trade, but otherwise show disdain for 
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a globalizing world (Fukuyama, 2018). Cosmopolitans, broadly speaking, focus upon global 
society with a fondness for diversity and cultural heterogeneity. They focus on cooperation rather 
than competition and dismiss the lottery of birth that placed them in a bounded location (Brown 
& Held, 2010). They reject the noble lie of Socrates that binds the individual to the land in which 
they are born (Plato/Bloom, 1991, p. 94). As citizens of the world, cosmopolitans see their 
responsibility as including all people, whereas populist nationalists direct their responsibility 
towards others in their own country27 (De Mattas, 2017).  
 As discussed in Chapter IV, a Cosmopolitan/Populist Nationalism (CPN) Scale was 
created to measure both cosmopolitan and populist nationalism attitudes. This scale, comprised 
of six questions favoring cosmopolitan values and seven favoring populist nationalism values, 
allowed for respondents to be identified as favoring one of the two outlooks or being neutral. Of 
the 826 respondents, 20.2% (167) were identified as cosmopolitan, 20.0% (165) as populist 
nationalist, and 59.8% (494) as neutral28. Having identified the respondents, their disposition to 
political ideology, media, and political action could be investigated. The attitudes measured in 
the CPN Scale can be seen in Table 6.1: 
  
 
27 The incompatibility of cosmopolitan and populist nationalism is discussed in the literature review in Chapter II 
and is confirmed by this study, the results of which are discussed in Chapter IV.  
28 As discussed in Chapter IV, those who scored 4 and above on the CPN were coded as cosmopolitan, a score of 2 
and below were coded as populist nationalists, and those with a score in-between were coded as neutral. 
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Table 6.1: Cosmopolitan/Populist Nationalism Scale 
 
Cosmopolitan Attitudes Populist Nationalism Attitudes 
• I am willing to work abroad in another 
culture 
• I am open to living abroad in another 
culture 
• I enjoy learning more about different 
cultures in the world 
• I get upset when people do not want to 
offer help when those in need are 
foreigners 
• I want to help those in need, even if 
they are from other countries 
• We should celebrate cultural 
differences 
• Being an American is important to me 
• International organizations are taking 
away too much power from the U.S. 
government 
• Immigrants increase crime rates 
• I believe we should solve problems at 
home before helping other countries 
• I believe my country usually does 
what is in the best interest of the world 
• When there is widespread human 
suffering in other countries, I believe 
the U.S. should focus on its 
responsibility towards other 
Americans 
• When there is widespread human 
suffering in other countries, I believe 
the U.S. should intervene if the 
country is important to the U.S. 
   
Won’t You Be My Neighbor? 
 
 One of the main questions this dissertation seeks to examine is to what extent 
relationships with those from other countries, and particularly through global social media 
connections, influences attitudes. In theory, the more connections people have with those from 
around the world, the more compassion, understanding, and empathy they are expected to have 
for others. In the digital age, these connections are easier to establish with technology removing 
many of the traditional barriers to interaction with those around the world. The past century has 
witnessed tremendous innovation, not only in physical travel, but also in the ability to 
communicate with others regardless of geographical proximity. Communication has evolved 
from only taking place between those living locally, to the written word being carried over great 
distances, to physical travel almost anywhere, and now real-time visual and aural 
communication. For millennia, people could only interact with those who lived in their 
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communities, but now digital technology allows for access to and communication nearly 
everywhere. 
One of the hypothesized relationships described in Chapter IV is that people with more 
connections to those from other countries will hold greater cosmopolitan values (H4). 
Presumably international travel would contribute to creating those connections. The more people 
travel, the more they will interact with other cultures. Respondents were asked the binomial 
question of whether or not they had traveled overseas (1 = yes, 0 = no). An independent t-test 
showed that cosmopolitans were more likely to travel internationally (M = .72, SE = .035) than 
populist nationalists (M = .61, SE = .038). The difference was significant t (326.82) = -2.18, p < 
.05, however, it only represented a small effect size29 d = .23. Surprisingly, there was only a 
small correlation between international travel and being cosmopolitan or populist nationalist. 
However, the survey asked about international travel, but only as a binary yes or no question. It 
is plausible that such a broad question could not capture the quality of travel compared to its 
quantity. If someone travels internationally on a cruise in which they only visit touristy ports for 
a few hours, it may be international travel, but it is certainly not the same experience as someone 
who spends a few months or years living abroad. Hull et al. (2019) found that even short stays, if 
well planned, can have a positive impact on cosmopolitan attitudes. The notion of increased 
travel leading to more cosmopolitan feelings has been found in numerous studies (Mau et al., 
2008; Gu & Schweisfurth, 2015; Kishino & Takahashi, 2019). Future research should take a 
more complex look at how travel impacts cosmopolitan and populist nationalist attitudes by 
 
29 The measure of effect size, Cohen’s d was established by Cohen (1988) setting the threshold of small, medium, 
and large at 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 respectively. Sawilowsky (2009) recommends the expansion of this scale to include 
very small starting at 0.01, very large (1.20) and huge (2.0). Sawilowsky’s additions will be used in this dissertation.  
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looking at factors such as duration of travel, the kinds of interaction with the native population, 
the purpose of the travel, and other factors that may better explain this relationship.  
A better measure of global connections may come through friendships with those from 
other countries. When it comes to developing empathy for those in other countries, one of the 
simplest methods is to have contact with people from those countries. It is easy to not feel any 
responsibility or connection to a nameless and faceless public that an individual has never had 
any experience with. When people experience other cultures, especially through friendship, it 
would likely result in a greater connection with those in that culture. Knowing others, seeing 
their experiences, hearing their opinions, and witnessing a life outside of one’s own can foster 
empathy. Metro-Roland (2018) notes that the presence of foreign students on college campuses 
can help foster cosmopolitan attitudes.  
To examine the extent to which personal relationships impact cosmopolitan or populist 
nationalist attitudes, this study asked respondents about the number of friends they have from 
other countries, the number of close friends from other countries, and finally, the number of 
friends on social media from other countries. When asking about the total number of friends 
from other countries, respondents with greater number of friends from other countries were more 
likely to be identified as cosmopolitan (M = 3.00, SE = 1.03) compared to populist nationalists 
(M = 2.25, SE = .89). The difference was significant t(329) = -7.10, p < .001; with a medium, 
bordering large, effect size d = .78. When it comes to having close friends from other countries, 
we see similar results. The more close friends people have, the more likely they are to be 
identified as cosmopolitan (M = 2.55, SE = 1.23) compared to populist nationalists (M = 1.95, SE 
= .95). The results were significant t(309) = -5.00, p < .001, and had a medium effect size d = 
.55.  
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Social media presents an interesting case because of the new nature of these online 
relationships. So-called real, in-person friendships are likely to create better understanding 
between people as they are exposed to the life and views of each other. But virtual friendships 
have thus far not been tested in terms of how much of a bond is created and how much is shared. 
While in-person friendships require a measure of geographical proximity, at least during some 
point in the friendship, the digital world suffers no such confines. Connections can be made 
without ever actually meeting the person with whom you are now friends. Platforms like 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and others are predicated on establishing friendships, both through 
real-world relations and through finding others who share similar interests. McEwan and Sobre-
Denton (2011) explain it by saying that “there is evidence that social media facilitates virtual 
spaces where individuals can co-construct third cultures, develop cosmopolitanism, and transfer 
cultural and social capital” (p. 257). Social media creates a space in which people can “live” and 
exist together regardless of geographic locations. People who live on opposite ends of the earth 
can be neighbors in cyberspace. Results of the survey indicated that the more friends from other 
countries people have on social media, the more likely they are to be classified as cosmopolitan 
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.01) compared to populist nationalists (M = 2.41, SD = .87). This difference 
was significant t(325) = -9.25, p < .001, and represented a large effect size d = 1.02.  As this 
study has shown, friends and contacts from other countries on social media do contribute to 
cosmopolitan attitudes rather than feelings of populist nationalism.   
Politics  
 
 One of the strongest relationships between cosmopolitan or populist nationalism values is 
how someone identifies on a spectrum of liberal to conservative. In the survey of digital natives, 
respondents were asked to rate their political views on a seven-point scale, with 1 being 
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extremely conservative and 7 being extremely liberal. Respondents classified as cosmopolitan 
were more likely to identify towards the liberal side of the scale (M = 5.63, SD = 1.10) compared 
to those identified as populist nationalists who identified with the more conservative side of the 
scale (M = 2.79, SD = 1.40). The difference was significant t(309.4) = -20.60, p <.001, and 
represented a huge effect size d = 2.26. Cosmopolitans were much more likely to identify as 
politically liberal, populist nationalists were much more likely to identify as politically 
conservative. The more liberal a person is, the more they will exhibit cosmopolitan values, and 
conversely, the more conservative a person is, the more they will reflect the values of populist 
nationalism.  
There is a marked difference between American conservatives and liberals in a number of 
key policy areas, but for this chapter, the differences in ideology are the paramount concern. 
Gries (2014) explains, “Trusting liberals are more inclined towards cooperation; wary 
conservatives, by contrast, are predisposed towards competitive interpersonal and intergroup 
relations” (p. 40). This fundamental tenet of political ideology would naturally play an important 
part in developing populist nationalist or cosmopolitan attitudes. If life is about competition, 
there seems to be little to no benefit in placing a great care for the welfare of those beyond one’s 
local community. Conversely, when cooperation is seen as a benefit for all parties involved, 
there is value in caring for the well-being of others, regardless of geographical proximity.  
 Respondents were also asked to rate their level of interest in domestic politics and 
international affairs. As explained in Chapter IV, I hypothesized that those cosmopolitans would 
be more interested in international affairs and populist nationalists would be more interested in 
domestic politics. Hypothesis H4 stated that those exhibiting cosmopolitan traits would be more 
interested in international affairs and H5 stated that those exhibiting populist nationalism traits 
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would be more interested in domestic affairs. The survey results for this were mixed. Interest in 
domestic politics, measured on a scale from 1 (not interested) to 7 (very interested), revealed that 
cosmopolitans were significantly more interested in domestic politics (M = 3.78, SD = 1.11) than 
populist nationalists (M = 3.26, SD = 1.31). The difference was significant t(317.67) = -3.91, p < 
.001, but produced only a small effect d = 0.43. These findings contradict the expected results 
described in H5, which predicted that populist nationalists would have a greater interest in 
domestic politics than cosmopolitans. However, as the literature described in Chapter II, populist 
nationalism often includes an element of disdain for elites and the political system itself. A 
dislike, or distrust, for the system would likely result in low levels of interest in domestic 
political issues. Although this study did not test for this directly, future research should include 
an examination of populist nationalists towards the state and the mechanisms of government to 
see the level of such distrust.  
Respondents were also asked about their level of interest in international and global 
affairs. Cosmopolitans again showed a greater interest (M = 4.10, SD = .93) than did populist 
nationalists (M = 2.99, SD = 1.26). The difference was significant t(298.84) = -9.09, p < .001, 
and represented a large-sized effect d = 1.00. As theorized in H4, those interested in international 
and global affairs were significantly more likely to be cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitans may be 
more interested in both domestic and international affairs because they feel a greater 
responsibility for things in general. Populist nationalists may be more accepting of the status quo, 
especially at a time when a populist nationalist such as Donald Trump is president. If their 
beliefs are not supported by the political leadership, they may not follow the affairs of state with 
such vigor.   
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Age of Information? 
 
 Speaking to a convention of news directors in 1958, Edward R. Murrow behooved them 
to embrace the incredible responsibility conferred upon them by their position. He said, “Our 
history will be what we make it. And if there are any historians about fifty or a hundred years 
from now, and there should be preserved the kinescopes for one week of all three networks, they 
will there find recorded in black and white, or color, evidence of decadence, escapism and 
insulation from the realities of the world in which we live” (Murrow, 1967, p. 355). The role of 
media in society, the responsibility it bears for informing a society, is a subject that has received 
much attention (Sanders, 2015; Bednarek & Cape, 2017; Coe, 2018; Scammell & Semetko, 
2018). A robust media is essential for any free society. As Murrow pleaded, the media often fails 
in its mission when it provides entertainment and distraction rather than providing the critical 
information needed by citizens. In an ideal democracy, the citizenry must be aware of the events 
of the day, the affairs of state, the actions of their representatives, and other such information that 
allows them to perform their duties as citizens in the most informed way possible. Voting and 
other political participation require informed reasoning, and the media has traditionally been a 
critical source of such information. The media are not entirely blameworthy in this, given that 
gossip and infotainment often provide greater ratings than actual news. However, when Murrow 
gave this admonishment in 1958, the news received by the public was largely the purview of 
news directors and editors. With limited options, the public only had a few sources of critical 
media.   
 One of the hallmarks of the digital age is the unprecedented access to information, 
including access to news through a variety of sources. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
digital natives have a wide breadth of media through which they consume information. With 
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over 96% of survey respondents indicating that they follow public affairs at least weekly through 
one or more news sources, the importance of examining the type, factual consistency, and 
political leanings of those sources becomes a critical issue. The sheer plethora of information 
available does not negate the fact that all information is not delivered equally. All news sources 
have some bias in what they report and how they report it, but some go so far as to completely 
distort information to serve their agenda. One hypothesis (H4) is that cosmopolitans will be more 
likely to get their news from a variety of sources, and more legitimate news sources. Conversely, 
H5 posits that populist nationalists will get their news from more agenda-based sources. 
 The information available can influence a person’s view of the world. Biases from media 
and the way information is presented (or not presented) will undoubtedly factor into 
cosmopolitan or populist nationalist attitudes. The relationship between what people watch and 
their global outlook is a contentious one. Lindell (2012) explored the idea that increased media 
consumption would cause cosmopolitan feelings through what Hannerz (1996) called “electronic 
empathy.” Lindell found no significant increase in cosmopolitan attitudes between those who 
consumed media via radio, television, or internet amongst those in Scandinavian countries, 
although reading the news did show a significant effect in three of the four countries studied. In 
this dissertation, media is not treated as a monolithic entity. The question being asked here is 
whether or not there is any relationship between cosmopolitan or populist nationalist values and 
various sources of media.  
Respondents were asked about their consumption habits (Never (1), Less than Monthly, 
Monthly, Weekly, or Daily (5)) of ten different sources of media. There was no significant 
difference in the average time spent reading newspapers or magazines, listening to the radio, 
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viewing online traditional news30 (CNN, Fox, MSNBC, etc.), and getting news via email 
newsletter and social media between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists. Populist 
nationalists were more likely to watch cable news31 (M = 3.33, SD = 1.32) than cosmopolitans 
(M = 2.96, SD = 1.35). The difference was significant t(328) = 2.5, p = .013, but it only had a 
small effect size d = 0.28. Populist nationalists were also more likely to watch local television 
news (M = 3.26, SD = 1.33) than cosmopolitans (M = 2.75, SD = 1.43). The difference was 
significant t(324) = 3.33, p = .001, but again only had a small effect size d = 0.37. Local news 
may have an appeal to populist nationalists because it covers more local and regional issues. 
Seeing the plight of neighbors may make one more inclined to want to help those at home rather 
than those far away. It also promotes a sense of community by keeping people apprised of local 
events. Populist nationalists were also more likely to watch agenda-based news sources (Occupy 
Democrats, Infowars, Breitbart, etc.) (M = 2.44, SD = 1.44) than cosmopolitans (M = 2.01, SD = 
1.35). The difference was significant t(324.1) = 2.86, p = .005, and it did represent a small effect 
d = 0.31. This does confirm H5 that predicted populist nationalists would be more likely to get 
their news from agenda-based sources, even if the effect was not as strong as expected.  
 As hypothesized in this dissertation, and supported by the literature review, connections 
with other people from around the world, fostered by the digital age, ought to produce a sense of 
cosmopolitan responsibility. If a person gets their news through friends, who may be from other 
countries, and can offer different perspectives, that may be the reason it contributes to 
cosmopolitan leanings. Cosmopolitans did show a greater predilection for getting information 
from friends (M = 4.49, SD = .675) compared to populist nationalists (M = 4.29, SD = 1.03). The 
 
30 While there is an important ongoing debate about media bias, separating traditional news into all the top media 
companies would have made the survey too burdensome, so they were grouped together. This is not meant to 
downplay the importance of such debates, but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
31 Examples given of cable news were CNN, Fox, and MSNBC. 
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difference was significant t(275.1) = -2.13, p = 0.34, but the effect size was small d = 0.23. 
While there may be only a small difference between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists, it is 
worth noting that cosmopolitans were more likely to have a greater number of international 
friends. If cosmopolitans have a greater likelihood of getting news from friends, and those 
friends are from other countries, it is likely that that news will include a more global perspective. 
Similarly, social media can include global connections that also inform on international issues. 
These connections that bring people together may be part of what Hannerz (1996) considered 
electronic empathy. Lindell (2012) did not find any connection between media and 
cosmopolitanism, but it may be because he failed to differentiate between types of media. 
However, without having produced any evidence to the contrary, Lindell’s conclusions might be 
supported. A deeper investigation into how people get their news, whether it is active or passive, 
may shed further light on this issue and warrants further research. 
 To answer the assertion that cosmopolitans would be more likely to get their information 
from a variety of sources (H4) their responses to frequency of news consumption were changed 
to simply reflect whether or not they consumed that source of news. Surprisingly, this hypothesis 
was unconfirmed, with no significant difference between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists 
who both viewed an average of 7 sources of news (6.99 for cosmopolitans and 6.96 for populist 
nationalists). There was also no indication that cosmopolitans or populist nationalists viewed 
media (as a whole) with greater frequency than the other. This indicates that both groups do get 
their news from a variety of sources, and consume news with a relatively equal frequency, 
indicating the source of news that appears to have greatest impact. This also shows a need for a 
more nuanced study of media and the impact on cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism. This 
study treated mainstream media as a monolithic source, which it clearly is not. Future research 
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should seek to understand what specific news sources are being viewed, not just the medium by 
which they are viewed, which was the method used here.  
 In addition to understanding where people get their news, it is also important to examine 
the level of trust people have in various sources of news. Scheuer (1999) warns that a blanket 
distrust of the news undermines the fabric of an open and democratic society. Media is a conduit 
by which those in power are kept in check. When elites make promises and claims, the media is 
responsible for holding them accountable and ensuring the public is aware of what does or does 
not transgress. Tocqueville (1835/1994), described the importance of a free press to democracy 
saying, “When the right of every citizen to a share in the government of society is acknowledged, 
everyone must be presumed to be able to choose between the various opinions of his 
contemporaries and to appreciate the different facts from which inferences may be drawn” (V1, 
p. 183). Access to various sources of media is critical, as long as a certain level of trust can be 
presumed from those sources. Kalogeropoulos et al. (2019) studied media trust in 35 countries 
and found that trust remained highest with newspapers and television news, and it has been 
growing with online “nonmainstream” news sources, but social media remained at a lower level 
of trust.  
 While the focus of this chapter is the comparison between cosmopolitan and populist 
nationalist attitudes, the overall trust amongst digital natives in different media outlets needs to 
be examined. Media has an impact on the development of both cosmopolitanism and populist 
nationalism. Taken as a whole, digital natives show a mix of trust and skepticism in a variety of 
news sources. 
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Table 6.2: Trust in Media32 
News Source Trustworthy Untrustworthy 
Daily Newspaper 59.8 % (494) 7.5% (62) 
Printed Magazine 20.4% (168) 37.3% (291) 
Cable News 33.4% (276) 30.8% (254) 
Local Television News 54.1% (447) 13.4% (111) 
Radio News 40.2% (332) 15.7% (130) 
Talking with Friends or Colleagues 27.6% (228) 21.8% (180) 
Online Traditional News Websites 37.9% (313) 26.4% (218) 
Online Agenda-Based News Websites 14.3% (118) 46.6% (385) 
Email Newsletters 16.6% (155) 29.2% (241) 
Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 14.4% (119) 48.5% (401) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there has been a marked decline in the public’s trust in the 
media. Sadly, the information age has also become the disinformation age. In 2016, the Oxford 
English Dictionary’s word of the year was “post-truth” which it defined as “relating to or 
denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion 
than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” The resulting skepticism in journalistic integrity 
has only been inflamed with the recent political climate, which has witnessed the President of the 
United States repeating the accusation of the mainstream media being “fake news” and even 
making suggestive threats against members of the media. “More than once a day, on average, 
[President Trump] has publicly assailed ‘fake news,’ ‘fake polls,’ ‘fake media,’ and ‘fake stories’ 
[and] between January 10, 2017 and today [January 17, 2018], Trump has used the word ‘fake’ 
at least 404 times in tweets and public appearances, sometimes more than once in the same 
sentence” (Stelter, 2018). This could offer some explanation as to why such a high number of 
respondents believed all media sources to be neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy. This survey 
 
32 Questions of trust were answered on a Likert scale (0 = unsure, 1 = very untrustworthy, 2 = untrustworthy, 3 = 
neither, 4 = trustworthy, 5 = very trustworthy). For this table, trustworthy was defined as a response of very 
trustworthy and trustworthy, while untrustworthy was defined as a response of very untrustworthy and 
untrustworthy. 
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had between one quarter and nearly one half of respondents having such an opinion on every 
form of news. In a 2018 Gallop poll, 83% of respondents said they believed there to be either a 
fair amount or great amount of political bias, and 66% believe that “most news media don’t do a 
good job of letting people know what is fact and what is opinion” (p. 11). It is likely that the 
younger portion of the digital native generation would be unsure about their trust in various news 
sources because they are reaching their political coming of age in a time when debates take place 
not over interpretations of facts, but over what “facts” are accepted.  
Taking a closer look at trust in media by cosmopolitans and populist nationalists, only 
two sources of news showed a significant difference. Populist nationalist were slightly more 
likely to trust local cable news (M =3.49, SD = 1.02) compared to cosmopolitans (M = 3.20, SD 
= 1.04). The difference was significant t(329) = 2.57, p = .011, but represented a small-sized 
effect d = .28. This is unsurprising considering populist nationalists were also more likely to get 
their information through this medium. There was also a significant difference between the levels 
of trust in agenda-based news sites. Populist nationalists were more likely to trust agenda-based 
sources of news (M = 2.38, SD = 1.37) than cosmopolitans (M = 1.79, SD = 1.09). The difference 
was significant t(309) = 4.32, p < .001, and represented a near-medium-sized effect d = .48. 
Again, this is unsurprising when paired with the fact that populist nationalists are more likely to 
get their information from agenda-based news sources. However, this should be concerning 
because agenda-based news sources, by definition, pursue a narrative. While news is meant to be 
informative, not subjective, agenda-based news frames information in a way that suits its 
ideological leanings. Falcous, Hawzen, and Newman (2019) examined this trend even in 
something as neutral as sports reporting. They found numerous of examples in which Breitbart 
Sports made value statements and political judgments in sports analysis with headlines such as 
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Where Are the Christian Athletes? and UnAmerican! Animal Rights Activists Protest Dodger 
Dogs on Fourth of July Weekend (Falcous et al., 2019, pp. 596-599). Watching agenda-based 
news is likely to reinforce one’s own views because it presents information within a 
predetermined frame. Even though populist nationals are more likely to find it trustworthy, they 
still do not have a high level of trust within this medium.  
Even with the plethora of misinformation, disinformation, biased coverage, and the 
ability to manipulate images, soundbites, and videos, digital natives are not giving up on the 
Fourth Estate. The pessimistic view of these statistics could easily suggest being on a precipice 
of a complete breakdown of the media, but like most things, this new generation is not 
destroying it, only refashioning it. When asked if they will read a news story from a variety of 
different sources, 81.8% responded that they do. Over 30% said that they do so very often. The 
past century has witnessed the evolution of media from printed material only, to radio, to 
television, the expansion of television, to online platforms, and now interactive forums in which 
news can be shared and discussed. As media platforms have expanded, so too have the ways in 
which people may access information. When asked about other sources of news, survey 
respondents added a great number of options such as podcasts, specific news sites not mentioned 
in the survey (NPR, The Economist, etc.), YouTube, Reddit, and others. One respondent, a male 
under 21 years old, stated that he would watch events filmed by people directly. This aspect of 
the digital age enables individuals to be both producers and consumers, avoiding the traditional 









 Another question this dissertation seeks to explore is what cosmopolitans and populist 
nationalists will do with the information they have. Will they use the information they have to 
influence the political system? Will their values translate to political action? With a populace 
with the capacity to be the most informed generation ever, the question thus moves to how that 
information can be used within the polis. As discussed in the previous chapter, digital natives 
have an ever-increasing barrage of ways to be involved with the political system. However, the 
mere existence of means does not guarantee their use. 
There are traditional methods of political action such as voting, signing a petition, 
contacting an elected official, participating in a boycott or strike, or demonstrating. However, the 
digital age has introduced new methods of political engagement that can be done independently 
or in concert with traditional political action. These digital means of engagement include 
following current events through the social media accounts of news organizations, advocacy 
groups, and elected officials. They can also engage in online discussions and share and reflect on 
issues they deem important.  
 As part of the survey, respondents were asked about both their traditional political action 
and their online political action. The results show that digital natives are taking advantage of all 
methods of political participation, but there are still those that remain apathetic. The general 
trends have been discussed in the previous chapter, so this chapter focuses on the differences 
between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists.  Respondents were asked to consider if they 
would never do (1), might do (2), would do (3), or have done (4), various traditional political 
actions. Cosmopolitans were more likely to call an elected official, sign a petition, join a strike, 
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engage in a boycott, and/or participate in peaceful demonstrations. The full results can be seen in 
Table 6.3: 
Table 6.3: Political Action 
  Cosmopolitans Populist 
Nationalists 
t-value p d 








326.6 = -11.39 <.001 .55 






267.24 = -8.16 <.001 .9 






315.83 = -10.34 <.001 1.13 






328 = -11.39 <.001 1.26 








330 = -11.41 <.001 1.26 
 
 The digital age has expanded the ways in which people can be politically active. It has 
not replaced traditional action, only adding new means that enable citizens to be engaged in their 
community. To address these changes, survey respondents were asked to consider their online 
political activism on the same scale as traditional political action, discussed above. Following 
elected officials on social media, following traditional media accounts, and following issue 
advocacy groups (examples of the NRA and Sierra Club were given), showed no significant 
difference between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists. In the other online political 
activities, the same trends found within traditional political action were shown in which 
cosmopolitans were more active. Cosmopolitans were more likely to engage in online political 
discussions (M = 3.02, SD = 1.2) compared to populist nationalists (M = 2.59, SD = 1.21). The 
difference was significant t(316) = -3.2, p = .002, and it represented a small-sized effect d = .36. 
Cosmopolitans were also more likely to comment on elected officials’ social media posts (M = 
2.61, SD = 1.22) compared to populist nationalists (M = 2.11, SD 1.11). The difference was 
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significant t(311.71) = -3.83, p < .001, and it represented a small-sized effect d = .43. 
Cosmopolitans were more likely to share a political news story (M = 3.07, SD = 1.1) compared 
to populist nationalists (M = 2.7, SD = 1.19). The difference was significant t(309.11) = -2.88, p 
= .004, and it represents a small-sized effect d = .32. Cosmopolitans were also more likely to 
share political memes (M = 3.04, SD = 1.16) than populist nationalists (M = 2.69, SD = 1.18). 
The difference was significant t(315) = -2.7, p = .007, and it represented a small-sized effect d = 
.3. Finally, cosmopolitans were more likely to email an elected official (M = 2.76, SD = 1.04) 
compared to populist nationalist (M = 2.06, SD = 1.04). The different was significant t(311) = -
5.98, p < .001, and it represented a medium-sized effect d = .67. 
Overall, the results suggest that those identified as cosmopolitans are more politically 
active both through traditional means and online. As previously mentioned, populist nationalists 
may be less active because of a distrust or aversion to elites and government, or they may simply 
be satisfied with the status quo and do not feel a need for things to change. If populist 
nationalism is becoming more mainstream and becoming the status quo, its supporters may not 
feel the need to be as engaged in political action. Political action is often sought to change the 
status quo, not reinforce it. Cosmopolitans may be more active because they seek a change to the 
status quo or feel a responsibility to be engaged in the political system. They may feel the need 
to be proactive in advocating for change rather than preserving the current state of affairs. People 
with progressive ideologies often pursue their vision of a better system whereas conservatives 
seek to preserve the way things are.  
Discussion 
 
 This chapter has presented evidence that digital natives have a sense of cosmopolitan 
responsibility and that the digital age plays a role in its promotion. In the ideological battle 
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between cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism, global events will continue to pull people in 
both directions. Ironically, the changes brought about by the digital age drive both these 
ideologies. For populist nationalism, there is a fear of change brought by changing demographics 
and economic integration. They see traditional society threatened by the pluralism driven by 
globalization. They also show a general disdain for government. Conversely, cosmopolitans see 
these same forces as a natural evolution in which the rights accorded to their geographical 
neighbors ought to be the same for their global neighbors. This compassion is driven by contact, 
both in-person contact with those from other countries and online connections. This contact 
fosters both compassion and empathy that is at the root of human rights.    
 This chapter reveals several characteristics about digital natives who are either 
cosmopolitan or populist nationalist. Hypothesis H4 posited that cosmopolitans would be more 
likely to travel internationally, more likely to have friends from other countries, more likely to be 
interested in international affairs, and more likely to get their news from a variety of sources. For 
the most part these hypotheses were confirmed. The only hypothesis that was not confirmed was 
that cosmopolitans were unique in getting their news from a variety of sources. They were no 
more likely to use a variety of sources than populist nationalists, which may be more of a 
testament to the digital age. With so much information available, digital natives seem to be 
taking advantage of the variety of sources to gather information rather than being limited to one 
or two sources. Hypothesis H5 posited that populist nationalists would have less international 
travel, fewer friends from other countries, more likely to be interested in domestic affairs, and 
would use fewer sources of news. As previously mentioned, there was no significant difference 
between the number of news sources used by either group. The survey did confirm that the 
populist nationalists surveyed would be less likely to travel internationally, and they were likely 
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to have fewer friends from other countries. The results also counter the assertion that populist 
nationalists would be more interested in domestic affairs.  
  The center issue of this chapter has been the idea of international responsibility. While 
the previous chapter dealt with digital natives as a whole, while examining their conceptions of 
local and national responsibility, this chapter offers insights into the two dominant global 
outlooks of cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism and how they view their global 
responsibility. The idea of cosmopolitan responsibility put forth in this dissertation, is the idea 
that responsibility for human rights extends to all people, regardless of their physical proximity 
to those suffering. All people bear a responsibility for those suffering from systemic and 
widespread abuse. This responsibility, and ability to respond, is made possible by the digital age, 
which enables people to connect with others from around the world. The ability to be unaware of 
human rights abuses is nearly impossible in this globally connected world. But these possibilities 
also bring backlash, specifically the fear that globalization is threatening local communities 
leading to a belief that responsibility is best manifested locally.  
  




Developing a Digital Conscience 
 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home—so close and 
so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the 
individual person: The neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, 
farm, or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks 
equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have 
meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold 
them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world. 
- Eleanor Roosevelt, remarks to the United Nations, March 27, 1953 
 
In an age of near limitless information, why is there so little wisdom? The digital age has 
produced the ability for every citizen to make informed decisions on political and community 
issues. It has created a means by which human rights atrocities can be confirmed as they happen, 
and an appropriate response can be planned. Yet misinformation and disinformation continue to 
spread, and far too many people believe false information because it aligns with their political 
views. And human rights atrocities continue to happen in full view of the world community with 
little global effort to alleviate the suffering. Much of this is occurring in a world where growing 
populist nationalist sentiments are appealing to those who feel left behind by an increasingly 
globalized world. While this stark reality may seem daunting, there is an even greater force 
empowered by digital technology, and that is a growing embracement of responsibility. Digital 
natives are connecting to their peers around the world without regard for national boundaries. 
Their compassion extends to those who are suffering, no matter where they live. They are 
finding new ways to be engaged in their local communities and the world as a whole.  
The question, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” asked in Genesis 4:9, is a question of 
responsibility. To whom do we owe our concern? Who should we care about and why? Society 
is predicated upon the cooperation and shared responsibilities that allow a community to 
function. This dissertation seeks to provide a glimpse into what civic and global responsibility 
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entails in the digital age. With ever-expanding connections, digital technology connects people in 
ways never before imagined. Of particular interest is how digital natives, those born into a world 
in which the internet has been the norm rather than the exception, interpret their responsibility. In 
order to investigate these topics, a survey of 834 digital natives in the United States was 
conducted to better understand their attitudes towards a number of topics relating to civic 
engagement, online activities, political outlook, human rights, and other areas ripe for inquiry. 
No right exists without a corresponding responsibility. This maxim has been recognized in 
numerous philosophical texts and formal treaties. The U.S. Declaration of Independence 
maintains that opposition to tyranny is both a right and a duty. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 29:1, states, “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the 
free and full development of his personality is possible.” The promotion of rights, both at home 
and abroad, requires the exercise of responsibilities. Digital technology has created an 
environment in which the exercise of these responsibilities is enabled through greater access to 
information, the ability to form advocacy networks, and a capacity to be heard globally. 
The Power of the Digital Age 
 
 Digital technology has been condemned as the death of society and praised as the savior 
of it. It has been derided as a tsunami of misinformation and disinformation and heralded for 
bringing information to the masses. Critics and supporters alike are quick to paint an image of 
one extreme or the other, but like all things its value is found in how it is utilized. When Ridlen 
Ray (1999) examined previous innovations such as newspapers, telephones, cars, and television, 
she found the same fears and the same eventual acceptance of these as a means to achieve what 
the user desires. Dewey (1946) even mentions the hope of those at the beginning of the 20th 
century who believed that “the revolution which was taking place in commerce and 
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communication would break down the barriers which had kept the peoples of the earth alien and 
hostile and would create a state of interdependence which in time would insure lasting peace” (p. 
23). Putnam (1996) places blame on television as an isolating device that contributes to 
decreasing social connections. All innovation holds the potential for greatness and destruction. If 
people are willing, the internet can be a source of information, a means of associating and 
organizing, and a way to further human rights, but only if individuals choose to use it in such a 
way.   
Yet digital technology offers numerous opportunities for civil and global society. The 
public forum has long been a hallmark of any republic, and an open and free space for people to 
come and debate ideas and issues has always been of the utmost importance. From the glistening 
white togas debating the meaning of democracy in the Agora to the three-hour long Lincoln-
Douglas debates on slavery and union to the town halls in every American community, the 
public forum is an essential civic element. The internet has the capacity to revolutionize the 
conception of the public forum. This addresses one of Dewey’s main concerns, that “it is 
impossible for a highly industrialized society to attain a widespread high excellence of mind 
when multitudes are excluded from occasion for the use of thought and emotion in their daily 
occupation” (1999, pp. 64-66). In the fast-paced modern world, much of civic life has been 
relegated to a lower status of importance. As this study has shown, nearly 90% of digital natives 
discuss national or global issues with friends or colleagues, and much of that can be done online. 
This is the foundation of democratic iterations as defined by Benhabib (2006). Seventy-six 
percent of digital natives also reported engaging in online political discussions. As Dahlgren and 
Alvares (2013) discussed, participation must go beyond a perfunctory performance in which it is 
often dismissed as slacktivism. Participation must be meaningful.   
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Much to the consternation of political theorists and philosophers, politics and civic 
engagement are not on the forefront of daily concern to the average citizen. In 1961, Dahl noted 
that “one of the central facts of political life is that politics—local, state, national, international—
lies for most people at the outer periphery of attention, interest, concern, and activity. At the 
focus of most men’s lives are primary activities involving food, sex, love, family, work, play, 
shelter, comfort, friendship, social esteem, and the like” (p. 279). While questions of the public 
good, the proper direction of government, and how to advance global human rights may not rise 
to the level of near obsession found in the author and those like him, they are questions that need 
at least occasional consideration by members of any free society. Dewey (1946) notes the 
difficulty within such a seemingly easy request when he writes, “human beings do get tired of 
liberty, of political liberty and of the responsibilities, the duties, the burden that the acceptance of 
political liberty involves” (p. 34). Dewey is in no way advocating for authoritarianism or any 
other such similar form of government, he is simply pointing out the work involved in keeping a 
free and open society. Far too often the focus of democracy is on the freedoms it provides 
without due consideration of the responsibilities such a society requires. No freedom exists 
without a corresponding responsibility.    
The digital age offers tremendous opportunities to connect people, but those connections 
have also sewn the seeds of dissent against an expanding community. Populist nationalism has 
risen, in part, thanks to those connections driven by globalization and the digital age. It seeks a 
return to an imagined past in which borders provided near absolute security, not only from actual 
violence, but also from perceived threats to changing cultures. The world glorified by 
nationalists and isolationists in which countries and societies exist independently from one 
another is a fiction. As Appiah (2006) observes, “Cultural purity is an oxymoron. The odds are 
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that, culturally speaking, you already live a cosmopolitan life, enriched by literature, art, and film 
that comes from many places, and that contains influences from many more” (p. 113). While the 
vision of populist nationalism may be a farce, its impact on domestic and global politics remains 
a very real influence. 
It Is Not Enough to Know 
 
 The digital age, the age of information, has created a plethora of avenues by which 
information can be obtained and transmitted. A more critical question is found in asking what 
individuals do with that information. In the film Hotel Rwanda (2004) there is a fictional account 
of an interaction between hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina (played by Don Cheadle) and a news 
cameraman, Jack Daglish (played by Joaquin Phoenix). Daglish had just filmed the brutal 
murder of Tutsis and apologizes to Paul for letting him see the horrific images. Paul says, “I am 
glad that you have shot this footage and that the world will see it. It is the only way we have a 
chance that people might intervene. How can they not intervene when they witness such 
atrocities?” Jack looks back at him, and says, “I think if people see this footage, they’ll say, ‘oh 
my God, that’s horrible,’ and then go back to eating their dinners.” This imagined interaction 
was all too real as the international response to the Rwandan genocide played out on major news 
channels without any intervention taken by the outside world. It wasn’t for lack of knowledge 
that the international community stood idly by. Even under the obligations set forth in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide33 the United States 
publicly obfuscated and denied any responsibility. In 2004, it would be revealed that as early as 
16 days after the start of the genocide, U.S. officials knew the details and even referred to the 
 
33 The United States would not ratify the convention until November 05, 1988. 
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situation as a genocide (Carroll, 2004). We saw, and we did nothing. We knew, and we did 
nothing.  
 Unfortunately, this is not the first time (nor the last time) the United States would ignore 
massive human rights abuses. During World War II, the extent of the Holocaust may not have 
been yet realized, but it was known that the Nazis were undertaking a systematic extermination 
of the Jewish people. In a 1942 broadcast, Edward R. Murrow said, “The phrase ‘concentration 
camps’ is obsolete…It is now possible to speak only of extermination camps” (Murrow, 1967, p. 
57). On December 17, 1942 the Allied Nations released condemnation of the extermination of 
the Jews and it made the front page of the New York Times the next day. We heard, and we did 
nothing. We knew, and we did nothing.  
 Samantha Power (2002) poignantly describes the willful ignorance that has often driven 
U.S. foreign policy:  
In an age of instant information, U.S. officials have gone from claiming that they 
“didn’t know” to suggesting—as President Clinton did in his 1998 Rwanda 
apology—that they “didn’t fully appreciate.” This, too, is misleading. It is true 
that the atrocities that were known remained abstract and remote, rarely acquiring 
the status of knee-buckling knowledge among ordinary Americans. Because the 
savagery of genocide so defies our everyday experience, many of us failed to 
wrap our minds around it. We gradually came to accept the depravity of the 
Holocaust, but then slotted it in our consciousness as “history”; we resisted 
acknowledging that genocide was occurring in the present. Survivors and 
witnesses had trouble making the unbelievable believable. Bystanders were thus 
able to retreat to the “twilight between knowing and not knowing” (p. 505).  
 
So how does information influence people if it can be ignored or questioned? Populist 
nationalism, especially in the United States, has seized upon a strategy that does not involved a 
debate over the facts, but rather a debate about the facts. In 2018, while speaking at the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars (VFW) annual convention, President Trump said, “Stick with us. Don’t believe 
the crap you see from these people, the fake news. What you’re seeing and what you’re reading 
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is not what’s happening” (Cillizza, 2018). For information to be meaningful, it must be 
understood and acted upon. This dissertation began with the stories of Salek Kuenstler, those in 
hiding at the Hotel des Mille Collines, and Bana al-Abed. Their stories illustrate that it is not just 
knowledge, but knowledge in the hands of people who care and embrace a responsibility that 
ultimately makes an impact. Taken alone, each of their stories could have been tragic had it not 
been for the actions of others. Information by itself is neutral; it has no position. But when put 




 The power of responsibility is found in its ability to harness the collective action of 
individuals willing to use their democratic advantages for the benefit of others. Small actions, 
voting for candidates who protect human rights, advocating for those without a voice, even just 
raising awareness, all have immense power when combined with the actions of others. Almond 
(1996) reminds us “if democracy means anything, it means that in some way governmental elites 
must respond to the desires and demands of citizens” (p. 3). Democracy provides a means by 
which citizens can have an impact on what they care about. Former President of South Korea, 
Kim Dae-Jung, warned, “An apathetic attitude is effectively on the side of evil, letting alone a 
submissive attitude for a dictator and an attitude of flattery to buy a position with influence and 
power” (2018, p. 303). Embracing responsibility, be it civic or cosmopolitan, is a personal act of 
ethical conduct that can change the course of history. Those more cynical will doubt the power 
of change at the individual level, but history has shown that movements, springing from the 
collective work of individuals, have been the main source of change throughout time. Rawls 
(2003) addressed this concern by saying, “I recognize that there are questions about how the 
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limits of the practicably possible are discerned and what the conditions of our social world in fact 
are. The problem here is that the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a 
greater or lesser extent change political and social institutions and much else” (p. 12). 
 Traditional civic engagement allows for relatively obvious signs of success: laws are 
passed, officials are elected or ousted, democratic machinery functions. Even though it may 
sometimes feel like democratic institutions do not respond to the popular will, history has 
already proven otherwise. What is harder to see are the successes of cosmopolitan responsibility. 
Cases such as the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade and the end to apartheid in South 
Africa are historically clear, but only in reflection. The timetables of regular elections do not 
exist with global campaigns.  
Cosmopolitan responsibility is not simply an idealistic formulation of individual 
responsibility in a globalized world. It follows the historical dialectic in which international law 
moved from collective responsibility to include individual responsibility. The First World War 
was blamed on Germany, and as a collective, the people of Germany were indebted for their 
crime. Following the Second World War, Germany was once again an aggressor, but it was no 
longer the entire country at fault. The Nuremburg Trials singled out those most responsible for 
the crimes committed during that war and they were punished rather than assigning blame to all 
Germans. Just as international law expanded from collective to individual liability, so too does 
responsibility for protecting rights expand from the collective state to the individual. As capacity 
and circumstances change, so to must our understandings of responsibility.  
Cosmopolitan responsibility entails the promotion of an international norm dedicated to 
making the protection and promotion of human rights a priority. It addresses the advice offered 
by Brown (2013) that rather than attempting to remove norms, like Responsibility to Protect, 
AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
138 
 
from a perceived political consideration, these norms should be embraced and reformulated in 
terms of national interest. Cosmopolitan responsibility asks individuals to view human rights as a 
national priority that can be expressed through domestic and foreign policies. Individuals have 
the power to advocate and network globally, while also taking definitive action locally. The 
protests over the killing of George Floyd began in Minnesota but spread across the United States 
and many other countries around the world. From German soccer players to Syrian graffiti 
artists, people have acted within their capacity to affect change. “The power of ideas is an 
important factor that contributes to legal change, and ideas do not respect national boundaries” 
(Sloss & Sandholtz, 2019, p. 1184). As support builds for ideas, and they become embraced by 
an ever-growing global audience, they take on an immense power. Every movement begins with 
a simple idea. From Black Lives Matter to the R2P to the global movement for environmental 
sustainability, every movement begins with a simple hope for a better world. Stimson (1932) 
noted, “Moral disapproval, when it becomes the disapproval of the whole world, takes on a 
significance hitherto unknown in international law” (p. viii). Revolutions may be suppressed, but 
the ideas that drive them can never be silenced.  
Key Findings 
 
 Throughout this dissertation I have endeavored to illustrate what responsibility looks like 
in the digital age. I have done so within the competing ideologies of populist nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism, both of which are driven by globalization and digital technology. Bala (2014) 
explains how digital technology allows individuals to exercise their responsibility (both legally 
and extralegally). She writes, “Digital civic engagement leads to a wide range of phenomena, 
from organizing protests using social networks (e.g. Occupy Wall Street) to the use of digital to 
access institutions’ information unlawfully (e.g. Anonymous) to the use of mobile application 
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made locally to access government services or the use of digital platforms for exchanging views” 
(2014, p. 768). The exercise of responsibility, locally and globally, was described at length in 
Chapters V and VI respectively. The main findings can be summarized as such: 
 Civic Responsibility 
 
Almond and Verba’s (1963) The Civic Culture provided the groundwork for over five 
decades of study of how individuals interact within their community and government. As 
hypothesized (H1), their typology of the participant, subject, and parochial mostly remain 
relevant today as a way to categorize civic engagement. There are digital natives who understand 
the role government plays in their lives, how it is set up, who the main actors are, and they 
engage with that system (participants). The digital age has created new means by which 
participants can engage in the system. The traditional means of participation studied by Almond 
and Verba, such as voting, discussing issues with others, calling elected officials, and so on, are 
still being used by digital natives, but they now have a more expansive arsenal for participation. 
This confirms H2 ,which said that there would be more robust avenues for civic engagement. 
Participants in the digital age are able to create and disseminate information online, find like-
minded people and groups from all over their countries and the world, organize and plan political 
action, and make connections that geography had previously prevented. The traditional methods 
for civic engagement coupled with these new digital methods create this robust collection of 
means of civic engagement. There are also those who are moderately aware of the impact of 
government but take little or no action to influence it (subjects). Subjects, or people who identify 
as apolitical or “just not interested in politics” also benefit from the advances of the digital age, 
but just as with traditional means of engagement, they choose to be minimally involved. Finally, 
there may be those who have no idea of how government impacts their lives and would not know 
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how to participate if they ever chose to do so (parochials), but those are becoming more and 
more rare with expanding education and access to information.  
Parochials, as a classification, may no longer be useful in understanding how people 
relate to government. Almond and Verba viewed them as people who were genuinely unaware 
and disinterested. By and large, this is no longer possible in the digital age, but there still remains 
a group of people who remain willfully ignorant. This group might best be called bystanders, as 
Samantha Power (2002) described, since they ignore the information they see. Exemplifying this 
was one survey respondent, a White female, 21 or under, who watches news from a variety of 
sources, is active in campus activities, and when asked about an issue that made her take political 
action, responded, “To be honest, I’m not very politically active.” This respondent is informed 
and understands the impact of government (even strongly agreeing with the statement “I believe 
the actions of government have a great deal of impact on my life”), but just doesn’t show a desire 
to participate in the system. The definitions of participants and subjects remain valid, but there is 
a strong case for replacing parochials with something more in line with people who are informed 
and aware, but simply apathetic.  
Additionally, the plethora of misinformation and disinformation created by the digital age 
may give cause for a fourth group. There are people who have access to information but choose 
to only seek information that reinforces their previously held beliefs. The internet can be an echo 
chamber in which to seek information that confirms a bias, rather than being open to information 
and opinions that would challenge that. This group might best be described as blind partisans 
who reinforce their views and dismiss any challenges as false news. Exemplifying this category 
was a survey respondent, a White male aged 22-37, who is politically active, who, when asked 
about types of news consumption he viewed, responded, “More reputable sites than those listed 
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above.” The news sites that were listed were daily newspapers, printed magazines, cable news 
(CNN, Fox, MSNBC, etc.), local television news, radio news, talking with friends and 
colleagues, online traditional news sites (CNN, Fox, MSNBC, etc.), online agenda-based news 
sites (Occupy Democrats, Infowars, Breitbart, etc), email newsletters, and social media 
(Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Unfortunately, this category arises as a result of the study so there were 
no questions asked about being open to opposing points of view, but this respondent and others 
like him, suggest that there is a group dismissive of information that does not fit their already 
held beliefs. Several other respondents showed similar views about traditional and new media, 
indicating they find most media to be untrustworthy, but they follow current affairs through 
“alternative media,” “independent news networks,” and other such responses. One respondent 
even explicitly stated, “I trust nothing.” This category has emerged as an area ripe for further 
research.   
 Like any group, digital natives are quite diverse in their opinions and predilections. 
Popular stereotypes paint them as ignorant and apathetic, self-absorbed, and forever hidden 
behind the screen on their smartphone. While they have yet to show up as a reliable voting bloc, 
these stereotypes vastly underestimate an influential generation coming into their own. The vast 
majority (90.9%) believe government has an impact on their lives and as such, they almost 
universally (96%) follow public affairs weekly through one or more news sources. Just as new 
technology outpaces or replaces the old, digital natives have adapted their information gathering 
in the digital age. The respondents to Almond and Verba heavily utilized radio, newspaper, and 
television for their information, whereas digital natives have expanded this to include social 
media, internet news sites, email, and other digital media. However, while there is a plethora of 
information available, public confidence in the media continues its decades-long decline. One 
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stark contrast between 1963 and 2018 is the drop in trust in equal treatment before the law. In 
1963 nearly 90% believed they would receive the same treatment as anyone else, but in 2018 that 
number was just 41%. As discussed in Chapter V, this is likely the result of a more diverse 
sample than that of Almond and Verba.  
 The digital age also provides the means by which users move from passive consumers of 
news and information to active reflection with it. Digital natives can comment on news stories, 
share them with others, interact with elected officials online, network with like-minded others, 
and even create news using a camera phone. Similarly, digital natives have an abundance of 
methods by which they can take political action beyond traditional means such as voting, writing 
to elected officials, signing petitions, and so on. While their use of traditional means of activism 
is on par with previous studies, they are also able to discuss politics with friends online, organize 
and network through digital means, and engage in new ways. 
 This dissertation advances the literature on civic culture in the digital age by providing a 
current analysis of the attitudes and actions of digital natives in the United States. As discussed 
in Chapters II and III, the implications of the digital age on civic engagement are only starting to 
be understood. Much of the previous literature was written prior to digital natives entering 
political maturity. Social networking has only become the norm within the past two decades, 
leaving its impact ripe for exploration. The results of the survey show that civic culture is alive 
and well and has taken on a multitude of new forms. While the obstacles faced by digital natives 
are substantial, so too are the opportunities. Digital natives have the capacity to be the most 
informed generation ever, yet the results of this survey show that not all are up to the task. Just 
like the participants studied by Almond and Verba (1963), the digital age participant must be 
willing to put forth an effort to be both informed and engaged. Along with actively seeking 
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information and participating, the digital age participant must also be willing to navigate through 
the myriad of misinformation, disinformation, and break free from the echo chamber that all 
create an impediment to actually being informed. Civic engagement, at any level, remains a 
choice.  
 Cosmopolitan Responsibility 
 
 Human rights are enshrined in international law, yet enforcement of those laws relies 
upon the individual and collective actions of states. Action, or more often inaction, occurs solely 
at the state level. As the duty bearer, states have been the focus of attempts to both codify 
international law and create better enforcement mechanisms, such as R2P. The failure of states to 
live up to these ideals calls for the diffusion of responsibility to include individuals. 
Cosmopolitans have long argued that individual responsibility must extend beyond the artificial 
borders of the state (See Chapter II). Other philosophical schools of thought, such as anarchism 
and communism, also shared consternation with the limits of ethical responsibility created by the 
state. Mikhail Bakunin explained, “The State then is the most flagrant negation, the most cynical 
and complete negation of humanity. It rends apart the universal solidarity of all men…It takes 
under its protection only its own citizens, and it recognizes human right, humanity, and 
civilization only within the confines of its own boundaries” (Maximoff, 1953, p. 138). The social 
contract binds individuals to a connection with a particular state, and those within that state, 
creating an other to which they owe no consideration. Bakunin argues that patriotism and the 
state exist antithetical to a universal human connection because to recognize a universal equality 
would undermine the logical foundations of the social contract that created individual states. If 
all of humanity is deserving of the same rights, there is no reason for individual states to protect 
the universal rights of only a small fraction of people (Ibid, pp. 136-146). 
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The philosophical foundations of the state aside, the legitimate concerns of a universal 
responsibility for human rights, or a cosmopolitan responsibility, are no longer threatened by a 
state-centric system. Whereas the traditional notion of cosmopolitanism included a self-
identification as a citizen of the world, cosmopolitan responsibility does not require such 
identification, merely the acceptance that civic duty extends beyond one’s own borders. Those 
who consider themselves patriotic, with a strong bond to their state, can act upon their 
cosmopolitan responsibility with the same fervor of a traditional cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitan 
responsibility acknowledges interdependence and the universal nature of rights and can be 
carried out within the traditional system of states.  With a hallmark of the digital age being a 
smaller, more closely connected world, responsibility ought to expand to cover those beyond 
one’s immediate geographical proximity. Specifically, the area of human rights ought to be 
examined to see how these digital connections impact advocacy and concern. Building on Luck 
and Luck’s (2010) call for an individual Responsibility to Protect, and Ackerly’s (2018) concepts 
of just responsibility, this survey sought to examine how individuals interpret their cosmopolitan 
responsibility, especially given the opposing trends of populist nationalism.   
 This study found that those digital natives classified as having greater cosmopolitan 
attitudes were more engaged with the political system. They showed greater interest in both 
domestic and global issues. They were also more likely to sign a petition, join in boycotts, attend 
peaceful demonstrations, join strikes, and email elected officials than their counterparts who 
favored more populist nationalism attitudes. One of my main hypotheses was that being 
connected with others from around the world would promote cosmopolitan responsibility. While 
travel did not have any significant relationship, having friends from other countries (both in 
person and online) did have a positive correlation with cosmopolitan attitudes.  





With survey research, there is always a concern of a social desirability bias in which the 
respondent will give the answer they believe to be right rather than what they actually believe. 
Holbrook and Krosnick (2010) suggest that anonymous surveys help mitigate this risk because 
the respondents are less likely to worry about judgment. Additionally, a large sample size 
reduces the risk of the results being impacted by this bias. This survey also had an over-
representation of respondents from the southeastern part of the United States. Finally, all politics 
are personal. As Kaltwasser et al. (2017) note about populism, “populism scholarship is bound 
up with practical politics. The term is used to advance or undermine political causes in the media 
but also sometimes within academia” (p. 2).  
Future Research 
 
 Like any good research (or bad research for that matter), I have created more questions 
than I have answered. This dissertation has created a great deal of intrigue in future research, 
which I endeavor to briefly offer here. As with Almond and Verba’s original study, there is great 
benefit in expanding these questions beyond the United States. Civic culture in the digital age 
ought to be a cross-national study. There is also a great need to better understand exactly how 
digital natives use technology for political purposes. This dissertation briefly examined some of 
the basic questions of what actions are taken, but future research ought to go deeper into various 
digital advocacy tools, how they are used, and why users prefer them to other action. From apps 
developed for specific actions to people who believe online activism to be more effective than 
other traditional forms of participation, there are many new methods created by the digital age. It 
would also be interesting to address some of these issues from the perspective of elected 
officials. What means of communication and action do they respond to best? What influences 
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their decisions? Furthermore, the area of media trust and perceptions of truth in the digital age 
needs greater attention. There is a growing body of literature examining these issues, but with the 
growing influence of populist nationalism that emboldens this distrust, the circumstances are 
changing rapidly.  
 In terms of global responsibility, I would propose that future research inquire into the 
level of importance digital natives place on things such as human rights. While I have shown 
there is a relation between friends from other countries and cosmopolitan values, I have not 
shown exactly how these issues manifest. What types of friendships or contact impact 
cosmopolitan attitudes? How do various degrees of foreign travel (living abroad, working 
abroad, longer duration of stays, etc.) impact these attitudes? How do foreign exchange students 
on U.S. campuses impact these values? How can human rights advocacy organizations promote 
such attitudes and harness their political power? Given the evidence of cosmopolitan 
responsibility developed by this project, further research should focus more specifically on what 
actions are taken in furtherance of those values. How might the Responsibility to Protect be 
strengthened through individual civil engagement?  
Concluding Thoughts 
 
 We stand upon a precipice of possibility. The digital age has created the capacity for this 
generation to be the most informed and most engaged ever. Their impact can be felt on the other 
side of the world with just a few clicks on a keyboard. Human rights have long existed merely as 
an ideal, but the digital age creates a very real means by which they can be meaningfully 
advanced. From local government to global affairs, digital natives are positioned to be the 
generation that redefines participation. They are creators and consumers of information, 
witnesses and participants for world events, global travelers in person or online, and they desire a 
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better world. These digital citizens are transcending national boundaries while also being more 
engaged in their local communities. The only limitation to the digital frontier is the willingness 
of each person to act upon his or her beliefs.     
The digital age has provided a myriad of opportunities and obstacles that are only 
beginning to be understood. The struggle of the individual to find an identity amongst the 
community is an eternal one, but the modern circumstances have again changed these 
relationships. One of the unifying themes between civic engagement, populist nationalism, and 
cosmopolitan responsibility is the concept of dignity. The belief that every person has intrinsic 
worth through a shared humanity is the basis of human rights. Recognizing the dignity in others 
and striving for ways to protect and ensure that dignity is one of the reasons people enter into 
community. If everyone is equal in dignity, then it follows that everyone is deserving of those 
rights predicated on dignity and a society in which those rights have legal protections. 
Schopenhauer34 lamented the idea of dignity, which he saw as an empty vestige used to justify 
morality. He wrote, “Only this expression ‘Human Dignity,’ once it was uttered by Kant, became 
the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For behind that formula they 
concealed their lack, not to say, of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which possessed of 
an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their readers would be so pleased to see 
themselves invested with such a ‘dignity’ that they would be quite satisfied” (Schopenhauer, 
1840/1903/2014, p. 101). His criticism is based on the perceived axiomatic existence of dignity, 
which he saw to be vapid and egotistical. But the value of ideas like dignity derive their 
 
34 Schopenhauser believed compassion to be the foundation of morality. See Part III, Chapter V in The Basis of 
Morality.  
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substance from the truths they are able to describe. Dignity35 captures the essence of what 
connects us all.  
 It is necessary to address dignity because it contributes to understanding how digital 
natives relate to the world around them. Their conception of who ought to be protected and what 
their responsibility entails reflects their understanding of dignity. Fukuyama (2018) invokes 
Hegel, saying, “He argued that the only rational solution to the desire for recognition was 
universal recognition, in which the dignity of every human being was recognized. Universal 
recognition has been challenged ever since by other partial forms of recognition based on nation, 
religion, sect, race, ethnicity, or gender, or by individuals wanting to be recognized as superior” 
(p. xvi). Some people find dignity in the universal and some in the particular. Digital natives are 
developing an identity in a changing world. The forces of globalization, driven by digital 
technology, push some to embrace a cosmopolitan responsibility and others to retreat to the 
security of the known, through nationalism and isolationism. In many ways, this is a search for 
personal identity, and personal dignity. If digital natives can suspend their torpor and continue to 
be exposed to and learn from those from other countries, they have the chance to reshape the 
world in a way that has not been seen since the great wars of the 20th century. The digital age has 
created a means by which to amplify the individual voice as well as created forums to bring 
together individuals around a common cause. Political leaders, both domestic and foreign, can 
now appeal directly to populations, bypassing the gatekeepers of traditional media. Human rights 
abuses can now be streamed as they happen, reaching billions of people. Digital natives are 
primed to be able to react to these abuses in ways the international community of states has so far 
 
35 For a detailed examination of the concept of dignity, see Michael Rosen’s Dignity: It’s History and Meaning 
(2012). 
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mostly failed to do. The identity of the digital native is one of informed action, but only if they 
choose to embrace that responsibility.   
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Inter-item correlation matrix 
 
Items 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 PN1 PN2 PN3 PN4 PN5 PN6 PN7 
C1 -             
C2 .83 -            
C3 .52 .54 -           
C4 .37 .37 .39 -          
C5 .33 .35 .47 .67 -         
C6 .31 .34 .46 .47 .47 -        
PN1 -.17 -.18 -.11 -.23 -.17 -.12 -       
PN2 -.25 -.25 -.20 -.30 -.26 -.24 .31 -      
PN3 -.22 -.25 -.27 -.48 -.43 -.40 .39 .47 -     
PN4 -.19 -.18 -.14 -.39 -.29 -.12 .30 .36 .42 -    
PN5 -.17 -.19 -.15 -.17 -.16 -.17 .40 .29 .34 .24 -   
PN6 -.08 -.11 -.07 -.11 -.04 -.09 .33 .16 .24 .21 .28 -  




Corrected item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha if item is excluded –  
Cosmopolitanism Scale 
 
Items Corrected item-total correlation Alpha if item deleted 
C1 .65 .79 
C2 .67 .79 
C3 .64 .80 
C4 .59 .81 
C5 .60 .81 
C6 .52 .82 
 
  





Corrected item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha if item is excluded – 
Populist Nationalism Scale 
 
Items Corrected item-total correlation Alpha if item deleted 
PN1 .52 .72 
PN2 .47 .73 
PN3 .54 .71 
PN4 .49 .72 
PN5 .45 .73 
PN6 .42 .74 




Corrected item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha if item is excluded – 
Cosmopolitan – Populist Nationalism Scale 
 
Items Corrected item-total correlation Alpha if item deleted 
C1 .49 .81 
C2 .52 .81 
C3 .48 .82 
C4 .60 .80 
C5 .54 .81 
C6 .46 .82 
PN1 .45 .82 
PN2 .49 .81 
PN3 .61 .80 
PN4 .47 .81 
PN5 .40 .82 
PN6 .31 .83 
PN7 .35 .82 
 
  








Almond & Verba, 1963 ACS37, 2018 Gethings, 2018 
White 89.4% White  75.1% White 71.6% (597) 
Non-White 10.6% Black or African 
American 
14.1% Black or African 
American 
14.5% (121) 
 American Indian 
or Native Alaskan 
1.7% American Indian or 
Native Alaskan 
0.5% (4) 
Asian 6.8% Asian 3.6% (30) 
Native Hawaiian 
or Pacific Islander 
0.4% Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander 
0.1% (1) 
Other 5.5% 2+ Races 6.0% (50) 
 Other 3.6% (30) 






Almond & Verba, 1963 ACS, 2018 Gethings, 2018 
Male 46.9%  Male 49.2% Male 38.7% (323) 
Female 53.1% Female 50.8% Female 59.5% (496) 
  Other 0.8% (7) 
Prefer not to answer 1.0% (8) 




Region of Residence 
 
Almond & Verba, 1963 US & World Population Clock, 
201938 
Gethings, 2018 
Northeast 25.8% Northeast 17.1% Northeast 8.4% (70) 
Midwest 27.7% Midwest 20.8% Midwest 3.0% (25) 
South 32.4% South 38.3% Southeast 84.8% (707) 
West 14.1% West 23.9% Southwest 2.2% (18) 
  West Coast & HI, AK 1.0% (8) 
Pacific Northwest 0.0% (0) 
N = 970 N = 328,239,523 N = 828 
 
 
37 2018 American Community Survey 
38 https://www.census.gov/popclock/ 
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Table 4h.            Table 4i. 
 
Student Clubs            Other Organizations 
 
Activity   Organization  
Academic 24.1% (201)  Democratic Party 15.7% (131) 
Civil/Political 9.9% (83)  Republican Party 16.8% (140) 
Diversity/Cultural 11.5% (96)  Other Political Party 4.7% (39) 
Honor Societies 24.1% (201)  Church/Religious Groups 29.7% (248) 
Sports/Recreation 19.1% (166)  Sports/Athletics 15.2% (127) 
Religion Spiritual 12.5% (104)  Civic Engagement 5.6% (47) 
Other 9.2% (77)  Other 2.5% (21) 
 N = 834   N = 834 





 Impact of government 
 
Question: Please rank your agreement with the following statement: I 
believe the actions of government have a great deal of impact on my life. 
Strongly agree 38.2% (316) 
Somewhat agree 36.5% (302) 
Neither agree nor disagree 16.3% (135) 
Somewhat disagree 9.1% (75) 
Strongly disagree 0 
N = 828 
 
Table 5b:  
 
Elected Representatives Care 
 
Question: Please rank your agreement with the following statement: I 
believe my elected representatives care about my views. 
Strongly agree 8.3% (68) 
Somewhat agree 38.2% (315) 
Neither agree nor disagree 21.5% (177) 
Disagree 32.0% (264) 
Strongly disagree 0 
N = 824  
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Table 5c:  
 
Elected Representatives Respond 
 
Question: Please rank your agreement with the following statement: I 
believe my elected representatives will respond to me if I contact them. 
Strongly agree 5.5% (46) 
Somewhat agree 21.4% (177) 
Neither agree nor disagree 28.7% (238) 
Disagree 44.4% (368) 
Strongly disagree 0 





















AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER? 
172 
 
Appendix B: Survey 
 
 
ONLINE SURVEY CONSENT FORM  
 Study #18-479        
Title of Research Study: Digital Conscience: Civic Culture, Cosmopolitan Responsibility, and 
the Protection of Human Rights in the Digital Era      
 
Researcher's Contact Information:     
David Gethings  201-707-9711  Dgething@kennesaw.edu      
 
Introduction      
You are being invited to take part in a research study conducted by David Gethings, a PhD 
student in the International Conflict Management program at Kennesaw State University.  This 
research is being supervised by Dr. Volker Franke at KSU, who may be contacted at 
vfranke@kennesaw.edu. Before you decide to participate in this study, you should read this form 
and ask questions about anything that you do not understand.      
 
 Description of Project  
The purpose of the study is to understand how individuals view their responsibility to 
community, country, and world in an increasingly connected world.  With the power of digital 
technology and social media platforms, this research aims to evaluate participants’ connections 
to others.       
 
 Explanation of Procedures 
This survey will ask you a number of questions relating to civic and political participation, and 
about the diversity of your social media network.      
 
Time Required  
This survey should take approximately 10 to 15 minutes and is completely 
voluntary.  Participants may stop at any time without penalty.      
 
Risks or Discomforts      
There are no known risks or anticipated discomforts from taking this survey.      
 
Benefits      
While there may be no direct benefits to you for taking part in the study, the answers you provide 
will help researchers and policy-makers better understand the changing dynamics of civic 
engagement and responsibility for human rights.  As people become more connected through 
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social media, it becomes increasingly important to understand these connections and their impact 
on civic and political attitudes.       
 
Confidentiality      
The results of this participation will be anonymous.  No identifying information will be asked 
nor will any internet protocol addresses be collected.  Survey responses cannot be linked to the 
participants email address.     
 
 Inclusion Criteria for Participation     
 You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this study     Research at Kennesaw State 
University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional 
Review Board.  Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to the 
Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, 
GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268.      PLEASE PRINT A COPY OF THIS CONSENT 
DOCUMENT FOR YOUR RECORDS, OR IF YOU DO NOT HAVE PRINT CAPABILITIES, 
YOU MAY CONTACT THE RESEARCHER TO OBTAIN A COPY 
o I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project.  I understand that participation 
is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty.  (1)  
o I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the questions.  (2)  
 
Skip To: End of Survey If ONLINE SURVEY CONSENT FORM Study #18-479   Title of Research Study: Digital 
Conscience: Civic Cul... = I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the questions. 
 
Page Break  
  




1 Have you traveled internationally? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Have you traveled internationally? = Yes 
 




Display This Question: 
If Have you traveled internationally? = Yes 
 
1b During your travels internationally, have you made friends to whom you are still connected? 
o Yes  (1)  
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Being an American is important 
to me (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
International organizations are 
taking away too much power 
from the U.S. government (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Immigrants increase crime rates 
(3)  o  o  o  o  o  
I am willing to work abroad in 
another culture (4)  o  o  o  o  o  
I am open to living abroad in 
another culture (5)  o  o  o  o  o  
I enjoy learning more about 
different cultures in the world (6)  o  o  o  o  o  
I get upset when people do not 
want to offer help when those in 
need are foreigners (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I want to help those in need, even 
if they are from other countries 
(8)  o  o  o  o  o  
I believe we should solve 
problems at home before helping 
other countries (9)  o  o  o  o  o  
We should celebrate cultural 
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3 People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world.  To which of 
these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? Please rank your selections 
in the order in which you believe you belong to from most (1) to least (5). 
______ World (1) 
______ Continent (2) 
______ Country (3) 
______ State (4) 
______ Town (5) 
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4 People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources.  For each of 
the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, 
monthly, less than monthly, or never. 
 









Daily newspaper (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Printed magazine (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
Cable News (CNN, Fox, 
MSNBC, etc) (3)  o  o  o  o  o  
Local television news (4)  o  o  o  o  o  
Radio news (5)  o  o  o  o  o  
Talking with friends or 
colleagues (6)  o  o  o  o  o  
Online traditional news 
websites (CNN, Fox, 
MSNBC, etc) (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Online agenda-based news 
sites (Occupy Democrats, 
Infowars, Breitbart, etc) (8)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Email newsletters (9)  o  o  o  o  o  
Social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, etc) (10)  o  o  o  o  o  
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5 People often have differing views on the trustworthiness of news sources.  They may see some 
as very reliable and accurate, and others as biased and inaccurate.  Please rank your level of 
trust in each of these sources, with 1 being very trustworthy and 5 being not trustworthy at all. 
 
 




















Daily newspaper (1)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Printed magazine (2)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Cable News (CNN, Fox, 
MSNBC, etc) (3)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Local television news (4)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Radio news (5)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Talking with friends or 
colleagues (6)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Online traditional news 
websites (CNN, Fox, 
MSNBC, etc) (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Online agenda-based 
news sites (Occupy 
Democrats, Infowars, 
Breitbart, etc) (8)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Email newsletters (9)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, etc) (10)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Other (please specify) 
(11)  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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6 Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in domestic political affairs, with 1 
being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested. 
o 1 - not interested at all  (1)  
o 2 - not very interested  (2)  
o 3 - neither interested nor disinterested  (3)  
o 4 - interested  (4)  




7 Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in international/global affairs, with 
1 being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested. 
o 1 - not interested at all  (1)  
o 2 - not very interested  (2)  
o 3 - neither interested nor disinterested  (3)  
o 4 - interested  (4)  
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8 In political matters, people talk of "liberal" and "conservative."  How would you place your 
views on this scale, generally speaking? 
o Extremely Liberal  (1)  
o Liberal  (2)  
o Slightly Liberal  (3)  
o Middle of the Road  (4)  
o Slightly Conservative  (5)  
o Conservative  (6)  
o Extremely Conservative  (7)  
 
 
9 On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being not democratic at all and 10 being completely 
democratic, how democratically do you think the United States is being governed today? 
o 1 (not democratic at all)  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o 4  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
o 6  (6)  
o 7  (7)  
o 8  (8)  
o 9  (9)  
o 10 (completely democratic)  (10)  
 





 10 Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc) 
o Yes  (23)  
o No  (24)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc) = Yes 
 
11 On social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and others, people often share news 
stories, memes, and posts from others about political issues that are important to them.  Thinking 
about those news stories, memes, and posts from others that you have shared, please consider 








Rarely (4) Never (5) 
I will share a news story, 
meme, or post from others 
without checking the 
accuracy of the information 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I will share a news story, 
meme, or post from others 
without checking the 
accuracy of the information 
if I trust the original source 
(2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
When I see a story I am 
interested in, I will read 
about it from a variety of 
news sources (4)  
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12 Here are some of the forms of political action that people can take.  For each of these, please 












Signing a petition (1)  o  o  o  o  
Calling an elected official (6)  o  o  o  o  
Joining in boycotts (2)  o  o  o  o  
Attending peaceful demonstrations (3)  o  o  o  o  
Joining strikes (4)  o  o  o  o  
Other form of political action (please 
specify) (5)  o  o  o  o  
 
13 Thinking of the forms of political action you can take, please consider how many times you 








Rarely (4) Never (5) 
Signing a petition (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Joining in boycotts (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
Attending peaceful 
demonstrations (3)  o  o  o  o  o  
Joining strikes (4)  o  o  o  o  o  
Other form of political action 
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Display This Question: 
If Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc) = Yes 
 
14 Here are some forms of political action that people can perform online.  For each of these, 
please indicate if you have done any of these, would do them, or never would do them. 
 




Engaging in an online 
political discussion (2)  o  o  o  o  
Commenting on an 
elected official's social 
media post (4)  o  o  o  o  
Following an elected 
official on social media 
(5)  o  o  o  o  
Sharing a political news 
story (6)  o  o  o  o  
Sharing political memes 
(7)  o  o  o  o  
Emailing an elected 
official (13)  o  o  o  o  
Following traditional 
media accounts (CNN, 
Fox, MSNBC, etc) (9)  
o  o  o  o  
Following issue advocacy 
groups (NRA, Sierra 
Club, etc) (10)  
o  o  o  o  
Other form of online 
political action (please 
specify) (12)  
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Display This Question: 
If Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc) = Yes 
 
15 Thinking about those political actions that you can perform online, please consider how many 








Rarely (4) Never (8) 





o  o  o  o  o  
Commenting 
on an elected 
official's 
social media 
post(s) (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Emailing an 
elected 
official (9)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Sharing 
political news 
stories (5)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Sharing 
political 
memes (6)  o  o  o  o  o  




specify) (8)  
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16 Thinking about a time that you have have been politically active, or more politically active 
than usual, was there an event or an issue that made you take political action?  Please briefly 







17 When national elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or never? 
o Always  (1)  
o Usually  (2)  
o Sometimes  (6)  
o Never  (3)  
o I was not old enough to vote, but I plan to  (4)  




18 When state and local elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or never? 
o Always  (1)  
o Usually  (2)  
o Sometimes  (6)  
o Never  (3)  
o I was not old enough to vote, but I plan to  (4)  
o I was not old enough, but still do not plan to  (5)  
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I believe my 
elected 
representatives 
care about my 
views (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I believe my 
elected 
representatives 
will respond to 
me if I contact 
them (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I believe the 
actions of 
government 
have a great 
deal of impact 
on my life (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I believe I 
receive the 
same treatment 
under the law as 
anyone else 
would (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I believe 
politicians 
usually do what 
is in the best 
interests of the 
country (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I believe my 
country usually 
does what is in 
the best interest 
of the world (8)  








20 Please consider the following scenarios and possible action that could be taken. 
 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
I have never been in 
such a situation (3) 
Have you ever tried 
to break up a fight (1)  o  o  o  
Have you ever used 
your cell phone to 
record an abuse (3)  
o  o  o  
Have you ever helped 
at the scene of an 
accident (4)  
o  o  o  
Have you ever called 
the police to help 
someone (5)  o  o  o  
Have you ever 
defended a stranger 
who was being 
bullied in person (6)  
o  o  o  
Have you ever 
defended a stranger 
who was being 
bullied online (7)  
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21 You may have heard stories of widespread human suffering in places like Syria, Rwanda, 
Bosnia, Darfur, and other places.  Sometimes countries are unwilling or unable to protect their 
own citizens.  Thinking of these scenarios, please rate your agreement with the following 
















or food aid 
(6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Use military 
intervention 
with the help 
of the United 
Nations (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Use military 
intervention 
with the help 
of other 
countries (2)  





support (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Use military 
intervention 
if the country 
is important 
to the US (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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22 When you think about the people you know in person, approximately how many of your close 
friends are from other countries? 
o None  (1)  
o A small few  (3)  
o Some  (4)  
o About half  (6)  
o A majority  (7)  
 
 
23 Again thinking about the people you know in person, approximately how many of your 
friends (not just close friends, but all friends) are from other countries? 
o None  (1)  
o A small few  (2)  
o Some  (3)  
o About half  (4)  
o A majority  (5)  
 
24 Now thinking about your social media contacts, those you have never met or only met briefly 
in person, approximately how many of them are from a different country? 
o None  (1)  
o A small few  (2)  
o Some  (3)  
o About half  (4)  
o A majority  (5)  
o I do not use social media  (6)  
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25 What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Other  (3)  




26 Which category below includes your age? 
o 21 or under  (1)  
o 22-37  (2)  
o 38-53  (3)  
o 54-72  (4)  




27 Are you a U.S. citizen? 
o Yes  (1)  
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28 Which of the following best describes your ethnicity? 
o White  (1)  
o Black or African American  (2)  
o American Indian or Alaska Native  (3)  
o Asian  (4)  
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  (5)  
o Two or more races  (6)  
o Other  (7)  
 
 
29 What is your classification in college? 
o Freshman/First Year  (1)  
o Sophomore  (2)  
o Junior  (3)  
o Senior  (4)  
o Graduate Student  (5)  
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30 Which of these fields best includes your major or anticipated major? 
o Arts and Humanities  (1)  
o Biological Sciences  (2)  
o Business  (3)  
o Education  (4)  
o Engineering  (5)  
o Physical Sciences  (6)  
o Other Professions  (7)  
o Social Sciences  (8)  
o Undeclared/Unsure  (10)  




31 In what region of the country have you spent most of your life? 
o Northeast  (1)  
o Southeast  (2)  
o Midwest  (3)  
o Southwest  (4)  
o West Coast (including Hawaii & Alaska)  (5)  
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32 How would you classify the community in which you spent most of your life? 
o Urban  (1)  
o Rural  (2)  




33 How would you classify the community in which you live now? 
o Urban  (1)  
o Rural  (2)  




34 Please indicate if you are a member of any of the following types of student clubs. (Select all 
that apply) 
o Academic  (1)  
o Civil/Political  (2)  
o Diversity/Cultural  (3)  
o Honor Societies  (4)  
o Sports/Recreation  (5)  
o Religion/Spiritual  (6)  
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35 Please indicate if you are a member of any of the following types of organizations outside of 
school. (Select all that apply) 
o Democratic Party  (1)  
o Republican Party  (2)  
o Other Political Party  (3)  
o Church/Religious Group  (4)  
o Sports/Athletics  (5)  
o Civic Engagement  (6)  
o Other (please specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
